Identity:
Beyond Tradition and McWorld Neoliberalism

Identity:
Beyond Tradition and McWorld Neoliberalism

Edited by

Brian Michael Goss and Christopher Chávez

CAMBRIDGE
SCHOLARS
PUBLISHING

Identity: Beyond Tradition and McWorld Neoliberalism,
Edited by Brian Michael Goss and Christopher Chávez

This book first published 2013

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN (10): 1-4438-4747-X, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4747-6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction ix
Brian Michael Goss and Christopher Chávez

PART I: MASS MEDIATED IDENTITY

Chapter One 3
"Yob Rule": The Us and Them Binary in *The Daily Telegraph*'s Coverage of the 2011 Riots
Brian Michael Goss (*Saint Louis University – Madrid*)

Chapter Two 27
Imag(in)ed Diversity: Migration in European Cinema
Arne Saeys (*University of Southampton*)

Chapter Three 47
Total Aliens or Humans Just Like Us? Ambivalent Images of Foreigners in Hybrid Short Stories in Sightseeing
Sompatu Vungthong (*King Mongkut's University of Technology Thonburi*)

PART II: IDENTITY REFRACTED THROUGH NATIONS AND TRANS-NATIONS

Chapter Four 65
Global Latino: Corporate Advertising Discourses and the Re-imagination of Space
Christopher Chávez (*University of Oregon*)

Chapter Five 85
¿*Visca España*? *La Selección*, National Metaphor and the 2010 World Cup
Mateo Szlapek-Sewillo (*University of Adelaide*)

Chapter Six 111
Kratos without *Demos*? European Identity and the Prospects for a Democratic Europe
Francisco Seoane Pérez (*University of Castilla-La Mancha, Cuenca Campus*)

Chapter Seven 133
Politics in the Age of Blogging: The Internet as a New Medium of Change and the Bridge into the Iranian Diaspora
Pardis Shafafi (*University of St Andrews*)

Chapter Eight 155
La Dolce Vita: Creative Re-imaginings of Italianicity
Paul Venzo (*Deakin University*)

PART III: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

Chapter Nine 171
Matchmakers as Socialization Agents in the Process of Reconstructing a New Identity for Jewish Singles
Ya'arit Bokek-Cohen (*Ariel University of Samaria*)

Chapter Ten 191
Rethinking Agency: Pornified Discourses and Shifting Gendered Subjectivities
Antonio García Gómez (*University of Alcalá de Henares*)

Contributors 213

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As this volume emerged out of an ephemeral event – a conference convened 19-21 April 2012 on the Saint Louis University-Madrid, Spain Campus – we first seek to acknowledge, enduringly and in print, our colleagues on the event's Organizing Committee. Daniel Chornet and Pamela Rolfe sifted through 170 abstracts while Daniel also designed and maintained the conference's webpage. We nod with appreciation to our administrators and support staff that furnished assistance and encouragement, notably Dean Paul Vita, Director of Finance Vicky Villarreal and her assistant Jessica Erwin. Fairouz Medjahed (Information Technology) and the team of Fernando Béjar and Ángel García (Marketing and Communications) furnished valuable conference infrastructure such as payment web pages, programs and posters. Juliet Arata and Isabel Hurtado of Library Services scanned documents on command and lent their space to the event. Where getting the space prepared is concerned, Samuel Hernandez's team of *bedeles* fashioned a comfortable physical environment. Colleagues who directed panels are also in our debt. Our conscientious panel chairs include Kevin G. Barnhurst, Daniel Chornet, Anne Dewey, "Rad Man" Renzo Llorente, Fabiola Martínez Rodríguez, Anne McCabe, T. Jeff Miley, Kristine Muñoz, and Agustín Reyes Torres. Students who assisted at the event with zeal and distinction include Laura de Socarraz Novoa and Kimberly Cacicedo O'Connor. Our keynote speaker, James Curran, got the conference off to a rousing and provocative opening and maintained a profile throughout the event. The highly positive feedback and the "vibes" that this small-to-medium sized conference generated was a group effort as it engenders considerable cooperation to pull off such an event.

In producing this volume, we thank Carol Koulikourdi at Cambridge Scholars Publishing for taking on our project. Friends and colleagues who composed detailed reviews of chapters helped our contributors to "raise their games". As editors, we thank the following people for agreeing to review chapters and offering their generous and constructive insights in areas of expertise: Shelly N. Blair, Matthew Carlson, Daniel Chornet, Anne Dewey, and Anne McCabe.

INTRODUCTION

BRIAN MICHAEL GOSS
AND CHRISTOPHER CHÁVEZ

Whether one asks for one or not, and regardless of how it may be locally construed and experienced, identity gravitates to the subject. In turn, an identity may be mistaken or reified (for example, a longtime resident of a tourist-laden country being misapprehended as a tourist) or invested with unwanted and even specious preconceptions (that need not be pejorative to be aggravating). While identity is also a regularly invoked rallying call for celebration, it is currently an unhappy concept. Identity may be construed as caught between the conflicting logics of unyielding right-wing, essentialist atavism, on one side; and, on the other, identity is assumed to melt into neoliberal globalization as an ostensible universal solvent of identities. The thesis is not new, as Benjamin Barber reduced it to the "Jihad vs. McWorld" aphorism in a 1996 book of that title. The gloss presented by Barber's dichotomy, nevertheless, maintains a hold on imagining identity.

As subjects and as academics, we also seek exits from the *cul-de-sacs* of assuming either static identity atavism or identity as governed by the common currency of manic commodification. Instead, we assume that out of the cultural materials at hand – necessarily not of our own making, and in many cases with distinct constraints in how they may be taken up – subjects arrange and re-arrange these materials to fashion finely calibrated identities. The question thusly begged is: How does one mend the many tears in the theoretical fabric to advance empowering concepts of identity that account for its (often un-empowering!) real world exigencies?

Two vignettes

Moving away from airy abstractions, what is at stake in pinning down what identity is – and what it is not? Consider two vignettes.

The first vignette revolves around a 55 second audiovisual sequence that is now available on YouTube long after its original movement into

circulation ("I Spy TV Opening Theme Version 1" 2010). While the term "revolutionary" is widely over-used, this audiovisual material can make a claim for such. Specifically, the sequence is the opening credits of the US prime time television action-adventure series *I Spy* (originally broadcast from 1965 to 1968). The credits open with a stylized sequence of an animated figure playing tennis in silhouette as the names of a series of high profile cities (*e.g.*, Berlin, Madrid, Tokyo) roll horizontally around him. The silhouetted figure pivots, kinetic codes shift from exhibitionist tennis player to that of covert agent, and the racket morphs into a gun. After the animated part of the sequence ends, actor Robert Culp lights and lobs a bomb toward the camera/spectator – explosive! – that inaugurates a montage of shots from the upcoming episode of *I Spy*. During the credit sequence, a title card transmits the name of Culp's co-star, Bill Cosby, who is prominent in the montage.

While the credits convey some of the 1960s sensibility of visual cool, where are the hints of the revolutionary in this? *I Spy* made its debut in the US' national televisual schoolroom in 1965, during the second decade of the medium's ubiquity in the North American home – and it represented the first time that an African-American (Cosby) was featured in a lead role, with all of the anxieties that this prompted for Euro-American producers and the majority audience (Kackman 2005: pp. 113-143). In the same decade, a few short years before *I Spy*'s debut, a child born in Honolulu, Hawaii was destined to become the US' first African-American president. Connecting these two roughly contemporaneous events in a straight line simplifies an ineffably complicated (and ongoing) narrative. One can nonetheless speculate: In the cultural "war of maneuver" (Jones 2006) that eschews the direct frontal assault on the seat of prevailing authority, President Barack Obama traversed the cultural platforms forged in materially resonant moments such as, *e.g.*, Jackie Robinson's arrival in major league baseball in 1947 and Cosby's in *I Spy*. Politics followed on the platforms established in popular culture, in other words! Nevertheless, Cosby (and others who followed in short order, such as *Mission: Impossible* regular Greg Morris) were harassed by traditionalist chauvinists through abusive letters to the television networks. Echoes of these rear-guard actions continue in pathetic, rag-tag campaigns in late 2012 to secede from the US following Obama's successful 2012 re-election campaign. One may conclude that, while revanchist chauvinists continue to inflict damage, their crusade is an elegiac one, animated by the raging "romanticism" of the dead end and the lost cause that few others lament.

Discussion of the first vignette may seem optimistic, and teleologically so, as utopian ideals of equality push relentlessly against harsh realities. The "dark side" that arises around the issue of identity may, nevertheless, be illustrated through some snapshots of atavistic dystopia. On 22 July 2011, in the heart of one of the world's most prosperous and egalitarian societies, Anders Behring Breivik embarked on a terrorist rampage. It began in Oslo, with bombings of government buildings that murdered eight people. The massacre then continued on the nearby island of Utøya where, using firearms, Breivik murdered 69 more people. Most of Breivik's victims on the island were teenagers attending the summer camp of Norway's ruling Labor Party. Concurrent with the paroxysms of mass violence, Breivik released a "manifesto". His rationalizations for mass murder present a roll call of right-wing obsessions as they intersect with identity. These obsessions include ultra-nationalism and racial supremacy, while the manifesto pitches against feminism, Islam, multiculturalism and "cultural Marxism" (Tietze 2012, 24 August). While Breivik conducted his terrorist campaign alone, his stated ideology contained germs of right-inflected but "mainstream" discourse.

As with other chauvinists, Breivik's take on identity may be called fundamentalist, white-knuckle literal, as serious as a heart attack. In this view, bodily-marked ascriptive identity *is* essence and it *is* unswervingly indexical.[1] While the violent essentialism that Breivik apotheosizes is increasingly marginal, it is consequential in literal life and death terms when it erupts. Moreover, as Corey Robin argues (2012), a chronic state of brooding grievance and loss is part and parcel to the political right's self-definition – and assures that pushes for revanchist reaction will never be exhausted of fuel. Robin theorizes that, for the right, every moment is the adrenaline surge of "high noon" and a cultural Battle of the Alamo is convened on every corner in perpetuity.

The moment of commodification and the market

The contrasting vignettes of revolutionary implications embedded within the everyday (such as TV) and right wing atavistic reaction are but two (dramatic and contrasting) moments that illuminate the play of identity. Let us now step further back and consider another paradigm by which identity may be organized and understood; one that may be called classically liberal or neoliberal in its emphasis on capitalist market relations and economic reductionism. In this view, collective identity has been reconfigured from its traditional specifications according to marketplace logic. Raymond Williams (1980) argues that the conversion of persons into consumers is a fundamental

characteristic of modern society and that our inclination to describe members of capitalist society in terms of their economic capacity reflects the marketization of everyday life. Susan Strasser (2003) captures the deeply grounded, materially resonant economic logic behind this shift in subjectivity when she marks the conversion in the economic base from artisanal production to conglomeration. The milieu of craftspeople and family-grounded entrepreneurialism in villages and urban neighborhoods, selling necessities to people they knew, was supplanted. In its place, transient and alienated exchanges between an employee working for someone else and the consumer became the norm. Mass production and the rise of retail chains, in this view, generate a form of a mass subject, among its many other product lines.

As market logic has gained expression, identity has had less to do with ascriptive identities that have traditionally been associated with spatial concepts and more to do with patterns of consumption. While a long way from traditional essentialism, class and economic status regiment identity by the rules of its own regime. Moreover, a paradox arises. Right wing atavism essentializes – exaggerates and reifies group differences – so that We are irreducibly distinct from all of Them. At the same time, the classically liberal paradigm reduces identity to (literally) a matter of common currency that is concerned with "diversity" principally for the instrumental purpose of isolating the market niche for a commercial appeal.

While the market may be relatively liberalized within the register of ascriptive identity – the color that matters is that of the money, and not of the skin – it is a bare-knuckled taskmaster, particularly in its relatively unbridled neoliberal form (Harvey 2005; Duménil & Levy 2011; Klein 2007). The deep class striation associated with neoliberalism's form of authoritarianism is no less neo-feudal in its ferocity for a partial detachment from ascriptive identities.

The moment of the nation

One potentially enabling paradigm places little emphasis on ascriptive aspects of identity. In this view, identity is a construction, an achievement, a pastiche, a series of performances even; one may strategically enact, disavow, or re-articulate an identity on these logics.[2] For the theorist of this persuasion, the mass media in which contemporary societies are saturated present a key site in collating identities. Dick Hebdige (1991)'s seminal research on musical sub-cultures in mid-twentieth century Britain

furnishes an exemplar of identities cobbled together from the *bricolage* of culture and its everyday objects (combs, gel, safety pins).

In a similarly media-driven vein, consider identity as implicated in the construction of the nation. In an often quoted passage, Benedict Anderson conjures the newspaper reader: "the ceremony he [or she] performs" with a copy of the daily tribune "is being replicated by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he [or she] is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notions" (1983: p. 46). The mass mediated imagined community, in Anderson's phrase, can be convened *as if* it is the traditionally "real" community of the village, via mass ritual enacted in parallel – and to powerful effect when very loose ties are multiplied by multitudes. The tendency to construct imagined communities are likely heightened with the rise (and intensification) of polyglot nations that demand the production and maintenance of common points of reference out of which an identity may be cobbled together.

So, it is settled: nations, one contemporary fundamental of an identity are mere bureaucratic constructions that inadvertently throw off an efflux of plastic and malleable identities. In this view, national identities summon an orderly narrative where there is none – and also gloss over the raft of aberrant subjectivities and subalterns, while generating possibilities for identity by *bricolage* within the nation's seams. At the same time, positing the nation as a form of contrivance is too pat and does not account for the lived experience of identity within it. National identity is regularly experienced as ripe, rich, super-organic, palpably real in ways that resist dismissal as "false consciousness". In other words, even if the nation is a contrivance, it has largely succeeded in generating the self-fulfilling aura of transhistoric truth around it. Profound ambivalences are, nevertheless, regularly insinuated into the subject who may exalt the abstracted ideal of the nation – while (paradoxically) despising most of his or her neighbors (see: the case of Breivik). And, in parallel, even a nation's discontents may employ its symbols and tropes to register that discontent, to even exhort that "*¡Spain is not truly Spanish enough!"* (or, insert name of any other nation).

Leftists in the Gramscian tradition are particularly alert to the paradox of the artificiality of the nation, alongside its palpably experienced texture that is felt in living through the "national popular" (Hall 1988; Jones 2006). Here, one is beckoned to participate and embody the national identity in a hands-on manner. Far from repressing expression or imposing onerous demands, nationalism seduces subjects' participation and animates them to say and do more for the collective. Notice that the potentially progressive impulses that drive identity construction can be – indeed, often

are – hijacked by a re-inscription of atavism when inserted into national identity. Mobilizations through appeals to a monolithic version of "Us" against "Them" in preface to wars of aggression are an obvious instance (Goss 2013). In these moments, rather than being a creative achievement, identity is proximal to chauvinism against designated Others, a matter of prejudice and not pride.

The moment of transnational identity

While Anderson's *Imagined Communities* was published merely 30 years ago, its influential conceptualizations have already been partly undercut by galloping globalization. Since 1983, the roster of alphabet soup organizations has proliferated (EU, WTO … and also MTV, FIFA, D&G), the reach of global events has spiked (from the World Cup to deadly terrorist "propaganda of the deed"), and the flows of diasporic populations has intensified. Globalization implicates distinct but articulated domains of activity: finance, mobility, communication and media. In the light of these globalizing forces, scholars are reconsidering the persistence of national identity. In this vein, Manuel Castells (1994) suggests that major European cities have become nodal centers of the new global economy. These metropoles are the locus of a "European dream" of peace, prosperity and political recognition that immigrants have risked death in hazardous transit to reach, as Jeremy Harding (2012) documents in harrowing, indignantly marshaled detail. These circumstances are profoundly impacting the nature of collective identity and the nation in Europe, with their attendant re-constitutions of what it is taken to be European – and also with (as noted) attendant episodes of backlash of varying degrees of ferocity.

The impact of media and communication further illustrate the new transnational terrain as concerns the contours of the nation. By the turn of the millennium, Mike Davis (2000) theorized the rise of "transnational suburbs" between the US and Latin America. These have been enabled by the "communications revolution" and its concomitants (*e.g.*, low cost airlines, video telephony) that have re-fashioned space as de-literalized and de-territorialized. Slices of the US harbor umbilical connections with Mexico or El Salvador while, simultaneously, the US' domestic spaces are re-visioned and re-shaped. These connections are arguably more vigorous than a century ago when immigrants left a homeland on a boat and never looked back (except, perhaps, through the lens of distanced nostalgia). Since Davis first minted the concept, countless other transnational suburbs have come into view, for example, between Spain and Romania.

Despite the pressures exerted through globalization, the nation and its imagined community are not set to be retired to the museum as relics of the past. As Armand Mattelart (2000) observes, strong national states are not an inhibitor *but a necessary pre-condition* for the advent of globalization. In this view, nations are the links that, when articulated, constitute the chain, or the nodes that compose the world-encompassing network. At the same time, recent claims that globalization has withered away as a casualty of ongoing economic disturbances (Stewart 2013, 18 January) are palatable to observers who hold that it is mainly a vehicle of exploitation – as well as pleasing the identity essentialists who resent global integration's impact on their idealized and hermetically sealed community. For good and/or ill, globalization is a cake that cannot be readily unbaked and parsed into its constituent ingredients, even if there are oscillations in how "oven baked" solid it is. In the light of the ongoing dialectic between nation and trans-nation, this volume will engage with teasing out tensions between the national and transnational.

The moment of subjectivity

Theorizing identity in some of the terms discussed above, one can construe it as a collage of materials from the cultural agora (or, if one prefers, the cultural garage sale). Prominent components of the collage include the "usual suspects" of gender, race, confessional status, class, and ethnicity. In this view, sub-cultural capital is also assumed to be an important constituent part of identity (*e.g.*, punker, vegan, Red Sox fan). The resultant conceptualization of identity emphasizes that it is in flux, a creative work that is never quite finished. This theorization spins away from the accent on ascriptive identities and is hostile toward essentialism, while it champions the contingencies of cultural constructionism. As such, it is a long way from Breivik and other right wing obsessives fixated with *you* – and the problem of how "'to perfect *you* personally, to perfect *you* politically, to perfect *you* religiously, or racially, or geographically'" (emphasis added; Amos Oz, quoted in Trimble 1998) in line with their rigid, bullying demands about what part you must unswervingly play.

Once again, is the matter settled by finally reducing identity to an individual, monadic subject absorbed in exercising classically liberal identity "choices"? Not really. Even in convening the "Identity, Culture, and Communication" conference in spring 2012 in which this volume is anchored, constructions of identity came into play for even relatively privileged people in unexpected ways – and hurtled us back to negotiating the more fixed categories that the conference's Organizing Committee

generally eschews. For instance, depending on a conference presenter's nationality, he or she experienced an easier or more difficult time gaining entry into Spain and the European Union. And this was not merely a question of geographical distance. European Union citizens who participated in the conference were, of course, able to glide through member states' borders largely without friction. By law, transit was also facilitated (no need for visas for visits of up to several months) for citizens of some of Britain's former colonies; to wit, the nations of USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, that were all represented at the conference, despite their spatial remove from Madrid. These societies, where "excess" European population settled centuries ago, have been long dominated by European descendents and are today among the wealthiest nations on the globe. By contrast, citizens of Britain's biggest and most important former colony, India, do not enjoy the same privilege of entering the European Union without a visa. Other potential participants who had been admitted to the conference had their aspirations to participate thwarted not by the absence of a stamped piece of paper, but by the lack of a state-backed document of another kind. In other words, a lack of money or subsidy effectively kept these scholars segregated from colleagues and peers with abiding academic interest in identity.

Even considered in terms of organizing the conference on which this volume is based, identity may also have more subtle calibrations. In its deliberations, the conference's Organizing Committee admitted a minority of the applicants (38 percent) from a pool of almost 200. While we do not harbor neurosis about our decision-making calculus, there is no doubt that our "gate keeping" judgments were at least partly driven by seeking applicants who satisfied the template of academia that we internalized from graduate training in North American "Research I" universities. Applicants who were able to fit this template, who were fluent in the academic idiom that we transact, were advantaged. The resultant conference roster was impressive in terms of original topics and the far-flung nations in which participants work. The hoped-for diversity was achieved! Nevertheless, shot through each of our invited participants was a form of academic training as a constituent part of identity, one as internationalized in its own way as the styles (tattoos, piercings) of the rising MTV generation that populates our courses at the highly international Saint Louis University-Madrid Campus that hosted the conference. In this view, we at once presided over diversity – *and* sought out "people (somewhat, more-or-less) like us" in non-ascriptive terms. While our deliberations were by no means a species of chauvinism, they were surely and subtly shaded gate-keeping behaviors that reaffirmed what

we as subjects understand to be "legitimate" approximations of academic discourse.

Despite emerging acceptance of identity as a collage, ascriptive identities still retain compelling force, even if violent fanaticism, such as that of Breivik, presents a sickening symptom of backlash against a more deeply integrating world. Nevertheless, this volume will place a relatively strong accent on nonascriptive identities in a departure from 1990s-style theorization of identity that wagered heavily on gender and race. Chauvinism that surrounds ascriptive identities is by no means set to be retired, despite the courageous and partly successful efforts of feminists and anti-racists to alter the prevailing climate. This volume assays, however, to explore territory that may generally be less familiar (even if it is by no means without its precedents). While cognizant of the qualifications on conceptualizing identity that have been rehearsed here, the volume's *portmanteau* provides eclectic snapshots of a variegated global milieu. The advantage of this approach is that the studies presented in each chapter drill down into particular sites to illuminate case studies. Moreover, the volume's center of gravity is not North American-centric and its discourse makes distinctive contributions to knowledge for scholars in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

Each chapter is permeated with an emphasis on identity and culture as part of the quotidian with its practical concomitants. It is here in the crevices of everyday practice that ideology arises, subjectivities coalesce, and disparate and even contradictory materials of identities consolidate, fused together in the white heat of practice (Althusser 1994; Eagleton 1991, 1994).

Overview of the volume

In the light of the vertiginous complexity of the topic, this volume is parsed into three sections in order to organize the reader's experience and group chapters to the extent possible within a recognizable scheme. These sections are, in order, "Mass-Mediated Identity", "Identity Refracted Through Nations and Trans-Nations", and "Social Aspects of Identity".

Alongside the convulsions of new media, the "old" ("heritage" or "incumbent") mass media continue to reach audiences of millions – and to colonize large swaths of the ostensibly new media territory (Curran 2012). Brian Michael Goss' "Yob Rule" leads the volume off and also opens the discussion of mass media as it intersects with identity. Goss confronts a journalistic discourse on identity that defies the empowering conceptualizations that this introduction assays to map. In particular, Goss

analyzes the discourse in the United Kingdom's *The Daily Telegraph* with respect to riots that convulsed England, 6-10 August 2011, at a cost of five lives and an estimated £500 million. The *Telegraph* – colloquially referred to as the "*Tory*-graph" for its rightward lean to the UK's Conservative party – was selected for study as it is recognized as "quality press" within the ensemble of British daily papers. A corpus of 147 articles (news reports, editorials, letters to the editor) published between 10 August and 31 December 2011 informs the analysis. After introducing theories pertinent to the discursive construction of "Us" and "Them", Goss characterizes the *Telegraph's* right-leaning politics as gaining expression through otherizing discourse – albeit in largely non-ascriptive ideological and class terms. By contrast, the newspaper was relatively muted on matters of bodily marked (ascriptive) identity such as race. Immigrant behavior is, moreover, praised by the *Telegraph* during the riots, albeit in patronizing terms that sentimentalize immigrants as what the right wants them to be (static and monolithically wedded to tradition). In the *Telegraph*'s discourse on the riots, the left is a monolithic and made-to-order "Them" while police are constructed as unambiguous avatars of "Us" in uniform. Nonetheless, the ostentatiously pro-police *Telegraph* editorially hurtled far beyond what at least some police figures considered proportionate for public order (for example, with respect to use of rubber bullets). Moreover, the *Telegraph*'s unequivocal if idealized support for the police trashes its ostensibly conservative distrust of the State.

In Chapter 2, entitled "Imag(in)ed Diversity", Arne Saeys orients to the big screen in Europe; in particular, filmmakers from extra-European backgrounds who are infusing the continent's industries with new impetuses. Saeys prefaces his discussion with a detailed rebuttal to Hamid Naficy's "accented cinema" thesis (2001) on the grounds that it is reductionist and over-simplifying as it effaces the national contexts in which multiculturalism is becoming more deeply inscribed. However well-meaning a concept such as accented cinema may be, it depends upon *a priori* categories that necessarily put familiar othering tropes into motion. In completing the conceptual pivot away from "accented cinema", Saeys surveys European film production that transcends the Maghrebi and Turkish roots of its makers and traces its trajectory from the margins to a place within the mainstream. In crafting this argument, Saeys develops case studies of two signature national film industries on the European continent. Specifically, Saeys argues that Maghrebi influences on French cinema or Turkish ones in Germany are not a question of "accent" – but of actual embedding of the newer arrivals into the representation of the continent to itself on screen. The chapter conveys the aspiration that what

Naficy calls "accented cinema" should, alternatively, be regarded as just another aspect of the quotidian in shepherding work-a-day European realities of diverse lives to the screen.

In completing the volume's first section, Sompatu Vungthong's "Total Aliens or Humans Just Like Us?" gazes on a Guttenbergian mass medium that is often overlooked. She plays on the observation that when we think of images of foreign visitors in the media, we usually think of the discourses of news, advertisements, or the screen industries of film and television. However, she argues, literary work can be seen as a medium for transmitting ideology. Her chapter pulls on this thread by examining the discourse around foreigners in Rattawut Lapcharoensap's *Sightseeing*. The book is a well-received collection of short stories originally written in English by a young Thai writer and channels current attitudes of Thais towards foreigners. More specifically, Vungthong asks how western tourists, expatriates, Filipino and Cambodian immigrants are portrayed alongside Thais on their home turf. In doing so, Vungthong works through the tradition of linguistic analysis (*e.g.*, Reisigl and Wodak 2001) that employs referential and predicational strategies. She also critiques some of the implicit assumptions of discourse analysis. In parsing how foreigners are linguistically constructed through the qualities attributed to them, Vungthong develops a concept of identity that assumes no inner core or essence to dictate its contours. Consistent with this view, she finds that fixed or stable images of foreigners in *Sightseeing* are finally elusive. To be sure, foreigners are represented according to Thais' stereotypes with their attendant simplistic and negative notions. On the other hand, significant slippages are evident and foreigners are also and finally "people like us", regardless of their initially exotic or alien qualities.

The second section of the volume is concerned with tensions that surround the nation and identity in an era of intensifying transnationalism; a topic that has been rehearsed earlier in this introduction. The era of globalization has in important ways reconfigured, but not effaced, identities nested in the national and demands careful analysis. Christopher Chávez begins this section with a focus on the global advertising industry and the practice of market segmentation. In "Global Latino", Chávez argues that as transnational corporations have become increasingly important conduits for global flows, there is a need to rethink the relationship between physical space, collective identity and the profit motive. The global expansion of the advertising industry necessarily requires discursive tools that enable these institutions to imagine their dominion, but as Anderson (1983) and Mignolo (2005) point out, such devices are ideologically driven. With a specific focus on the discursive (re)construction

of Latin America, Chávez provides an ideological critique of institutional discourses exchanged between the global advertising industry and an audience of financial stakeholders. In his analysis, Chávez demonstrates how internal advertising discourses have inherited colonial discourses by positioning Latin America as a resource to be exploited by more powerful, globalizing bodies. In doing so, physical space has been abstracted and reconstituted for strategic purposes. Chávez also argues that political, ethnic and class divisions that exist between nation-states are suppressed in an effort to achieve the economic goals of the advertising firms' networks.

The chapter that follows executes a pivot from the keyboards of political dissidents to politics on the grassy fields of sport. In "*¿Visca España*?", Mateo Szlapek-Sewillo probes Spain's triumph in the 2010 Féderation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup as concerns its implications for a re-crafting the long-problematic issue of national identity in Spain. Szlapek-Sewillo takes theoretical loans from Anderson (the "imagined community", 1983), Billig ("banal nationalism", 1995) and Hobsbawm ("the invention of tradition", 1983). The chapter analyzes the Spanish national team *vis-à-vis* its construction as a national metaphor that still carries the cultural baggage of the Franco regime (1936-1975) that continues to burden "national" Spanish symbols long after Spain's successful re-invention during its Transition. Szlapek-Sewillo also fleshes out a process of cultural reclamation and applies it to the Catalan and Basque regional movements that have partly gained expression on the football pitch. At the same time, reinforcement of regional identity through football has become complicated by the heavy Catalan representation on Spain's World Cup-winning national team. Szlapek-Sewillo's timely analysis draws on an array of materials and suggests contemporary Spaniards' willingness to simultaneously hold and negotiate regional and national alliances (thereby frustrating demands from right wing Spaniards for the monolith of the nation to efface the regional). Szlapek-Sewillo concludes on the cautionary note that, almost three years after Spain's victory in South Africa, economic crisis and the resumption of old sporting and regional tensions may well have complicated a chance for further national reconciliation.

While a number of chapters address representation in media, in "*Kratos* without *Demos*?", Francisco Seoane Pérez orients to formal representation as it plays out in the political arena. In particular, Seoane observes that debates over the "democratization" of the European Union (EU) have run mostly along procedural lines (such as increasing the power of the European Parliament). However, these discourses have been largely and

conspicuously silent on the intimate linkage between nationalism and democracy. Moreover, debate about Europe has been largely indifferent to the need for a palpable and real European *demos* in order to sustain a democratic Europe. The reasons for this anemic version of democracy are, first, the absence of a common language of public communication. Second, Seoane posits, the structural features of the political "monster" that is the European Union are structurally at odds with democratic engagement. In particular, the EU is constructed on neo-functionalist principles (through the integration of inter-related policy areas) with an admixture of technocracy and diplomacy that pivots away from dialogue with the public. One of the governing principles of the European Union is "subsidiarity", hailed by some scholars as "federalist" for largely fencing off national affairs from supranational intervention; yet, at the same time, it renders the supranational authorities invisible to the average European citizen. The subsidiarity principle thereby entrenches the disconnection between EU institutions and the European people(s). All of these considerations generate barriers to closer European integration that could be cultivated through a widely-held feeling of being European in more than vague and nominal terms.

Recent waves of media are also implicated in the tensions between nation and trans-nation. In a case study of Iranian dissidence and diaspora, Pardis Shafafi's "Politics in the Age of Blogging" stresses new media, its intersection with the nation and with anti-government activism. Her contribution is timely since Iranian bloggers are some of the world's most prolific and scathing critics of the regime that they seek to oust. Shafafi argues that new media discourse, such as blogging, has transformed notions of risk and efficacy that are associated with political activism. Moreover, under the surveillance state that has come to characterize modern day Iran, internet activism is an indispensible beachhead against the right wing regime – and it is at least as risk-laden as more traditional forms of activism. Re-working Anderson (1983), Shafafi observes that the oppositional front that the internet has facilitated enables activists of the political diaspora to communicate with, relate to, and understand the country that they left behind in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Shafafi's research is informed by a community of political immigrants from Iran who had been politically marginalized for years in exile and have located a new media arena for participation that appears to yield results in real time – and that has partly collapsed generations and geographies of difference. The chapter explores the dissidents' dialogue, with consideration for the consequences of what it may portend for political movements in Iran and elsewhere. While Shafafi is cognizant of

the limitations of cyber-activism, as elaborated in sophisticated critiques (*e.g*., Morozov 2011), she also points to its alignment with "real life" action such as a recently convened Truth Commission and Tribunal on Iran.

From a perspective of deeply inscribed hybridity, Paul Venzo's chapter, "*La Dolce Vita*", observes that Italy's current economic crisis is interconnected with the politics of the Berlusconi era and the cultural implosion of the myth referenced in the chapter's title. At the same time, Venzo cross-examines the prevailing notion of Italian-ness that is grounded in a cartoonish vision of a country addicted to an indulgent "good life" – further characterized by corruption and obsessive individual self-interest – although these over-the-top constructions have been consistently affirmed in global media. Venzo examines the continued media interest in the antics of ex-Prime Minister Berlusconi and Francesco Schettino (captain of the ill-fated cruise ship Costa Concordia) as they function as synecdoches of narrow versions of Italian identity and simultaneously talk over other ways of interrogating national identities. With the perspective of a first-generation migrant who writes into Italianicity through creative poetic practice, Venzo explores the imminent collapse of outdated modes of understanding what it means to be Italian. Influenced by the work of Braidotti (1993, 2000), Deleuze & Guattari (1987), and Trinh (1992), Venzo argues that crabbed and cramped identity categories (such as ethnicity or nationality) must make room for a new "poetics of the self" characterized by flexibility, multiplicity, nomadism and hybridity. In Venzo's account, poetry and poetics offer a way into the labyrinth of existential material from which the subject is fashioned – and may counter dominant imaginings of Italian identity still prevalent in global media.

The third and final section of the volume addresses the social aspects of identity and the ways in which interpersonal relationships may be highly mediated projects. Each author approaches the topic from two very different contexts. Ya'arit Bokek-Cohen begins this discussion by examining the use of matchmakers in Jewish culture, a practice that dates back centuries. Bokek-Cohen focuses specifically on matchmaking within the National Religious (NR) sector of Jewish society whose members are attempting to balance fidelity to traditional and religious values with allegiance to Zionist secular culture. This negotiation between tradition and modernity presents a unique challenge in finding a mate, leading to an increase in demand for matchmakers. Drawing on marriage market theory (Grossbard-Shechtman 1984, 1985; Grossbard-Shechtman and Clague 2002), Bokek-Cohen examines how matchmakers "package" and "sell" their clients within the marriage

marketplace. Based on interviews with 25 volunteer matchmakers, Bokek-Cohen argues that her participants operate with a deep concern for the collective good. In an effort to solve the "problem" of protracted singleness, however, Bokek-Cohen found that matchmakers often re-constitute the identities with risks of objectification in order to make singles more marketable. The new identity focuses on physical appearance, improved inter-personal relations skills and personal assets.

While Bokek-Cohen sheds new light on the traditional practice of matchmaking, Antonio García-Gómez examines how interpersonal dynamics are shaped by more recent developments in communications technologies. García-Gómez specifically illuminates how some long-prevalent problems of gender roles are given renewed impetus on the internet, while other new problems for identity formation have also arisen. In "Rethinking Agency", García-Gómez examines how British teen girls perform gender through social media sites. García-Gómez situates his study in two social phenomena. The first involves girls' appropriation of "laddish" behavior via codes of communication and socialization that maintain social hierarchies (Jackson 2006; Ringrose 2006). The second phenomenon involves the increased use of pornography in non-pornographic contexts (Evans *et al.* 2010). Drawing on discourse analysis and discursive psychology, García-Gómez examines how young women draw on pornified discourses to shape their sexual identities in episodes of online relational aggression. Based on a quantitative and qualitative analyses of British female teenagers' wall posts on Facebook, García-Gómez argues that the young women employed sexualized images in their discursive strategies for negotiating conflict. García-Gómez also claims that these strategies pose the risk of legitimizing and exacerbating bullying among young women. He builds on current research that demonstrates the frequency in which teenagers engage in over-zealous and potentially detrimental practices in social media (*e.g.*, "sexting" or rumor spreading, *cf.* Ringrose *et al.* 2012; Williams 2012).

"The choice is ours"

It is our desire to employ this "Introduction" to usher in a volume that presents the rigors that arise from academic discipline and its attendant critical distance; even as, paradoxically, the volume examines the "stuff" of the quotidian, drawn from all over the globe. Moreover, in considering identity, it is finally apparent that we are *not* all alike. Genuine and material conflicts are implicated in this irreducible condition of being different from each other. This circumstance is, nevertheless, something in

which to glory since, whoever we may be, we are distinctive in important respects.

In the concluding passage of a carefully measured and insightful analysis of the infamous "Danish Muhammad cartoons" debacle in 2005-2006, British academic Tariq Ramadan threads the needle between distinct identities and the need for common interests in the following terms:

> We are in dire need of mutual trust. The crises provoked by these cartoons shows us how, out of "seemingly nothing", two universes of reference can become deaf to each other and be seduced by defining themselves against each other – with the worst possible consequences. Disasters threaten that extremists on both sides would not fail to use for their own agendas. If people who cherish freedom, who know the importance of mutual respect and are aware of the imperative necessity to establish a constructive and critical debate, if these people are not ready to speak out, to be more committed and visible, then we can expect sad, painful tomorrows. The choice is ours (Ramadan 2006, 6 February).

Following Ramadan's wisdom, a final word on identity may be that it bests serves us a matter of prideful celebration, tempered by critical reflection and resolute cancellation of prejudice.

Notes

[1] As Belden Fields (2003: pp. 91-92) defines the terms, ascriptive identity is grounded in bodily-marked identity that is defined biologically or with reference to whom one is biologically related. This implicates elemental characteristics such as gender, race and ethnicity. Nonascriptive identity is, by contrast, defined by roles and actions that are in some degree within the locus of a subject's control. This far broader sphere of identity includes educational status as well as religious, political or ideological positions that constitute identities. Prejudice and persecution can, of course, be directed at either ascriptive or nonascriptive identities.

[2] Notice that the project of theorizing identity as, at once, a reification and a construction – sometimes called "postmodern" or "post-structuralist" – has been disastrous as a formal political project in its quixotic efforts to mobilize the citizenry behind baffling slogans that, for example, valorize "empty signifiers" and "silences" that "speak" (see Jacoby 2006). Despite the overwrought theoretical arm-waving that it often triggers, "PoMo" has nevertheless proven enabling when it shepherds a flexible and tolerant informal cultural politics into being.

Bibliography

Althusser, L. "Selected Texts". In *Ideology*, edited by Terry Eagleton, 87–111. New York: Longman, 1994.

Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1983.

Barber, B. *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.

Billig, M. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 1995.

Braidotti, R. "Embodiment, Sexual Difference, and the Nomadic Subject". *Hypatia* 8, no. 1 (1993): 1-13.

Braidotti, R. "Once Upon a Time in Europe". *Signs* 25, no. 4 (2000): 1061-1064.

Castells, M. "European Cities, the Informational Society and the Global Economy". *Journal of Economic and Social Geograph*y 84, no. 4 (1993): 247-257.

Curran, J. Keynote Address: "Demystifying the Internet". Identity, Communication and Culture Conference. April, Madrid, Spain, 2012.

Davis, M. *Magical Urbanism*. New York: Verso, 2000.

Deleuze, G and Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1987.

Evans, A., Riley, S. and A. Shankar. "Technologies of Sexiness: Theorizing Women's Engagement in the Sexualization of Culture". *Feminism and Psychology* 20, no. 1 (2010): 114–131.

Duménil, G. and D. Levy. *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2011.

Eagleton, T. *Ideology: An Introduction*. New York: Verso, 1991.

Eagleton, T. *Ideology*. New York: Longman, 1994.

Fields, A. B. *Rethinking Human Rights for the New Millennium*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Goss, B. M. *Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the Twenty First Century*. New York: Peter Lang, 2013.

Grossbard-Shechtman, S. "A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labor and Marriage". *Economic Journal* 94 (1984): 863-882.

Grossbard-Shechtman, S. A. "Marriage Squeeze and the Marriage Market". In *Contemporary Marriage*, edited by K. Davis, 375-396. New York: Russel Sage, 1985.

Grossbard-Shechtman, S., and C. Clague, eds. *The Expansion of Economics Toward a More Inclusive Social Science*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.

Hall, S.. "The Toad in the Garden." In *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by C. Nelson and L. Grossberg. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988.
Harding, J. *Border Vigils*. Brooklyn: Verso, 2012.
Hebdige, D. *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*. London: Routledge, 1991.
"I Spy TV Opening Theme Version 1". www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ChKPEKMw74, 2010.
Hobsbawm, E.J. "The Invention of Tradition". In *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by E.J. Hobsbawm and T.O. Ranger. Cambride: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Jacoby, R. "The Brother From Another Planet". *The Nation*. www.thenation.com/article/brother-another-planet#, 23 March 2006.
Jackson, C. *Lads and Ladettes in School: Gender and a Fear of Failure.* Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2006.
Jones, S. *Antonio Gramsci*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Kackman, M. *Citizen Spy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
Mattelart, A. *Networking the World, 1794-2000.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
Mignolo, W. *The Idea of Latin America*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
Morozov, E. *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York: Allen Lane, 2011
Naficy, H. *An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Odih, P. "The Women's Market: Marketing Fact or Apparition?" *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 3 (1999): 165-193.
Ramadan, T. "Cartoon Conflicts." *The Guardian*. www.guardian.co.uk/media/2006/feb/06/homeaffairs.comment, 6 February 2006.
Reisigl, M. and R. *Wodak. Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*. London: Routledge, 2001.
Ringrose, J. "A New Universal Mean Girl: Examining the Discursive Construction and Social Regulation of a Mew Feminine Pathology". *Feminism and Psychology* 16, no. 4 (2006): 405–424.
Ringrose, J., Gill, R., Livingstone, S. and L. Harvey. "A Qualitative Study of Children, Young People and 'Sexting' A Report Prepared for the NSPCC", (2012) http://www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/resources forprofessionals/sexualabuse/sexting-researchreport_wdf89269.pdf.
Robin, C. *The Reactionary Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Stewart, H. “The Cult of Globalisation Fades”. *The Guardian Weekly*, p.1+, 18-24 January 2013.

Strasser, S. “The Alien Past: Consumer Culture in Historical Perspective”. *Journal of Consumer Policy* 26, no.4 (2003): 375-393.

Tietze, T. “The Importance of the Anders Breivik Verdict Reaches beyond Norway”, *The Guardian*. www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/24/anders-breivik-verdict-norway1, 24 August 2012.

Trimble, D. (1998). “Nobel Lecture.” (10 December 1998), www.nobleprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1998/trimble-lecture.html.

Trinh, M. H. *Framer Framed*, London: Routledge, 1992.

Wallerstein, I. *Unthinking Social Science*. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1991.

Williams, J. L. “Teens, Sexts, and Cyberspace: The Constitutional Implications of Current Sexting and Cyberbullying Laws”. *William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 20, no. 3 (2012): 1-35.

Williams, R. “Advertising the Magic System”. In *Problems and Materialism in and Culture: Selected Essays*. 170-195. London: Verso, 1980.

PART I:

MASS MEDIATED IDENTITY

CHAPTER ONE

"YOB RULE": THE US AND THEM BINARY IN *THE DAILY TELEGRAPH*'S COVERAGE OF THE 2011 RIOTS[1]

BRIAN MICHAEL GOSS

Introduction

In a famous passage on what he calls *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson posits that the quotidian object of the newspaper convenes an "extraordinary mass ceremony". The ceremony has become the modern "substitute for morning prayers", albeit in "paradoxical" terms. Anderson elaborates that the newspaper ritual:

> […] is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he [or she] performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he [or she] is confident, yet of whose identity he [or she] has not the slightest notion…[T]he newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his [or her] subway, barbershop, or residential neighbors, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life […] creating the remarkable confidence of community in anonymity (1991: p. 35).

Anderson adds that the pages of the newspaper, "created an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow readers to whom *these* ships, brides, bishops, and prices belonged" for being the shared nexus of news (1991: p. 62). More broadly, he visions the newspaper as the avatar of print capitalism that signals ratification of shared national languages – and consolidates the belief that an ensemble of strangers constitutes a nation with a palpably shared sense of an identity.

My purpose is not to quibble with Anderson's provocative interpretations of news media, even as they may seem dated under the new media's regime of asynchronous consumption that is no longer tethered to the national territory. The point that I want to explore about newspapers and identities concerns not just their hypothesized part in crystallizing group identity via the mass ritual of reading. I seek to also examine how identities may also be fashioned by segregating and demarcating who is *and is not* posited to belong to the group. On this view, a sense of identity is sharpened with reference to who is excluded, defined as "other" to the construction of Our identity – even within the nation's borders.

This chapter addresses the non-ascriptive identities that implicate subjects' alignments along the political continuum as these are fostered in mass media. In doing so, this investigation does not orient to ascriptive identities derived from "bodily marked" dimensions (gender, ethnicity, race; see Fields 2003: pp. 91-92). As European press openly hails subjects of the right, left or center via their editorial lines (Curran 2011: pp. 28-46), this chapter drills down into the discourse of one center-right newspaper's coverage of the riots that erupted in Britain in August 2011. In parsing the resultant journalistic discourse, I assay to reconstruct and interpret the identity of the political subject that is hailed by the newspaper.

Specifically, this investigation will examine the 2011 riots discourse across five months in *The Daily Telegraph*. Along with *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, and *The Times*, the *Telegraph* resides in the penthouse of "quality" daily British print news. As recently as 2010, it was recognized as Britain's "Newspaper of the Year". I will argue that the Us/Them binary that the *Telegraph* constructs in its prestige "broadsheet" discourse resonates with its right-leaning editorial line and interpolates a right-leaning identity.[2]

Following groundbreaking twentieth century scholarship on journalism (for example, Tuchman 1978), it is commonplace to construe news discourse as necessarily a simplification of an external reality that teems with paradox and contradiction. Even conceding this truism, the *Telegraph*'s attraction to Us/Them dichotomizing to right wing specifications further conditions and distorts its news discourse. The resultant account of the external world in the *Telegraph* corresponds with the sound and fury of other right wing discourses as much or more than with the reality on which it is supposed to reflect. In this view, the *Telegraph* constructs the riots as the deeds of Them, feral criminals driven by individualistic aggrandizement, removed from socio-economic conditions. By contrast, We who absorb the *Telegraph*'s accounts are positioned as the prosperous strivers with the morally upright police as

Our surrogates in the street. The *Telegraph*'s accounts are not generating events from whole cloth, even as the journalistic enterprise of which it is a part is irreducibly partial in both senses of the word (incomplete and slanted). At the same time, the *Telegraph*'s reporting on the riots regularly jams right wing obsessions into the news hole to force events into alignment with right wing ideology.

To address an obvious consideration before proceeding: I am squarely against rioting, mugging and burning down buildings, regardless of who commits the offenses. I have had encounters with street crime on several occasions – although these experiences have not reduced me to a Charles Bronson in *Death Wish* impersonator. I am also very proud that, during the same summer as the violent upheaval convulsed Britain, my resident country of Spain convened a series of occupations. In contrast with Britain, Spain's deep-seated unrest assumed the quality of outdoor seminars; and this despite the fact that Spain's economy is in far more desperate straits than that of Britain with unemployment that afflicts a quarter of the population. My position departs profoundly from that of the *Telegraph* by, for example, situating mass behavior within a neoliberal socio-economic environment that pauperizes and marginalizes fractions of the population that it subjects to market calculus (Duménil and Lévy 2011; Harvey 2005). In this view, the right's diagnosis of monadic criminality and its prescription of repressive force are grounded in Us/Them rhetorical point scoring and not in a constructive prescription.

The corpus of 147 articles (66,000 words) analyzed in this chapter were harvested from the Lexis Nexis database using the search terms "London" and "riots" in the "headline and lead" between 10 August to 31 December 2011. In fashioning a qualitative reading of the newspaper's riots discourse, I will tease out the binary of Us and Them as it suffuses and structures the *Telegraph*'s narratives across the various sections of the newspaper. Following extended contextualization on British journalism and on the theory of Us and Them that grounds this chapter's methodological approach, I will discuss the *Telegraph*'s editorials and reporting. Along with brief moments of "*Guardian*-lite" discourse – defined as moments that vaguely feint toward left-inflected modes of interpretation – I find that fixation with the identities of Us and Them to right wing specifications is shot through the *Telegraph*'s accounts.

Reporting on the *Telegraph*

As journalists engage the rigors of the "W" questions that endow a story with context – *Who? What? Where?* and *When?* – I will assay to follow

this practice in rolling out this investigation. Beginning with the "what" of British news media, a leading scholar on the topic opens a recent volume with a bracing statement: "These are troubled times for journalism" (Allan 2005: p. 1). A raft of studies elaborates the structural defects of contemporary journalism that recruit news discourses toward the imperatives of the State/corporate nexus (Bennett 2001; Herman and Chomsky 1988). Studies that specifically focus on British news media similarly identify its frequent shortcomings as an independent voice, grounded in systematic, extra-personal factors. In this vein, Justin Lewis and colleagues describe the seduction of overworked journalists by relentless public relations campaigns from government and the private sector (Lewis, Williams, Franklin, Thomas and Mosdell 2006; also see Davies 2009). The upshot is that the residues of news production and its political economy are regularly insinuated into the content of news discourse as narratives that serve the interests of society's privileged strata. Moreover, with their proximity to matters of bodily safety, law and order issues may lubricate news media's tendencies toward otherizing and moral panic (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts 1978; Reeves and Campbell 1994)

One notable characteristic of the *Telegraph* is that its alignment with the commanding heights of the social order (and with Britain's Conservative party) is often openly expressed. More specifically, as concerns the "Who?" of the *Telegraph*, the newspaper sold the most daily copies in 2007 among British quality broadsheets (894,000 copies *per diem*; Franklin 2008: p. 8). While the relatively high circulation *Telegraph* is not an extremist journal, the newspaper's discourse chimes with the themes of tradition, "free market" (neoliberal) capitalism, "law-and-order", and nationalism that animate center-right and right wing discourse. The newspaper has "'been a steady supporter of a very traditional way of life which chimes very much with the Tory party and its political editors have always been seen as having a hotline to senior ministers'" (BBC News 2004). Curiously, from 1985 until his incarceration in 2007, the law-and-order valorizing *Telegraph*'s proprietor was The Lord Conrad Black of Crossharbour. His ownership tenure was terminated by a jail sentence for defrauding the *Telegraph*'s parent company of $60 million.

As to "*Where*?" and "*When*?", the proximal trigger of the London riots was the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan by Scotland Yard's Operation Trident on 4 August 2011 in the London neighborhood of Totenham. Duggan, 29 years old and reported to be a small time hustler, had purchased a gun earlier in the day. After Duggan was fatally shot, the police claimed that he had shot first. The claim was subsequently recanted amid doubt as to whether he was armed at the time (Dodd 2011, 19

November). Duggan's family learned of his death over mass media and, upon visiting the police station, was kept waiting for five hours before speaking to anyone with authority over the case. Due to other instances of local minorities who had died after brushes with police or in their custody, protests in Totenham began in short order (Hattenstone 2011, 15 August).

Protest inflamed into rioting, first in London and then other large English cities, with massive looting, destruction of property including arson, and violent crimes against persons. Between 6 and 10 August, five people were killed and the rioting is estimated to have cost £500 million (Davies 2011, 29 November). One episode that conveys the brutal ferocity of the disturbances was the murder of 68 year old Richard Mannington Bowes, killed on the street by a rioter while he was attempting to put out fires. After flooding the streets with 16,000 police, the mass conflagration was pacified by 11 August. Thereafter, even clearly peripheral participants in the events were subject to severe-by-design sentencing guidelines that far exceeded usual punishments for crimes such as theft.

Theoretical tool: the Us/Them binary

This investigation reads the *Telegraph*'s discourse on the riots through the conceptual lens of the Us and Them binary. Contemporary insights on Us/Them and the "other" are indebted to Edward W. Saïd's groundbreaking body of work. In *Orientalism*, Saïd posits that, "Too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent" (1979: p. 27). A large part of Saïd's project was to trace politics into the arenas where they had been asserted to not operate. At book length, Saïd applied the concepts of Orientalism and otherization to discourses that included classic anthropology and "area studies" (1979), literature (1994), and news (1997). Whether or not otherizing is deliberate – and it is probably most powerful when it arises "naturally" and flies below the radar – Saïd provocatively demonstrates that the terms of otherization are deeply inscribed in cultural performances.

More concretely, Us and Them are differentiated by a series of binaries: agent/subject, industrial/pastoral, literate/oral, transparent/mysterious, original/imitation, rational/emotive, are some of the binaries that invigorate the classic Orientalist discourses while subsumed under a master Us/Them dichotomy. In constructing binaries, there is also an unavoidable if implicit hierarchy that posits Us as necessarily superior to Them (for example, as agents not subjects). Nonetheless, otherization need not operate in the register of polemic or overt prejudice and it may even be animated by soft-focus sentimentalism for Their charmingly "exotic" and traditional qualities.

In any event, otherization not only consolidates Our identity by positing it in distinction to Them who We are not; it also enthrones Us as better.

Prasun Sonwalkar extends the Us/Them binary into the everyday production of journalistic accounts. While events drive news, Sonwalkar situates its production in the "cultural power geometry in a society" and considers "how it influences the roots and routes of news production" (2005: p. 262). A society's Thems – for example, very poor people – largely drop off the grid of news coverage. There is little news about Them (aside from problems they are perceived to generate) or that orients toward their needs and interests, such as reports on how to bring a slumlord to heel (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2003). In this milieu, apparently neutral and professional criteria for what constitutes a newsworthy event (meaningfulness, relevance) are inscribed with the values that privilege news directed toward the interest of the comfortable class fractions. Moreover, like a prop in the back of the frame in a film, Sonwalkar posits a pervasive distinction of Us and Them as "banal" and unremarkable (2005: p. 263): "'We-ness' is largely unstated and unarticulated but lurks in the background as journalists go about performing their professional activities" (Sonwalkar 2005: p. 267). In this view, journalists' deeply embodied experience of Us and Them generates difficulty in discoursing upon events such as a riot where many of the conditions that their routines look past are in play. These conditions include poverty, low education, over-zealous policing, poor infrastructure, and existential frustration.

Other investigators similarly find pervasively class-biased journalism that, day after day, prioritizes news in the service of a wealthier clientele with greater disposable income (Bagdikian 1992; Curran 2011; Greider 1992: pp. 288-306). Ethnographer Herbert J. Gans puts it this way: "As much as I was writing about the journalists, I felt my book was as much about the dominant culture in America, and about its economic and political underpinnings." (2004: p.xxv). In this view, journalists regularly inhabit the role of surrogates of Us, the dominant economic and cultural class fractions. Beyond these observations, I am also arguing that the generalized tendency for journalism to construct Us and Them is given further impetus when the newspaper's editorial line is right wing and trip-wired to scan the horizon for Thems.

Us, them, and the political spectrum

Right wing identity is ideological and, thus, non-ascriptive without any necessary connection to race or gender; nor does right wing identity reduce mechanistically to class or religion. What holds the identity

together is subjectivity that grounds a person and endows him or her with emotionally tinged scripts toward hands-on action (Goss 2000). Critical discussion of right wing subjectivity is thus useful to unpacking the riots discourse in the right-leaning *The Daily Telegraph.*

Social psychologist Robert Altemeyer (2006)'s series of investigations of what he calls "right wing authoritarianism" addresses the intersection between attitudes and policies that appeal to the right. Altemeyer posits that the political right is characterized by "submission to" and "aggression in the name of authorities." Moreover, right wing subjects internalize "conventionalism" that makes demands for cohesion on the terms that they valorize, and that other people are assumed to be obligated to follow (2006: p. 9). Altemeyer reports that right wing subjects exhibit a chimerical posture on law and order. While prescribing stiff punishments regardless of whether an offense is trivial or severe, they are indulgent of abusive behavior if commissioned by authorities. Thus, right wing subjects in Altemeyer's studies signal their tolerance of agent provocateurs, opening mail without authorization, and beating hand-cuffed suspects. In this vein, the *Telegraph* approvingly quotes a US police chief who demands that "repercussions for those who step out of line must be severe" (Swaine 2011, 13 August, p. 4). However, as will become evident in the following discussion, the stern demands for unswerving discipline are applied to segments of the public designated as Them and *not* to the uniformed figures who police them.

In light of findings that resonate with rigid concepts of Us and Them, it is not surprising that the right wing cognitive style embraces double-standards, ethnocentricism, "ferocious dogmatism" and an ungenerous disposition to blame victims for their plight (Altemeyer 2006: p. 75). Contemporary examinations of right wing reasoning and practices support the tenor of Altemeyer's claims (Frank 2012; Greenberg, Carville, Agne, and Gerstein 2009; Krugman 2004). As I will discuss later, the *Telegraph* reproduces at least some of these right-wing tendencies in its discourse on police; even the police's lethal missteps are awarded a "free pass" in the newspaper's discourse.

Reporting the riots

A news discourse is, of course, often contradictory across sections of the same newspaper and across time. Nevertheless, how does the ensemble of factors considered above finally settle into discursive patterns in the *Telegraph*'s riot coverage? At times, the *Telegraph* convenes a potent Us/Them binary even in "News in Brief" (NiB) reporting that is marked

by concision (*Daily Telegraph* 2011, 10 August). For example, in the 267 words of "Riot Snapshot", 646,000 Facebook users are reported to have signed up for the "Supporting the Met Police against the London rioters" group. The *Telegraph* thereby summons a "silent majority". In the same NiB blurb, 120 people are cited as having been "on march through Totenham on Saturday demanding answers over the death of Mark Duggan" after he was fatally shot by police (2011, 10 August, p. 2). In other words, We are many – and They are few.

While the *Telegraph*'s reporting generally adheres to a dispassionate approach, on occasion, editorial judgments are channeled through quoted sources. A woman whose baby clothing store was looted describes rioters as "'feral rats'" twice in the course of a 352 word article before she also twice calls for military intervention (it is "'commonsensical'") (Alleyne and Ford Rojas 2011, 10 August, p. 3). Another article reports that a 12 year old who stole a £7.49 bottle of wine was given "a nine month referral order requiring him to see a probation officer once a fortnight" (Bunyan, Adams and Holehouse 2011, 13 August, p. 5). The same article notes that a family of three had been served with an eviction notice from council (subsidized) housing when the 18 year old son had been charged with theft. While the reporting is dispassionate in relaying the happenings, the article finishes with three paragraphs of "tough talk" on sentencing from David Cameron. The quotations from the Prime Minister seem to be in tacit but firm reply to even fleeting suspicions that draconian punishments may generate problems more severe than the ones they are ostensibly rectifying. Moreover, the framing that is furnished by the surrounding editorial comment in the *Telegraph* primes decoding that is aligned with right wing ideology; to wit, the tough sentencing, up to shadings of collective punishment, *is* just.

Nevertheless, other *Telegraph* reporting complicates the portrait of rioters as a feral Them in an apparent register of irony. Mark Hughes reports on an Oxford University law graduate with a Masters degree from London School of Economics who "threw bricks at police officers in broad daylight during last week's riots" (2011, 16 August, p. 1). On the same day, the suspect interviewed for a job with the London Civic Forum, the web page of which touts its aim to "'build healthy communities and improve quality of life for all'" (2011: p. 1). Another article reports on an "'A' student" at a "leading state school" charged with theft (Evans and Orr 2011, 12 August, p. 7). In yet another case, a millionaire's daughter pilfered £6,000 worth of goods (Ford Rojas 2011, 22 September, p. 13). While many of these articles consist of less than 100 words, they present jolts against the editorial line of that assumes Them as feral Other.

In a relatively rare reference to race in *Telegraph* reporting, Andrew Gilligan positions himself as damping down racially charged *vox pop*. One of Gilligan's sources, identified as "a drinker", sees a double standard in favor of immigrants who engaged in vigilante defense of their businesses. Another of Gilligan's *vox pop* sources predicts a "'civil war in this country'" along racial lines. The reporter's response is to install himself in the story as the voice of reason. "In vain did I tell them", he writes, that "I had spent the whole of the previous day in court, finding that most defendants, on that day at least, were white" (2011, 12 August, p. 6). Here as elsewhere, the *Telegraph*'s largely eschews appeals to ascriptive identities that are increasingly untenable within elite discourse. While the *Telegraph* seems generally sensitive about avoiding crude race-baiting, the newspaper's discourse conjures up a target-rich environment that is laden with others who have been constructed to right-wing specifications.

Editorial comment

While the newspaper's reporting smoothes over Us/Them ideology to some degree, the rightward orientation of the *Telegraph* is expressed most clearly in its editorial pages and commentaries. While they not the largest share of the *Telegraph*'s discourse, editorials and opinion pieces present the newspaper's voice with the greatest clarity and with fewest concessions to journalistic balance.

Editorial blasts of Us and Them: 10 August

The *Telegraph*'s editorials of 10 August, when the riots were on the cusp of petering out, lock the newspaper's right wing stance into place. Along with its rigid Us/Them framework, the editorials express law-and-order preoccupations and a desire for hard-edged displays of top-down authority. The *Telegraph*'s unsigned editorial castigates Home Secretary Theresa May for having "ruled out the use of water cannon and the deployment of the military to help quell the disturbances" (2011, 10 August, p. 21). Attacking the Conservative politician from the right, it posits that May's "civics lesson has clearly been lost on the thousands of young thugs who have laid waste streets across the capital […] with brazen impunity" (2011, 10 August, p. 21). While calling for the extraordinary measure of military intervention and paramilitary materials within Britain's borders, the *Telegraph* asserts that the police have "become so sensitized to the issue of race […] that their response to violent criminality when perpetrated by predominantly black people can be fatally inhibited" (2011,

10 August, p. 21). After placing race briefly and awkwardly in the frame, the *Telegraph* moves into scatter shot mode against the usual Thems and what They do. To wit, the *Telegraph* fingers "burgeoning gang culture in immigrant communities" and "welfare dependency", without evidence that these easy targets (that no serious person endorses) played the part in events that the editorial presupposes for them. In a similar vein, the editorial champions "exemplary sentencing" for anyone convicted since "the thugs must be taught to respect the law the hard way." One development satisfies the *Telegraph*. Specifically, top-down authority is at hand, since Prime Minister David Cameron "returned early from his holiday to take control of the crisis" and "set a new and aggressive tone" (2011, 10 August, p. 21).

The editorial presents its contentious claims as expressions of transparent common sense and posits force as the solution that cows unwanted reality into submission. In doing so, severe symptoms are taken as the problem in themselves without concern for underlying causes; these are rigorously repressed even as argumentative exercises. However, when one turns to interrogate specific editorial claims, one finds that a non-trivial minority of rioters were, indeed, gang affiliated. However, eighty percent of rioters were *not* affiliated with gangs, by police estimates (Laville, Dodd and Carter 2011, 7 September). Moreover, while the police force is not usually construed as a nest of left wingers, it largely rejected the calls for militarization that the *Telegraph* glibly promotes. Hugh Orde, president of the Association of Chief Police Officers, stated that,

> I do not think it would be sensible in any way, shape or form to deploy water cannon or baton [plastic] rounds in London […] I would only deploy them in life-threatening situations. What is happening in London is not an insurgency that is going to topple the country (quoted in Laville 2011, 10 August, p. 7).

Phillip Johnston's hair-on-fire editorializing characterizes Them in terms that he posits as "on the lips of all decent people", *i.e.*, Us (2011, 10 August, p. 19). Gazing with unashamed classism upon "cities [that] were trashed by elements of their criminally inclined underclass", Johnston claims that They demonstrate themselves to be "feckless, mindless and amoral thugs" who are driven by "perceived grievance" (2011, 10 August, p. 19). Johnston also condemns the repressive arm of the State for being insufficiently repressive following "four decades of politically correct policing". Johnston marshals other standard issue right wing tropes as the clues that solve all crimes: "multiculturalism", "the breakdown of the

family", "loyalty to the gang", and a lack of punishment meted out to Them.

Johnston's binarizations demand a policy of all sticks and no carrots, although objection is taken when this is pointed out. Specifically, when Ken Livingstone posits the "stick" of budget cuts as having exacerbated the riots, Johnston characterizes the former London mayor as "grotesque" and positions "Left-wing politicians" among the deviant Them. As reported in the *Telegraph*'s competitor *The Guardian*, empirical study across almost 80 years of data finds a predictable relationship between budget cuts and rioting, with cuts of three percent amplified in public response as 100 percent more unrest (Ponticelli and Voth 2011, 17 August). Undeterred, Johnston concludes that, "To find out what has gone wrong, we do not need to delve too deeply into the specific causes of the appalling events of the past few days, or establish commissions and inquiries" (2011, 10 August, p. 19). Rhetoric launched from the arm chair, backed by orthodox Us/Them binaries, are the all the sustenance required for the right wing narrative of individualistic thuggery. The world *is* simple when one has all the answers in advance and when, whatever is wrong, we already know that They are to blame. It is, moreover, striking that a newspaper would lead the editorial charge toward *non*-investigation into the contours of reality.

Pats on the head

Other entries in the *Telegraph*'s discourse are more subtle in conveying Us/Them contrasts and go out of their way to reject ascriptive identity as a key factor in rioting. Graeme Archer's 806 word editorial begins by discussing Turkish immigrants whose toil has "transform[ed] a dead street into a thriving, desirable location" in Hackney. Archer infers that that these Turkish Brits are vexed by the riots: "It can't be easy, closing up your shop, and driving home, wondering what you will return to the next morning." Pivoting to the larger picture, Archer writes,

> We have de-civilised boroughs like Hackney. This is de-civilisation. This is what happens when middle class liberals suspend judgment, for fear of causing offense (2011, 10 August, p. 20).

Although Archer assays to construct a Them to blame, there is no plausible arc of causality between his vision of monolithic "middle class liberals'" alleged failure to be judgmental and Britain's cascade of riots. Moreover, the logical corollary of the statement is plainly nonsensical; to wit, if apparently all-powerful "middle class liberals" had launched a

rampage of insults, the riots *would not* have occurred. Archer's claims mainly function as taking advantage of the troubling events to shadow box with his concepts of "Them".

Christina Odone similarly avoids positioning immigrants as other. Within the framework of the riots, she praises, "Turbaned Sikh men [who] stood guard outside their temples last Tuesday night. Some held swords, others hockey sticks as they defied looters" (2011, 11 August, p. 20). Quoting immigrant's praise for the opportunities Britain has afforded them, Odone adds, "They have shown themselves to be not just as law-abiding as the Anglo-Saxons, but far more inspiring." In this view, the immigrants are other to the rioters because their communities are strong to traditional specifications. Odone's discussion nevertheless collapses into otherization in a different register as she idealizes immigrants in almost abstracted terms. To wit, Odone valorizes immigrants' "tight knit enclaves" and sentimentalizes ethnic sub-cultures via nostalgia for a pre-modern world. She writes, "divorce is almost nil, single motherhood ditto; extended families living together are routine" (2011, 11 August, p. 20). Odone also airdrops a paean to neoliberalism into the editorial. Idealized immigrant communities present "an invaluable safety net that makes the state's assistance redundant…Dependence on the state is largely seen as unacceptable", she airily asserts, untroubled by specific exhibits of evidence – and with indifference to the extent to which legal immigrants depend in the first instance upon government to confer that status (2011, 11 August, p. 20).[3] Instrumental sentimentality toward immigrants, a potential "out" group, functions to delineate rioters and left-leaning non-traditionalists as the more troubling other.

Daniel Johnson chimes at similar bells as he discusses the deaths of three men from an immigrant family in Birmingham while they defended a car wash.[4] Johnson writes that, "The Jahan family has set an example, not only for their fellow Muslims, but for all Britons of all religions and none" (2011, 10 August, p. 19). An infusion of indignation endows Johnson with cover to change the topic: "If our welfare and education systems had not created an underclass of feral youths, Haroon [Jahan] and his friends would not have been the victims of mob violence." In this otherizing rhetorical detour, with a garnishing of sympathy for the immigrant family, the deaths are simply an occasion for a canned tirade against the State's welfare and educational arms. The ideological cue cards from which Johnson reads are agnostic to the stepped-up class conflict of neoliberal capitalism that demonstrably grows the underclass to which he refers. Instead, narrowly tailored government responses to market-driven class striation and scarcity are taken to be the origins of the same. Nevertheless,

Johnson locates a happy ending, as he pivots effortlessly from livid anti-Statism that places a murder rap at the feet of the educational and welfare systems, to full throated endorsement of the State's repressive functions: "For the first time, Londoners are learning what it feels like to be properly policed" (2011, 10 August, p. 19).

Vox pop

As John Richardson (2008) observes, editors have ample opportunity for ventriloquism of the newspaper's editorial line via letters to the editor selected for publication. In the case of the *Telegraph*, the selected letters generally follow the right wing editorial line and even exceed it via bluntly-expressed desire for punishment to be meted out to others. Although the *Telegraph* published a number of hard right sentiments, as noted below, it also allotted space for adversarial comment.

On 12 August, a fleet of letters in the *Telegraph* was published under a headline that sounds existential alarm about Them: "Either We Grasp the Chance Now to Prevent Future Riots or the Mob Will Think It Is Invincible." One letter scorns alleged police timidity and endorses the return of King George III (Tolstoy 2011, 12 August, p21). Another indicts judges who are "either out of touch, or paying too much attention to human rights", repeating the emerging – and chilling – right wing line of human rights as scourge (Williams 2011, 12 August, p. 21). Shooting on sight is advocated by another letter writer, citing ostensible Jamaican practice as worthy of emulation (Schofield 2011, 12 August, p. 21). There is also sardonic humor on the letters page: "If we cannot regain control of our cities, we will have to appoint Tony Blair as peace envoy to ourselves" (Bagshaw 2011, 12 August, p. 21). Another letter disrupts the *Telegraph*'s prevailing right wing mood music to briefly characterize the idea of deploying the British military within the nation's borders as drastic (Davey 2011, 12 August, p. 21). Later in its riots discourse, on 27 October, the *Telegraph* published a letter from the Director of the Criminal Justice Alliance positing that, "Those involved in riots must face the consequences of their actions, but a growing prison population is a sign of failure, not of strength" (Helyar-Cardwell 2011, 27 October, p. 29). Within the *Telegraph* discourse, this measure of subtlety about Us/Them binaries was not the mode, although it did have its moment.

The left wing Them

The *Telegraph* makes strenuous efforts to place a very narrow frame around the disturbances. In this view, what is *not* in the discourse is also of interest to an analysis. In covering the riots as sheer mayhem (*Daily Telegraph* 2011, 10 August), the *Telegraph*'s glosses over the riots' proximal trigger; Duggan's funeral is covered in a pithy 58 words on 10 September (*The Daily Telegraph* 2011, 10 September). The *Telegraph*'s left-leaning competitor, *The Guardian*, by contrast devotes 800 words and considerable texture to the same event (Muir and Taylor 2011, 10 September). The Labour Party and "liberals" in general are, on occasion, linked with the riots as causal agents, apologists, or both. In this vein, Fraser Nelson contributes this editorial page cheap shot: "Those teenagers who have been imprisoned for the riots were all educated under Labour", as if, among its other faults, Blair-Brown governance placed rioting in the curriculum (2011, 25 November, p. 32).

In stark contrast, *The Guardian* generally places the political-economic milieu of heavy-handed policing and the current episode of economic austerity in the explanatory frame (Goss 2013). While the *Telegraph* largely moved on from the riots by the end of the year, *The Guardian* collaborated with the London School of Economics for an extensive, multiperspectival "Reading the Riots" project to better document and analyze the violent upheaval. According to a Lexis Nexis search, *The Guardian* published 19 articles under the "Reading the Riots" rubric during the week of 5-10 December (Monday to Saturday). In terms that go beyond merely tweaking the competition, Phillip Johnston's livid account of *The Guardian* series in is peppered with references to "scum of the Earth", "a rag-tag army of opportunists, [and] feral criminals." Moreover, in an unconditional Us/Them caricature, Johnston claims that while "the rest of us cheered to the rafters" over harsh sentences, "the Left seethed with indignation" (2011, 6 December, p. 29). Johnston takes particular issue with the rioters' criticisms of police that are reported in *The Guardian* while hinting at his desires for mayhem: "One rioter told the researchers, presumably while struggling to keep a straight face: 'The police is the biggest gang out here'. *If only*" (emphasis added, 2011, 6 December, p. 29). In such moments, the thrill for punishment on the right gains expression in a longing for State-sponsored lawlessness in order to – paradoxically – satisfy ostensible devotion to law-and-order.

Guardian-lite

Despite the rightward trajectory of its discourse, some vaguely liberal-minded claims – call it "*Guardian*-lite" – get play in the *Telegraph*. Perhaps most striking is the Features/Opinion piece by Sarah Crompton published on 18 August 2011 that addresses "the fragility of personality and moral action" (2011, 18 August, p. 25). Crompton posits that while many "'hardened criminals'" and people "who exist on the edges of that criminality" had taken to the streets, other participants "made a terrible choice to join the minority" (2011, 18 August, p. 25). While Crompton concludes that punishment is in order, she calls for recognition of fallibility to guide the post-riot response at the same moment that exceptional sentences were being dealt out. Although her editorial does not approach the analytic depth of the *Guardian*'s discourse, she reaches beyond the simplistic law-and-order bromides that typify the *Telegraph*'s editorial pages.

Another moment of *Guardian*-lite animates the *Telegraph*'s reporting as it discusses the Futureversity program. The program offers a wide array of courses and was instituted to reduce youthful waywardness (Middleton 2011, 10 September). However, with available places whittled down dramatically from 50,000 to 8,000 in consequence of Conservative-led austerity measures, Christopher Middleton reports the Futureversity staff's conviction that the riots had become more likely with less constructive summer programming for youth. The cuts are part-and-parcel to the Cameron government's broader austerity program that is expected to reduce public employment by 490,000 while slashing government department budgets by 19 percent across five years (BBC 2010, 21 October).

Along with their obvious news salience, the riots also provoked artistic reactions. The *Telegraph*'s Dominic Cavendish reports that London's Tricycle Theater commissioned a writer to shape 54 hours of interviews on the riots into a play. While Cavendish is suspicious "that the piece will display a Leftist, liberal bias", he also criticizes the "glaring absence of any proper Government initiated inquiry into the week England erupted" (2011, 9 November, p. 33). Charles Spencer's *Telegraph* review of the production two weeks later is generally positive. He recounts the numerous perspectives that the play voices, that include Members of Parliament as well as rioters who describe their visceral glee. While the play may be an exercise in pluralism more than rigorous analysis, it prompts Spencer to profess sympathy with the "marginalized and disregarded." He adds that one looter's avowedly acquisitive rationalization "is surely little different from bankers who award themselves whopping

bonuses despite bringing our economy to its knees" (2011, 23 November, p. 37).

However, Spencer's final paragraph thumbs its nose at the favorable review that precedes it. The suddenly indignant tone and highly abstracted references suggest that an editor tacked the conclusion on, lest anyone believe that the *Telegraph* unconditionally approves the Tricycle Theater's artistic intervention:

> Ultimately, the play is as remarkable for what it omits as for what it contains. Watching this play […] no one seems to mention religion, still less those fusty old concepts of right and wrong and original sin. At root, the riots were surely a symptom of the moral and spiritual impoverishment that now blights so many aspects of British life.

As elsewhere in the *Telegraph*, tradition and its specifications of who We are has the final word.

Backing the bobbies

Given the authority vested in police, up to the use of force, transparency is essential to insure that pro-social public servants assume these roles. While these seem obvious points to make, police conduct has frequently fallen far short of desired standards. As concerns Britain, the cases of Jean Charles de Menezes (2005) and Ian Tomlinson (2009) illustrate the police brass' efforts to gloss over unacceptable officer conduct. The *Telegraph*'s support for police is underscored by an article partly devoted to assisting in the Metropolitan police's recruiting efforts (Hoare 2011, 21 September). However, the *Telegraph*'s support for police reads as unconditional and untroubled by differentiating idealized "bobbies" from behavior that does not reach the standards that police work demands.

As Labour Party Member of Parliament David Lammy explains in *The Guardian*, Duggan was killed by Operation Trident, a gun crime unit from Scotland Yard. Lammy posits that police "outsiders" to the neighborhood had tended to exacerbate problems in Totenham that local police were assaying to address with a more community-grounded approach (Hattenstone 2011, 15 August). While these observations impart an important message on better policing and public safety, the *Telegraph* cannot be bothered with such parsing of details of the conflicting agendas of different police services, even when stakes are literally life or death; police *are* Us, end of story.

The *Telegraph*'s account of the police crystallizes in its 15 August editorial, with rhetorical jabs at the apparently monolithic "Left" that are regular accoutrements to its otherizing tropes. To wit,

> the police, have been accused, among other things, of being too robust, of racism, of harassing ethnic minority youngsters and of swinging the lead. There are more of them than ever, yet fewer are seen on the streets. But that is because they spend so much time either filling in the forms that Parliament has foisted on them or carrying out duties that most people – and many police officers – do not think it is their job to perform. For decades, they have been encouraged by politicians, especially on the Left, to be another arm of the social services (2011, 15 August, p. 19).

None of these assertions are backed with evidence. Instead, for the *Telegraph* editorialists, truth is given by the very act of minting statements that square with longstanding right wing obsessions, without obligation to locate correspondences with reality external to the statements. The editorial also conjures some of the usual Thems to explain any problems it perceives: a lack of suppressive force, hypertrophic bureaucracy, the Left.

Moreover, when evidence of poor police conduct arises, it is glossed over very quickly in the *Telegraph*. For example, on 13 August, the entirety of the newspaper's reporting of this story is as follows:

> The police watchdog admitted it may have wrongly led journalists to believe that Mark Duggan, whose death triggered the riots in London, fired at officers before he was shot dead. The Independent Police Complaints Commission said it may have "inadvertently" given misleading information (*Daily Telegraph* 2011, 13 August, p. 2).

Forty-seven words constitute the *Telegraph*'s coverage, whereas *The Guardian* devoted an 870 word article to the same topic on the same day (Lewis and Laville 2011, 13 August). Despite the curiosity of how one can "inadvertently" mislead on such a basic feature of a suspect's death, the *Telegraph* does not follow up with the obvious questions. In light of false police statements after other instances of lethal State force against citizens (de Menezes, Tomlinson), one might suppose that the newspaper would cross-examine the State agency with the monopoly on force. However, law-and-order editorial bombast notwithstanding, the feral They are tasked with abiding by the moral path with no forbearance. By contrast, "Our" centurion/bobbies with whom We identify can deviate from the righteous route without editorial consequence, aside from being exhorted to intensified aggression toward Them.

While 47 words gloss over the circumstances of Duggan having been fatally shot by police, two pages later the *Telegraph* devotes 893 words to exalting the standard issue law-and-order slogans minted by US Police Chief Bill Bratton (also an adviser to UK police forces). During a series of John Wayne rhetorical postures, Bratton thunders that "police cannot be social workers"; an ostensibly iconoclastic refutation of what is actually a non-existent argument (Swaine 2011, 13 August, p. 4).

Conclusion

This investigation reads *The Daily Telegraph*'s news discourse through the Us and Them binary that structures the newspaper's accounts while it interpolates and re-circulates political identities. The results suggest that the Andersonian "imagined community" summoned by the news discourse is not necessarily ecumenical and may readily assume the form of reinforcing and reproducing sectarian splinters within a nation's body politic.

In theorizing what the findings suggest about identity, it is important to notice that the *Telegraph*'s invocation of Us and Them does not mainly revolve around ascriptive identities that are bodily marked (gender, race and ethnicity). Although these substrates of identity continue to be immensely important, the otherwise traditionalist *Telegraph*'s discourse is implicitly "hip" to identity as a non-ascriptive matter that looks toward behaviors and ideologies. While this may be progressive in certain respects, the tendency consolidates the newspaper and its readership's identity against They who are posited as irreducibly criminal in tacitly expressed class terms. In this view, circumstances demand that They need group punishment meted out by State suppression and incarceration. Although it is straightforward to read this otherization as enacting classist Us/Them binarizing (while rarely using the word "class"), the *Telegraph* also conjures an ideological alchemy through which They are at once feral *and* gifted with powerful allies. To wit, They are backed by a monolithic bloc of middle class liberals, bureaucrats, and politically correct campaigners (among other right wing stock characters) who function as enablers of Them.

In unpacking the *Telegraph*'s discourse, my final criticism is that the newspaper's habits of constructing Us and Them often operates at a level of caricature that annuls journalism's noble if flawed quest for Truth. Rioters? They are indivisibly feral and detached from a political-economic milieu, by definition, thus we need not look too deeply at events or investigate them as Philip Johnston (2011, 10 August) asserts. Immigrants?

Mirror images of idealizations about ourselves and hard-core neoliberals to boot. Monolithically mealy-mouthed middle class liberals? All powerful enablers of the rioters. Police? Avatars of Us, their only fault being inhibitions about using military-grade force and being tasked with too much paper pushing in the back office. The extent to which *The Daily Telegraph* paper depends upon Us/Them binaries and their attendant over-simplifications is finally of a piece with a larger retreat on the right from even attempting the rigors of measuring assumptions against reality.

Notes

[1] I did not mint the phrase "yob rule". The British Broadcast Company has used it as far back as 2008 (BBC 2008, 17 January).

[2] In contrast with the US, and in line with the European tradition, the axes of distinction among British papers are between broadsheets (quality) and tabloids (populist) as well as on the left-right political continuum. As concerns the latter axis, and has been discussed at length elsewhere, British papers pursue an editorial line with an overtness that is generally anathema to US' journalism's insistence on an objective idiom. In turn, for all its ostentatious positivistic ideological garnishments, the doctrine of objectivity is posited to have been adopted as a commercial strategy that enables US newspapers to not alienate any market niches. Nevertheless, while the practices of objectivity prevent overt bias from entering the news discourse through the front door, bias toward establishment institutions (State and private sector) readily enter through the back (Bennett 2001; Gans 2004; Herman & Chomsky 1988). In the UK, by contrast, it is assumed that readers are ideologically hailed by newspapers that answer to their political preferences in right-left terms from among the fleet of Britain's ten nationally distributed daily newspapers. However, beyond this assumption of ideological affinity, I am not explicitly concerned with readers and their decodings *per se*. In other words, this study focuses not on decodings, but on what is *encoded* in the news discourse of one particular newspaper.

[3] The latter observation is drawn from the experience of being an immigrant into the European Union.

[4] I would say "murder" and not "deaths" here, but the trial on charges of murder in this case did not yield convictions (Laville and Carter 2012, 20 July).

Bibliography

Allan, S. "Hidden in Plain Sight". In *Journalism: Critical Issues*, edited by S. Allan, 1-15. Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2005.

Alleyne, R. and J. P. Ford Rojas. "Mother Condemns 'Feral Rats' Who Attacked Store". *The Daily Telegraph* (10 August 2011): 3.

Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso, 2006 [1983].
Altemeyer, B. *The Authoritarians* (2006), home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~altemey/.
Archer, G. "In Hackney, the Knives Are Being Sharpened". *The Daily Telegraph* (10 August 2011): 20.
Bagdikian, B. H. *The Media Monopoly*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992.
Bagshaw, H. "Either We Grasp the Chance Now to Prevent Future Riots or the Mob Will Think It Is Invincible". *The Daily Telegraph* (12 August, 2011): 21.
BBC News. "Spending Review 2010". www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11569160, 21 October 2010.
—. "No 'Quick Fix' to End 'Yob Rule'". http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/merseyside/7194154.stm, 17 January 2008.
—. "The UK's 'Other Paper of Record'". news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3409185.stm, 19 January 2004.
Bennett, W. L. *News: The Politics of Illusion*, Fourth Edition. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001.
Bunyan, N., S. Adams and M. Holehouse. "Wine Thief, 12, Could Lose His Council Home". *The Daily Telegraph* (13 August 2011): 5.
Cavendish, D. "The Duo Who Turned a Crisis into a Drama". *The Daily Telegraph*, (9 November 2011): 33.
Crompton, S. "Why Did Youngsters Who Lack for Nothing Join the Riot Anarchy?". *The Daily Telegraph* (18 August 2011): 25.
Curran, J. *Media and Democracy*. London: Routledge, 2011.
Daily Telegraph, The. "The Criminals Who Shame our Nation" (10 August 2011): 21.
—. "Riot Snapshot" (10 August 2011): 2-3.
—. "Watchdog Misled Media over Shooting" (13 August 2011): 2.
—. "Police and Politicians Need to Act Together" (15 August 2011): 19.
—. "Police Victim's Funeral" (10 September 2011): 1.
Davey, A. "Either We Grasp the Chance Now to Prevent Future Riots or the Mob Will Think It Is Invincible". *The Daily Telegraph* (12 August 2011): 21.
Davies, C. "Lack of Robust Police Response Helped Riots to Spread". *The Guardian* (29 November 2011): 11.
Davies, N. *Flat Earth News*. London: Vintage Books, 2009.
Dodd, V. "Revealed: Man Whose Shooting Triggered Riots Was Not Armed". *The Guardian* (19 November, 2001): 1.

Duménil, G. and D. Lévy. *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Evans, M. and J. Orr. "Straight-A Student Faces Being Thrown off Her University Course". *The Daily Telegraph* (12 August 2011): 7.
Fields, A. B. *Rethinking Human Rights for the New Millennium*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Ford Rojas, J. P.. "Millionaire's Daughter 'in £6,000 Looting Spree'". *The Daily Telegraph* (22 September 2011):13.
Frank, T. *Pity the Billionaire*. London: Harvill Secker, 2012.
Franklin, B. "Newspapers: Trends and Developments". In *Pulling Newspapers Apart*, edited by B. Franklin, 1-35. London: Routledge, 2008.
Gans, H. J. *Deciding What's News*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2004.
Gilligan, A. "The Vigilantes Tainted by Claims of Racism". *The Daily Telegraph* (12 August 2011): 6.
Greenberg, S. B., J. Carville, K. Agne, and J. Gerstein. *The Very Separate World of Conservative Republicans*. Washington: Democracy Corps, 2009.
Goss, B. M. *Rebooting the Herman and Chomsky Propaganda Model at Twenty-five Years*. New York: Peter Lang, 2013.
—. "Hail to the Subject: The Durability (for the Moment) of Neoliberalism". *Cultural Studies: A Research Annual* 5, vol. 1 (2000): 363-93.
Greider, W. *Who Will Tell the People?: The Betrayal of American Democracy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
Hall, S., C. Critcher, T. Jefferson, J. N. Clarke and B. Roberts. *Policing the Crisis*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978.
Harvey, D. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
—. *The Condition of Post-Modernity*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
Hattenstone, S. "The G2 Interview: 'Just because You're Poor Doesn't Mean that Can't Know the Moral Difference Between Right and Wrong'". *The Guardian* (15 August 2011): G2.6.
Helyar-Cardwell, V. "Justice for Rioters". *The Daily Telegraph* (27 October 2011): 29.
Hoare, S. "Maintaining the Thin Blue Line". *The Daily Telegraph* (21 September 2011): 2.
Herman, E. S. and N. Chomsky. 1988. *Manufacturing Consent*. New York: Pantheon.

Hughes, M. “Oxford Graduate and RAF Hopeful in Court”. *The Daily Telegraph*, (16 August 2011): 1.
Johnson, D. “In This Nightmarish Week There Have Been Countless Examples of Real Heroism, Heartwarming Kindness and Bloody-Minded Determination to Just Keep Soldiering On”. *The Daily Telegraph*, (10 August 2011): 19.
Johnston, P. “The Long Retreat of Order”. *The Daily Telegraph* (10 August 2011): 19.
—. “Silly Me, I Didn’t Realise the Rioters Were Victims”. *The Daily Telegraph* (6 December 2011): 29.
Krugman, P. R. *The Great Unraveling*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004.
Laville, S. “Policing: Plastic Bullets”. *The Guardian* (10 August 2011): 7.
Laville, S., V. Dodd and H. Carter. “Aftermath: After the Flames and Fury Come the Bill”. *The Guardian*, (7 September 2011): 13.
Laville, S. and H. Carter. “Watchdog Investigates Officer Leading Birmingham Riots Murder Inquiry”. *The Guardian* (London), (20 July 2012): 8.
Letters to the Editor. “Either We Grasp the Chance Now to Prevent Future Riots or the Mob Will Think It Is Invincible”. *The Daily Telegraph* (12 August 2001): 21.
Lewis, P. and S. Laville. “Watchdog Admits It Misled Media over Duggan”. *The Guardian* (13 August 2011): 4.
Lewis, J., A. Williams, B. Franklin, J. Thomas, and N. Mosdell. *The Quality and Independence of British Journalism*. Cardiff, UK: Journalism Public Trust Project / Cardiff University, 2006.
Middleton, C. “The Proof that Funding Charity Projects Is Making a Difference”. *The Daily Telegraph*, (10 September 2011): 15.
Muir, H. and D. Taylor. “Mark Duggan Funeral”. *The Guardian* (10 September 2011): 14.
Nelson, F. “We are in Danger of Forgetting the Riots – and Ignoring Their Lessons,” *The Daily Telegraph* (25 November 2011): 32.
Odone, C. “Immigrants Love this Country More than We Do”. *The Daily Telegraph* (11 August 2011): 20.
Ponticelli, Jacopo and Han-Joachim Voth (2011). “Cuts and Riots: They’re Linked”. *The Guardian* (17 August 2011): 26.
Project for Excellence in Journalism. *Does Ownership Matter in Local News: A Five Year Study of Ownership and Quality*. Washington: Project of Excellence in Journalism, 2003.
Reeves, J. L. and R. Campbell. *Cracked coverage*. Durham, NH: Duke University Press, 1994.
Saïd, E. W. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

—. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
—. *Covering Islam*. New York: Vintage Books, 1997.
Sonwalkar, P. "Banal Journalism". In *Journalism: Critical Issues*, edited by S. Allan, 261-273. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, 2005.
Spencer, C. "Aftermath of the Battles that Shook the Nation". *The Daily Telegraph* (23 November 2011): 36.
Swaine, J. "Supercop's Battle Order for Tackling Britain's Street Gangs". *The Daily Telegraph* (13 August 2011): 4.
Tuchman, G. *Making News.* New York. Free Press, 1978.

CHAPTER TWO

IMAG(IN)ED DIVERSITY: MIGRATION IN EUROPEAN CINEMA

ARNE SAEYS

Introduction

Mass-mediated images and human migration crosscut international borders today more than ever. At the same time that Hollywood blockbusters are shown on screens around the world, people from various corners of the planet are moving at an increasing speed over longer geographical distances. These global flows undermine the old nationalist myth that nation-states are defined by discrete, homogeneous and territorially bounded cultures. At the macro level, many nation-states have domestic film markets that are dominated by multinational media conglomerates. The global hegemony of Hollywood and the concomitant worldwide spread of American culture have prompted fears of globalization effacing cultural differences. In response to these dynamics, national governments in Europe and elsewhere are trying to protect their domestic film industries in order to exert their power to safeguard national identities. At the international stage, national governments have translated their concerns in the argument that "cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature" (UNESCO 2001). International discourses defending the conservation of cultural differences between nations, however, become paradoxical when faced with the cultural diversity *within* nation-states. As immigrants and other subcultural groups within nation-states are also claiming the right to express their cultures, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain that national cultures are homogeneous and territorially bounded units.

Due to border-crossing migration and media, the view of the world as a mosaic of distinct cultures is losing ground to multi-connected and transnational conceptions of culture. While much attention has been paid

to the global spread of American culture, less obvious are the cultural exchanges and influences emanating from other parts of the world. Although Hollywood remains the most powerful film industry, economic and technological developments have led to the rise of new film industries and new filmmakers in the rest of the world. The success of world cinema via international film festivals and the growing popularity of indigenous productions in many countries challenge the idea of global homogenization by Hollywood. At the same time, European film companies have engaged in international co-productions with Third World filmmakers. Following recent work on transnational, transcultural, intercultural and diasporic cinema (Bergfelder 2005; Ezra and Rowden 2005; Higbee and Lim 2010; MacDougall 1998; Marks 2000; Naficy 2001), I will focus this chapter on the contributions of film directors with a non-Western background to European film production.

For a long time, the non-Western Other has been the subject of Eurocentric cultural stereotypes (Saïd 1978). According to Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (1994), "Eurocentrism bifurcates the world into the 'West and the Rest' and organizes everyday language into binaristic hierarchies implicitly flattering to Europe: our 'nations', their 'tribes'; our 'religions', their 'superstitions'; our 'culture', their 'folklore'; our 'art', their 'artifacts'; our 'demonstrations', their 'riots'; our 'defence', their 'terrorism'" (p. 2). In their effort to go beyond positing the non-Western Other as a voiceless victim of Western prejudices, Shohat and Stam argue that Third World filmmakers are able to counter Eurocentrism by producing their own images. This can be done by film directors operating in the Third World but also by those directors that moved to the West (Gabriel 1982).

The role of Third World filmmakers living in the West has been most extensively theorized by Hamid Naficy in his influential book *An Accented Cinema*. In the following sections, I will critically analyze the idea of "accented cinema". First, I will scrutinize several aspects of Naficy's categorization of displaced filmmakers in terms of exilic, diasporic and ethnic identities. Against the (surely inadvertent) Othering of migrant film directors by labeling them "accented" outsiders, I argue that the work of those film directors needs to be understood as fully embedded in the political economy of European film industries. My critique of "accented cinema" will be illustrated by the examples of Maghrebi and Turkish filmmakers in, respectively, French and German film industries. Comparing those two countries, I want to demonstrate how migrant filmmakers are shaped by – but are also re-shaping – national cinemas in Europe.

An Accented Cinema?

In *An Accented Cinema*, Hamid Naficy (2001) argues that Third World and other displaced filmmakers living in the West translate their personal experiences of exile, diaspora and ethnicity via an "accented mode of production" into an "accented style" of film aesthetics. Contrary to the poststructuralist conviction that "the author is dead", Naficy wants "to put the locatedness and the historicity of the authors back into authorship" (p. 34).[1] His main argument is that "deterritorialized peoples and their films share certain features" (p. 3). Naficy defines the locatedness and historicity of these filmmakers in terms of their orientation to either the homeland, the ethnic community or to the host country. He puts accented filmmakers into three categories: "[E]xilic cinema is dominated by its focus on there and then in the homeland, diasporic cinema by its vertical relationship to the homeland and by its lateral relationship to the diaspora communities and experiences, and postcolonial ethnic and identity cinema by the exigencies of life here and now in the country in which the filmmakers reside" (p. 15). In a second move, Naficy defines "accented cinema" by adopting what may be called an "old school" stylistic approach that constructs a general taxonomy of features based on the formalist techniques used by filmmakers. As features of an accented cinema, Naficy discusses interstitial and collective modes of production, epistolary narratives and chronotopes of utopian homelands, border crossings and claustrophobic life in exile. In addition, Naficy describes the accented cinema as an embedded criticism of the dominant Hollywood cinema. In Hollywood cinema, films are "realistic and intended for entertainment only, and thus free from overt ideology or accent" (p. 23). In this manner, "accented films" are supposed to be highly political and critical of, not to say oppositional to, the classic Hollywood style and the national cinema style of any particular country. In his theorization, Naficy reduces the enormous diversity of filmmakers and their stories to a simple "liminal subjectivity and interstitial location in society and the film industry" (p. 10). I argue that the categorization of accented filmmakers in terms of "in-betweenness" follows from Naficy's uncritical use of old concepts like exile, diaspora and ethnic identity. In the following section, I will present several critiques of these concepts.

The keynotes of *An Accented Cinema* (exile, diaspora and ethnic identity) are representative of a common way of thinking in postcolonial theories and identity politics (Bhabha 1994; Hall 1994; Rushdie 1992; Saïd 2003). Therefore, the critique that I will direct at Naficy's work is also a critique of a wider body of literature on postcolonial theories and

identity politics. At the same time, I do not want to dismiss the empirical richness of Naficy's work. His world-spanning overview of displaced filmmakers, with detailed close-ups, is a major work of reference for film studies. Nonetheless, because "accented cinema" is a new category gaining wide acclaim in film studies, I deem it necessary to cross-examine the basic tenets of this framework defined by exile, diaspora and identity.

Exilic, diasporic and ethnic filmmaking?

In what ways are the concepts of exile, diaspora and ethnic identity uncritically fashioned in Naficy's conceptualization? Exile, defined as internal or external banishment, has been extensively commented upon by literary critics (Allatson and McCormack 2008; Israel 2000; Kaplan 1996; Ouditt 2002; Rushdie 1992). Modernist art and literature described exile, as both fact and trope, in terms of isolation, solitude and alienation of the individual from an original community: the artist in exile is never "at home." This distancing has been aestheticized as a necessary precondition to produce high art. Edward Saïd (2003) famously noted: "[E]xile carries with it, I think, a touch of solitude and spirituality" (p. 181). Without dismissing personal testimonies like that of Saïd, Caren Kaplan (1996) observed that "the formation of modernist exile seems to have best served those who would voluntarily experience estrangement and separation in order to produce the experimental cultures of modernism" (p. 28). Kaplan argues that the mystifying metaphor of exile, as contrasted with ordinary travel or tourism, helps to maintain the division between high and low culture – and between art and commerce. Indeed, in line with Kaplan's observations, one can see that Naficy's (2001) selection of films emphasizes more experimental styles and techniques (*e.g.*, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Mona Hatoum). Naficy does not deal with displaced filmmakers working in more popular genres, such as Ang Lee and John Woo, both working in Hollywood. It is clear that more popular filmmakers fit less with the romanticized image of the solipsistic artist in exile creating high art. Exile has been mainly used to describe writers of literature. A complex process like film production even if experimental or low-budget requires the input of many diversely skilled people (Caves 2000). The idea of the individual filmmaker in exile is contradicted even by Naficy's own observations of the filmmaker's participation in multiple institutions, transnational co-productions and the use of multisource funding.

Another critique of exile comes from anthropology. Categorizing people as exiles or as refugees is based on certain assumptions about the "national order of things" (Malkki 1995). Malkki observes that, "[B]elonging

(identity, community) and not belonging (uprooting, exile) to a place are spiritualized in a broad sense of the word. And this spiritualization can lead to dehistoricization and depoliticization. The idealization or romanticization of exile and diaspora can be just as problematic for anthropology (and literary studies) as is the idealization of homeland and rooted communities in works of refugee studies. Malkki concludes that, "Both forms of idealization take for granted certain categorical forms of thought, and both forms set up […] a 'conventional opposition of origin and exile' […]" (1995: p. 515). Exile and diaspora discourses are closely linked to the nation-state model, assuming a natural bond between culture, identity and territory. Naficy argues, for example, that "Like the exiles, people in diaspora have an identity in their homeland before their departure, and their diasporic identity is constructed in resonance with this prior identity" (2001: p. 14).

At the same time, the concept of exile seems to have lost ground to diaspora discourses. The use of diaspora, however, shows similar shortcomings in designating migrants. As Soysal Nuhoğlu notes, "Diaspora is the extension of the place left behind, the 'home'. Thus, there is the presumed rootlessness of immigrant populations in the here and now of the diaspora and their perpetual longing for then and there. This theoretical move, that is, designating immigrant populations as diasporas, ignores the historical contingency of the nation-state, identity and community, and reifies them as natural" (2000: p. 3). Soysal Nuhoğlu argues that diaspora as an analytical tool is "obscuring the new topography and practices of citizenship, which are multi-connected, multi-referential and postnational" (p. 13). Instances of dual citizenship, EU membership, human rights and global cultural industries have changed the conditions in which migrant filmmakers work. While the term "*diasporic* filmmakers" highlights the relation with an ethnically defined community and homeland, it neglects other potential spaces of movements and activities that are created by globalization.

The same critiques apply to postcolonial ethnic and identity filmmaking of which second-generation immigrants are the paradigmatic examples. While Naficy and others (Burns 2007) direct the attention to the ethnic "politics of the hyphen" as a sign of hybridized identities, the global cultural flows and the urban contexts in which migrants realize their cultural projects are neglected. In the end, there is a fundamental contradiction between Naficy's original argument of "putting locatedness and historicity back into authorship" and his generalizing taxonomy. Only in the short close-ups of filmmakers throughout the book, does Naficy pay attention to the spatial and historical particularity of the filmmakers. His

stylistic taxonomy, however, erases the locatedness and the historicity of the filmmakers as soon as they are labeled as "accented filmmakers". Rather than contextualizing films, Naficy classifies them into reductive categories: "Like all approaches to cinema, the accented style attempts to reduce and to channel the free play of meanings. […] The style designation allows us to reclassify films or to classify certain hitherto unclassifiable films" (2001: p. 38). In a field like film studies where classifications are abundant, one may also wonder, what is the point of creating a new classification?

Naficy constructs the category of an "accented cinema" by putting the filmmakers in a liminal nowhere, rather than being part of the host country cinema, part of the home country cinema, or part of the international cinema. The filmmakers are conceptualized as forever "homeless", outside national and international film categories. In this way, Naficy creates a gap in the already existing film classifications, in order to summon an argument to fill that gap with a brand new classification that he dubs an "accented cinema". In contrast, consider the example of Belgian-Palestinian director Michel Khleifi. His films are discussed in works on Belgian cinema (Mosley 2001; Thomas 1995), in works on Palestinian cinema (Dabashi 2006; Gertz and Khleifi 2008), as well as in works on World Cinema (Chaudhuri 2005). What is the additional value of categorizing Khleifi's films as well under the heading of "accented cinema"? I think that creating a new film category, simply because the filmmakers have migrated, offers little added value to already existing classifications. Moreover, I believe that labeling filmmakers as "accented" reinforces the Othering of migrant filmmakers by film critics, academics and professionals. In fact, the "accented cinema" puts the filmmakers into a new discursive ghetto. The "accented cinema" is constructed as a stylistic category based on a generalized past of the filmmakers, modeled as a rupture from their natural territory of the nation-state. However, the "accented style" not only fails to account for the personal and professional evolution of the filmmakers over time, but also obscures the role of the "non-accented" political and economic context in contrast to which "accented" film productions are defined.

Contextualizing migrant filmmakers

If we take the locatedness and the historicity of migrant filmmakers seriously, our conceptual analysis should focus on the political economy of the local film industries in which these filmmakers are creating their projects. Moreover, to illuminate the limitations and opportunities offered

to migrant filmmakers, we need to compare the effects of specific contexts and local conditions on the themes and styles of these filmmakers. What is important is the national context that exerts its power over filmmakers and the image of the nation they produce. In Europe, state-supported film industries predominantly privilege an art cinema that reflects the nation and its history. Rather than excluding migrant filmmakers as "accented" outsiders from these national contexts, I believe it is more productive to understand films by migrant directors as what Mike Wayne (2002: 45) calls "anti-national national films", films that are situated within a specific national cinema because they deal with the social, political and cultural issues within a particular national territory. At the same time, they are anti-national insofar as these films critique the myth of national unity by frequently highlighting the position of minorities and unequal power relations within the nation. In what follows, I will argue that the work of migrant filmmakers needs to be understood in the political economy of the nations in which they are creating their film projects.

From the end of World War II till the mid-1970s, European governments recruited guest workers for their postwar industrial revival. While France and the United Kingdom imported workers from their former colonies, the governments of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium looked for guest workers from Mediterranean countries like Turkey, Morocco, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Castles and Miller 2009). Contrary to the expectations of the destination countries, many guest workers became permanent residents bringing their families with them and creating new communities in the host nations. Nationalist political parties voicing strong anti-immigrant sentiments heavily opposed the presence of non-Western immigrants in European nation-states. More specifically, they singled out immigrants from Muslim countries such as Turkey and from the Maghreb as the scapegoats for many social problems, particularly after the terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda in the United States, London and Madrid. These anti-immigrant sentiments have been fed and reinforced by the often negative and stereotypical portrayals of immigrants in the media.

As Bourdieu (1998) has argued, the media help to reproduce social hierarchies keeping the ruling class in power. Television, newspapers and cinema control, to a great extent, the means of public expression. These mass media enable their producers, directors and journalists to impose their worldviews, their definitions of problems and their solutions on the rest of society. In the media, immigration is often framed as a problem, if not as a threat to the nation. Racism, in addition to more subtle forms of prejudice and discrimination towards immigrants, have been rife in the

media (van Dijk 1991). As the media are predominantly controlled by global or national elites, non-Western immigrants have mostly been absent from media production. In order to access the field of media production, one needs not only economic capital but also cultural capital (Bourdieu 1998). As many non-Western immigrants arrive as relatively poor and low-educated guest workers, very few of them have entered the field of media production. In response to this, multicultural initiatives started encouraging the participation of people of non-Western origin in the media. The most well-known initiatives are the equal opportunities and diversity policies urging public broadcasters to employ a certain quota of people from ethnic minorities and the provision of programming to ethnic minority groups, as for example the BBC and Channel Four have been pursuing in the UK. In addition, the children of immigrants have obtained higher levels of education than their parents, which provide them with the cultural capital necessary for high-skilled jobs (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). These factors have lead to the emergence of media practitioners of non-Western origin in European television, newspaper and film industries during the last decades.

In the next sections, I will discuss how filmmakers of non-Western origin have entered European film industries. Rather than following the "accented" authorship approach that focuses on the biographies of film directors, I start from a broader socio-historical overview that compares the political and economic development of migration-related films in different countries. Until the 1980s, non-Western immigrants were seen as poor guest workers who were not able to represent themselves in cinema. Therefore, socially engaged "native" European directors were the first to provide portrayals of immigrants. After the 1980s, however, a second generation of filmmakers, born of immigrant parents and raised in European countries, gained access to film schools. Many of these filmmakers aimed to counter the stereotypical depiction of immigrants. Rejecting categorization in terms of their ethnic background, this new generation of filmmakers preferred to highlight socio-economic inequalities in global cities and to force a breakthrough into mainstream cinema.

From ethnic to mainstream cinema

When Naficy (2001) opposes "accented cinema" to mainstream cinema, he excludes in advance the possibility of "accented" films becoming mainstream. This is a highly problematic assumption, particularly because it reduces "accented" films to a subcultural cinema, deprived of any wider audiences. In order to investigate whether "accented cinema" can be

mainstream, we also need to define what is understood by "mainstream". Rather than limiting our understanding of mainstream cinema to the globally distributed blockbusters made by major entertainment firms, I posit mainstream cinema to also include local film productions that are commercially successful in specific national markets, as well as art cinema that is critically acclaimed at international film festivals. This more expansive account of mainstream cinema allows for a more dynamic interaction between "accented" and "mainstream" cinema than Naficy's dichotomy. Particularly in the European context, where low-budget art cinema and popular local cinema are the constituents of national film industries, "accented" films can achieve success as national films. Moreover, it can be argued that "accented" filmmakers even play with an advantage. By accentuating their otherness, they can achieve success in the art cinema circuits, where foreign, if not exotic, films are highly valued. In more popular genres, "accented" filmmakers can substantiate their ethnicity by targeting the growing ethnic markets in European countries. As a cost-intensive product, however, films require a substantial return on investment. Thus, the films should reach the largest possible audiences. Even if there are large immigrant communities, filmmakers would rather target mainstream audiences. By doing so, however, filmmakers must dispense with the rough edges that might alienate potential viewers. In this sense, the work of migrant filmmakers might lose many of the characteristics that make their films "accented".

In the following sections, I will briefly sketch the emergence of filmmakers of Maghrebi origin in France and the rise of filmmakers of Turkish origin in Germany. I have selected those countries because they both present strong film industries and a significant immigrant population. While France is known to host the most productive national film industry in Europe, the country is also home to the second-largest foreign-born population on the continent, with the greater share of immigrants originating from the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The largest foreign-born population in Europe can be found in Germany, where people of Turkish origin constitute the largest non-European immigrant population in Europe (Vasileva 2011). Moreover, France and Germany have often been contrasted for their distinct models of citizenship. In the French "assimilationist" model, children of immigrants born on French soil automatically qualify for French citizenship (*jus soli*). German citizenship, on the other hand, could until recently only be acquired if at least one parent is a German citizen (*jus sanguinis*). As a consequence, many children of Turkish immigrants born in Germany have not acquired German citizenship, while children of Maghrebi immigrants in France

automatically qualify for French citizenship. Despite these institutional differences, similar tendencies can be observed in both countries. Rather than uncritically celebrating ethnic diversity as something that is spicing up European cinema, filmmakers reject the ethnic categories imposed on them by critics. Moving away from ethnic stereotypes, some filmmakers have even managed to achieve mainstream success with socially engaged films that topped the box offices in France and Germany. These successes indicate the potential of "accented" filmmakers to convey their message to wider audiences beyond ethnic boundaries.

From *beur* to *banlieue* cinema

In the 1980s, French critics denominated a new movement of filmmakers as *cinéma beur*. Initially used as a self-descriptive slang for French youngsters of Arab descent, the term *beur* soon became widely used in the French media with reference to the riots in the social housing projects around the big cities and the "March for Equality and against Exclusion" in 1983. In the aftermath of these events, a series of films was identified as *beur* cinema. From the beginning, definitional problems challenged this new category. Film critic Christian Bosséno (1992) defined a *beur* film as "one which was made by a young person of North African origin who was born or who spent his or her youth in France and which features *beur* characters" (p. 49).

The problematic character of this definition becomes clear as soon as one thinks about two types of films that are excluded from this strict definition of *beur* cinema: films made by émigré directors born in North Africa and films by French directors depicting the *beur* communities. Bosséno's strict definition of *beur* films only applies to works like *Le Thé au harem d'Archimède* (Mehdi Charef 1985) and *Bâton Rouge* (Rachid Bouchareb 1985) that tell the story of *beur* youngsters living on the outskirts of Paris and directed by filmmakers who grew up themselves in those neighborhoods where their parents from Algeria had settled. Films such as *Le Thé à la menthe* (Abdelkrim Bahloul 1984) and *Salut Cousin!* (Merzak Allouache 1996), about *beur* characters living in France but directed by Algerians émigrés who came to France only at a later age, are left out of the category of *beur* cinema in Bosséno's view. Moreover, films by French directors that are concerned with *beur* communities, and that include *Le gône du chaaba* (Christophe Ruggia 1998) and *Samia* (Philippe Faucon 2000), would not be taken into consideration as *beur* cinema.

In more theoretical terms, Carrie Tarr (2005) argues that "[t]he importance of *beur* filmmaking surely lies primarily in the shift it operates

in the position of enunciation from which the dominant majority is addressed, focusing on minority perspectives which bring with them the potential for new strategies of identification and cultural contestation" (p. 14). According to Tarr, the ethnic origin of a filmmaker would determine his or her perspective on society, whereby she automatically puts ethnic minorities in opposition to a dominant majority. This is a highly problematic assumption as it supposes that ethnic minority filmmakers would make, by definition, oppositional films while other filmmakers would inevitably be part of the dominant majority. Taking the ethnic origin of film directors as the defining characteristic of their work creates an unnecessary dichotomy between filmmakers who are essentially dealing with the same issues in a socially engaged cinema.

Although *beur* cinema definitely gave voice to ethnic groups in French society, many of its *auteurs* rejected the label of *beur* filmmaker. In order to counter the ethnicization of their films, several directors foregrounded multi-ethnic gangs in their films and redirected the attention to the socio-economic exclusion of all the disadvantaged people living in the social housing projects on the outskirts of large cities. This new series of films was named *banlieue* cinema, with banlieue referring to the spatial setting of these films on the outskirts of large cities, echoing the black independent "hood films" from New York and Los Angeles.

In the mid-1990s, Mathieu Kassovitz achieved international critical acclaim and commercial success with the banlieue film *La Haine* (1995), which tells the story of a multi-ethnic trio of friends living the aftermath of a riot in an impoverished French social housing estate. The protagonist trio consists of the white-Jewish Vinz, the black Hubert, and the Maghrebian Saïd. The narrative revolves around the rage of the trio because the police brutalized a friend of them. The main character, Vinz, vows that, if the friend dies from his injuries, he will use the gun that he has found to kill a policeman. Stylistically, the film incorporates many influences from American popular culture. In particular, hip-hop culture manifests itself through the use of rap music in the soundtrack of the film and through sequences with DJ-ing, break-dancing and tagging. Besides highlighting the appropriation of African-American urban culture by French immigrant youngsters, the director also included cinephilic references to American films like Howard Hawks' *Scarface* (1932), Martin Scorsese's *Taxi Driver* (1976) and *Raging Bull* (1980). Although *La Haine* (1995) is a film that gives a voice to immigrant youngsters in France, the cast, the narrative, the style and the references are all at odds with the idea of "accented cinema" as the expression of ethnicity, diaspora or exile. By inserting the film in global cinematic discourses on urban exclusion and violence, *La Haine*

(1995) effectively avoids the pitfalls of becoming an ethnically labeled film. Remarkably, some critics questioned the legitimacy of Mathieu Kassovitz as a white middle-class filmmaker of Jewish origin to speak about the poor, multi-ethnic *banlieues* (Vincendeau 2005). These kinds of comments are as reductionist as the accounts that reduce migrant films to the expression of the filmmaker's ethnicity. Commercially, *La Haine* (1995) reached a large audience of two million spectators in France during its theatrical release. At the same time, the director won the Best Direction award at the Cannes film festival in 1995. Nevertheless, other banlieue films like Thomas Gilou's *Raï* (1995), Jean-François Richet's *Etat des lieux*, (1995) and his *Ma 6-T va crack-er* (1998), all socially engaged urban films denouncing the unemployment and police violence in the Parisian banlieues, did not achieve the same commercial success as *La Haine* (1995).

After *La Haine* (1995) managed to achieve mainstream success, French film producers and directors started to see the potential of the banlieue film as an economically profitable genre. Following the success of the action film *Taxi* (1998) and its sequels (starring *beur* actor Samy Naceri), the French director and producer Luc Besson exploited the banlieue genre commercially with the 2004 action thriller *Banlieue 13* and its 2009 sequel *Banlieue 13 Ultimatum.* From the 1990s onwards, filmmakers like Rachid Bouchareb, Abdellatif Kechiche and Djamel Bensalah continued to make films engaged with Maghrebi immigrants in France. Contrary to the *beur* cinema of the 1980s, these productions received bigger budgets and achieved some box-office successes. A notable example is Bouchareb's film *Indigènes* (released as *Days of Glory* in English-speaking markets 2006) that tells the story of the Maghrebi soldiers in the French army liberating Europe from the Nazis during the Second World War. Drawing comparisons with Hollywood war films like *Saving Private Ryan* (Steven Spielberg 1998), *Indigènes* attracted over three million spectators in France, gained international distribution and an Oscar nomination. Beyond its box-office success, the film also succeeded in changing French legislation with regards to the pensions of war veterans from the French colonies who had been receiving less than one-third of the amount given to their French counterparts (Sandford 2006). Both the commercial success and the social impact of the recent films made by migrant directors in France contradict the marginality of "accented cinema".

Moreover, the same tendencies can be found in other countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, small-scale productions by workshops like Black Audio Film Collective in the 1980s were later followed by big box-office successes like *East is East* (Damien O'Donnell 1999) and *Bend It*

Like Beckham (Gurinder Chadha 2002), films that portray the generational conflicts between immigrant parents and their British-born children in a comical way (Korte and Sternberg 2004). Although less political than the French examples, the commercial success of these films in the UK exceed the limiting assumptions about "accented cinema".

If examples from France and the UK clearly contradict concepts of an "accented cinema", what then about Germany? As stated before, Germany is the country with the largest non-European population in Europe, with people of Turkish origin forming the largest immigrant ethnic group not only in Germany, but in Europe as a whole. Despite the presence of millions of Turkish immigrants in Germany, the German authorities have been more reluctant than other nations to grant immigrants citizenship rights and, thus, to recognize Germany as an established site of immigration (Soysal Nuhoğlu 1994). Despite the strict citizenship rules, filmmakers of Turkish origin have developed their projects in Germany, some even achieving international fame, as I will elaborate below.

From cinema of duty to international fame

While France has mainly been receiving migrants from its former North African colonies, Germany has a large population of Turkish descent as a consequence of its guest worker agreements with Turkey in the 1960s. Among the first films dealing with Turkish immigrants in Germany were *Shirins Hochzeit* by Helma Sanders-Brahms (1975) and *Yasemin* by Hark Bohm (1988), films directed by German filmmakers dealing with the oppression of Turkish women by their patriarchal families. The first Turkish émigré director to make films in Germany was Tevfik Başer, who came to study at a film school in Hamburg. His *40 qm Deutschland* (1985) depicts the imprisonment of a Turkish housewife by her husband in an apartment in Hamburg. Although *40 qm Deutschland* won the German *Bundespreis* in 1987, film critic Deniz Göktürk (1999) criticized this "cinema of duty" for its victimization of Turkish women. Despite its claim to provide an understanding of Turkish immigrants, the film taps into the same set of stereotypical images as films like *Shirins Hochzeit* and *Yasemin* where Turkish women are portrayed as victims of an archaic patriarchal culture. Both Göktürk (1999) and Burns (2007) mention the Turkish production *Berlin in Berlin* (1993), directed by Sinan Çetin, as a turning point in the representation of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Through a complex story in which a German photographer ends up as an imprisoned guest in a Turkish family in Berlin, the ethnographic gaze at the Other is reversed. It is now the Turks who are watching the German.

From the 1990s onwards, a new generation of Turkish filmmakers born in Germany graduated from film schools in Hamburg and Berlin. In line with the shift from the *beur* to the banlieue cinema in France, Fatih Akın's first feature film *Kurz und schmerzlos* (1997) moved away from the ethnic focus on Turks towards a depiction of an urban multi-ethnic gang in Hamburg. Another second-generation filmmaker, Thomas Arslan followed a similar path of urban filmmaking in his Berlin-trilogy *Geschwister-Kardesler* (1996), *Dealer* (1998) and *Der schöne Tag* (2000). Other films – including *Aprilkinder* (1998) by Yüksel Yavuz, *Anam* (2001) by Buket Alakuş and *Urban Guerillas* (2003) by Neco Celik – tap into the same imaginary of the urban ghetto film. Barbara Mennel (2002) notes that these films integrate the rather conflicting traditions of European *auteurism* and American ghettocentrism from black independent "hood films". So, like the Paris banlieues, Altona in Hamburg and Kreuzberg in Berlin become the locations of transnational ghetto stories authored by migrant filmmakers.

Although Deniz Göktürk (1999) pleads for "the pleasures of hybridity", tackling migration and cultural clashes with a sense of humor and irony, the major breakthrough of Turkish-German cinema came when director Fatih Akın won the Golden Bear for Best Film at the Berlin Film Festival with his drama *Gegen die Wand* (released as *Head-on* in English-speaking markets, 2004). *Gegen die Wand* (2004) tells a tragic love story between two psychologically confused Turkish immigrants living in Hamburg. The narrative starts when the drug-addicted Cahit attempts suicide by driving his car head-on into a wall. He is subsequently taken to a psychiatric hospital where he meets Sibel who asks him to carry out a formal wedding with her so that she can escape from her conservative Turkish family. Although Sibel leads an independent sex life, Cahit falls in love with her, kills one of her lovers and is sent to prison. Upon his release, Cahit travels to Istanbul hoping to find Sibel who has started a new life there. As this film deals explicitly with Turkish immigrants and their homeland, it could qualify for the label of "accented cinema". I maintain, however, that this complex psychological drama should not be generalized as the story of all Turks in Germany. After the critical success of this film, the director Fatih Akın has become one of the most acclaimed directors of his generation in Germany. In his subsequent films, he explored other genres; for example musical documentary in *Crossing the Bridge: the Sound of Istanbul* (2005), comedy in *Soul Kitchen* (2009), as well as another drama in *Auf der anderen Seite* (2007). With his own production company, Corazón International, Akın started to produce the work of other migrant filmmakers like Özgür Yıldırım with *Chicko* (2007) and Miraz Bezar with

Min dît (2009). Finally, Turkish-German director Yasemin Şamdereli scored a huge box-office hit in Germany with *Almanya - Willkommen in Deutschland* (2011), a historical family film portraying three generations of Turkish immigrants in Germany.

The critical and commercial success of the films made by directors of Turkish origin in Germany is once more an argument against the supposed marginality of "accented cinema". The most powerful objection against the conceptualization of migrant directors as "accented" outsiders, however, comes from director Fatih Akın himself. Although Akın has been hailed as a prominent voice of the Turkish community in Germany, the director rejects the label of an *auteur* of Turkish immigrant films. In an interview with the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, Akın states: "I would like that the label immigrant film becomes meaningless. What kind of absurd genre is that after all? I want people to say: This is a love story, this is a drama, a melodrama – I want people to classify films in such categories" (Taubitz 2004).[2] This critique can also be applied to other ways of labeling films in terms of identity politics. Women, gay and black filmmakers may readily bristle at their work being reduced to respectively a chick flick, a queer film or a black film. As Brian Michael Goss (2009) rightly remarks: "Essentializing and reductionist assumptions may underwrite stereotype and caricature, if unwittingly, in reducing the film to the director's identity without acknowledging any possibility of slippage" between the film on celluloid and the identity behind its production (p. 56). Without ignoring the influence of biographical elements on the work of an artist, we should be aware of the global and local, political and economic frameworks that created the director in the first place – and even more so in the context of a sensitive political issue (migration) and an economically significant art form (filmmaking).

Conclusion

While cultural diversity has been celebrated as an emancipatory discourse for non-Western immigrants in Europe, a critical analysis of what Hamid Naficy has called an "accented cinema" reveals the problems of categorizing people in terms of their migration background. I have argued that the concept of "accented cinema" leads to the Othering of migrant filmmakers and relegates them to the margins of the film industry. Contrary to the *a priori* categorization of migrant filmmakers as "accented" outsiders, I have explored the embeddedness of migrant film directors in the national contexts of French and German film industries. While European cinemas used to be described in terms of distinct national

identities, the case of migrant filmmakers urges us to rethink the role of film as an expression of national identities. Today, both France and Germany have become key sites of transnational connections between people, goods and cultures from all over the world. While migrant filmmakers in France and Germany have been labeled in ethnic terms (*beur* or Turkish-German), I argue that the work of these filmmakers needs to be understood in the political and economic context of the nations where they are producing their films and where they are trying to reach audiences beyond ethnic boundaries. Instead of expressing supposed experiences of exile, diaspora or ethnic identity, filmmakers like Fatih Akın explicitly want their films to be understood in terms of genres rather than in terms of the director's ethnic origin. The recent mainstream success of films by migrant directors illustrates that these films have a universal appeal that makes them transcend the limited confines of ethnic identity. Rather than celebrating cultural diversity as an aim in itself, I believe cultural critics and policy-makers should support a socially engaged cinema that is able to make audiences aware of the social realities of our globalized world, regardless of the filmmaker's origins.

Notes

[1] Roland Barthes (1977) argues that the author of a text should not be seen as an empirical person but merely as a fictive figure within the text, privileging a spectatorial reading over that of authoring.

[2] The English translation is mine. The original quote in German is: "*Ich möchte, dass das Etikett Immigrantenfilm irgendwann bedeutungslos wird. Was ist das überhaupt für ein komisches Genre? Ich will, dass man sagt, das hier ist ein Liebesfilm, ein Drama, ein Melodrama - dass man die Filme in solche Kategorien einordnet.*"

Bibliography

Allatson, P. and J. McCormack, eds. *Exile Cultures, Misplaced Identities*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008.

Barthes, R. "The Death of the Author". *Image Music Text*. London: Fontana Press (1977): 142-48.

Bergfelder, T. "National, Transnational or Supranational Cinema? Rethinking European Film Studies". *Media, Culture and Society* 27, no. 3 (2005): 315-31.

Bhabha, H. K. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1994.

Bosséno, C. “Immigrant Cinema: National Cinema. The Case of Beur Film”. In *Popular European Cinema*, edited by R. Dyer and G. Vincendeau, 47-57. London: Routledge, 1992.

Bourdieu, P. *On Television*. Translated by Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson. New York: The New Press, 1998.

Burns, R. “Towards a Cinema of Cultural Hybridity: Turkish-German Filmmakers and the Representation of Alterity”. *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe* 15, no. 1 (2007): 3-24.

Castles, S. and M. Miller. *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World. Fourth Edition*. New York: Guilford Press, 2009.

Caves, R. *Creative Industries: Contracts between Art and Commerce*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Chaudhuri, S. *Contemporary World Cinema: Europe, the Middle East, East Asia and South Asia*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.

Crul, M., Schneider, J. and F. Lelie, eds. *The European Second Generation Compared. Does the Integration Context Matter?* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012.

Dabashi, H. *Dreams of a Nation: On Palestinian Cinema*. London: Verso, 2006.

Ezra, E., and T. Rowden, eds. *Transnational Cinema: The Film Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.

Gabriel, T. *Third Cinema in the Third World: An Aesthetic of Liberation*. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1982.

Gertz, N. and G. Khleifi. *Palestinian Cinema: Landscape, Trauma and Memory*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008.

Göktürk, D. “Turkish Delight - German Fright: Migrant Identities in Transnational Cinema”. *Working Papers Transnational Communities* (1999), http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working papers/mediated.pdf.

Goss, B. M. *Global Auteurs: Politics in the Films of Almodóvar, Von Trier, and Winterbottom*. New York: Peter Lang, 2009.

Hall, S. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” In *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*, edited by P. Williams and L. Chrisman, 392-403. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Higbee, W. and S. H. Lim. “Concepts of Transnational Cinema: Towards a Critical Transnationalism in Film Studies”. *Transnational Cinemas* 1, no. 1 (2010): 7-21.

Israel, N. *Outlandish. Writing between Exile and Diaspora*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Kaplan, C. *Questions of Travel. Postmodern Discourses of Displacement*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1996.
Korte, B. and C. Sternberg. *Bidding for the Mainstream? Black and Asian British Film since the 1990s*. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2004.
MacDougall, D. *Transcultural Cinema*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Malkki, L. H. "Refugees and Exile: From 'Refugee Studies' to the National Order of Things". *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 495-523.
Marks, L. *The Skin of the Film. Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000.
Mennel, B. "Bruce Lee in Kreuzberg and Scarface in Altona: Transnational Auteurism and Ghettocentrism in Thomas Arslan's Brothers and Sisters and Fatih Akin's Short Sharp Shock". *New German Critique* 87, Autumn (2002): 133-56.
Mosley, P. *Split Screen. Belgian Cinema and Cultural Identity*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.
Naficy, H. *An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Ouditt, S., ed. *Displaced Persons: Conditions of Exile in European Culture*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2002.
Rushdie, S. *Imaginary Homelands. Essays and Criticism 1981-1991*. London: Granta/Penguin Books, 1992.
Saïd, E. *Orientalism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.
—. *Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays*. London: Granta Books, 2003.
Sandford, A. "French Film Aims to Unite Nation". *BBC News*, 27 September 2006.
Shohat, E. and R. Stam. *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media*. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.
Soysal Nuhoğlu, Yasemin. *The Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Soysal Nuhoğlu, Y. "Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Post-War Europe?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 1, (2000): 1-15.
Tarr, C. *Reframing Difference: Beur and Banlieue Filmmaking in France*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.
Taubitz, U. "Ich Bin Kein Gastarbeiter, Ich Bin Deutscher". *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 20 March 2004, 46.
Thomas, P. *Un Siècle De Cinéma Belge*. Ottignies: Quorum, 1995.

UNESCO. "Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity". Adopted in Paris on 2 November, 2001.

van Dijk, T. *Racism and the Press*. London and New York: Routledge, 1991.

Vasileva, K. "6.5% of the Eu Population Are Foreigners and 9.4% Are Born Abroad." Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-034/EN/KS-SF-11-034-EN.PDF.

Vincendeau, G. *La Haine*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

Wayne, M. *The Politics of Contemporary European Cinema: Histories, Borders, Diasporas*. Bristol and Portland: Intellect Books, 2002.

CHAPTER THREE

TOTAL ALIENS OR HUMANS JUST LIKE US? AMBIVALENT IMAGES OF FOREIGNERS IN HYBRID SHORT STORIES IN SIGHTSEEING

SOMPATU VUNGTHONG

We are living in a world permeated with ideologies, defined by Van Dijk (2006) as belief systems that are socially shared by the members of a particular group or "social representations that define the social identity of a group" (p. 116). It should be noted that ideologies can shape our judgments and evaluations that, in turn, lead to particular actions and not others (Mullins 1972). A racist ideology, for example, may affect people's attitudes towards foreigners. With their important role in our contemporary world, ideologies have been subject to attention in various research fields. Ideologies are generally acquired and reinforced through discourse; critical discourse analysis (CDA) is one area that focuses on this concept. A vast amount of research has been conducted to find out how text and talk can convey a particular ideology and instill a particular point of view in people's minds, whether consciously or unconsciously.

One emerging topic of interest is the representation of foreigners through discourse. In this chapter, foreigners are defined as people outside their own native countries. We are now living in the world of global diaspora in which people choose to migrate from their homelands. As for Thailand, there have been more foreigners residing and working in the country (Huguet and Punpuing 2005) alongside an increase in foreign tourists (Tourism Authority of Thailand 2008). As a result, the interaction between Thai natives and foreigners seems unavoidable – and the examination of foreigner discourse through the Thai perspective should contribute to a better understanding of how text and talk reveal Thai people's attitude towards foreigners. In this chapter, I investigate whether racist and chauvinistic ideologies are reproduced in a particular literary text's short stories that convey ambivalent images of foreigners. I

conclude that foreigners are not necessarily portrayed as negative others who are totally different from "us". This conclusion differentiates from the CDA approach that, although rigorous, seems to assume racism and chauvinism is the unavoidable norm.

One prominent research tradition has long attempted to explore the negative portrayal of foreigners in such media as newspapers, television, films, comics and textbooks (Batziou 2011; Flowerdew, Li and Tran 2002; KhosraviNik 2009; Shaheen 1984; Stewart, Pitts and Osborne 2011; Tileaga 2005). However, the representation of foreigners in the media is not necessarily negative. People using CDA for the purpose of exposing the prejudice embedded in the media seem to anticipate and look for the negative representation of foreigners in order to uncover the discriminatory practice. Many studies employ van Dijk (2004)'s concept of positive self-representation and negative other-representation or Wodak and Reisigl's (2003) discourse-historical approach that includes referential and predicational strategies to demonstrate how people of different races are negatively portrayed. It should be noted that these studies make important contributions to the CDA field and help shed light on discriminatory practices. Nevertheless, the CDA methods may gloss over media channels and moments that do not so readily reproduce chauvinism. Whereas through the mainstream media of television and newspapers, foreigners are likely to be portrayed as negative others, some literary works may take a softer standpoint. For example, the Chinese in Thai novels from 1969 to 1980 were portrayed as having morality, tradition and culture (Monsa-ard 2007), and the positive sides of the Japanese were presented in the Thai novel *Khu-karma* (Sirasart 2010).

A couple more issues differentiate this investigation from ones that came before it. First, previous research tends to focus mostly on the European or American representation of people of different races (Batziou 2011; KhosraviNik 2009; Shaheen 1984; Stewart, Pitts and Osborne 2011; Tileaga 2005). In practice, racist sentiment can be directed against Europeans or Americans as well. It is, moreover, worth considering the perspective of non-Americans or non-Europeans, despite the peripheral status of such investigations. Second, literary works are rarely used as discourse data since newspaper and television are the dominant forms of media in the area of research on discourse. Fiction is often disregarded as fantasy that moves away from practicality and applicability to the real world. Although often cast as a realm of fantasy, literary works, like many other forms of writing, are actually inextricably linked with ideology. Therefore, to some extent, works of literature have surely influenced readers' mind and thinking. Previous entries in the academic literature

have been critical of news, films and television content that may cultivate social and political dimensions of structural racism (Smitherman and van Dijk 1988); but investigators rarely recognize any given fictional work of literature as a potential discourse resource that is also a powerful medium communicating ideology: Notable exceptions include *Ideology and Classic American Literature* (Bercovitch and Jehlen 2004) among some other works that outline the ideological dimensions of literary works in detail (Carson 1984; Hua and Hirakawa 1997; Waters 2007).

This chapter aims to address the gap in the scholarly literature by investigating the representation of foreigners in a Thai literary work through the CDA perspective. In particular, I explore the portrayal of various groups of foreigners in Rattawut Lapcharoensap's *Sightseeing* (2005); foreigners include western tourists and expatriates, Cambodian and Filipino immigrants. With significant award recognition, *Sightseeing* is a well-received collection of short stories originally written in English by a young Thai that communicates the ideas and attitudes of Thais toward foreigners. This study also includes an analysis of how native Thais are represented, since positive self and negative other representations are usually found in analysis of discourse on foreigners.

As this chapter aims to explore foreigners' images in the literary work, the selection criteria that I employed as an investigator to a large extent limited the choices. First, I sought a text written by a Thai that communicated part of the spectrum of Thai attitudes toward foreigners. Second, I set out to analyze fiction to fill in the gap in the literature as concerns what is assumed to be a useful source of discourse data. Third, I wanted a fictional work that was originally written in English to avoid a translation process that in many ways can dramatically distort the tone and, simultaneously, the interpretation of the original discourse. Fourth, I prioritized a text of recognized literary value that was well-known to the public in order to examine its messages and ideologies. Taking these points into consideration, *Sightseeing* (2005) seems an ideal choice. The setting is contemporary Thailand, reflecting the current situation. *Sightseeing* includes seven short stories, six of which are narrated through a Thai perspective and four of which include foreigners as characters. The short stories "Farangs", "Priscilla the Cambodian" and "Cockfighter" are narrated through a Thai narrator and focus on the Thai protagonist's interaction with a foreigner. As for "Don't Let Me Die in This Place", the narrative voice belongs to a western expatriate in Thailand.

In the four stories, as noted, interaction between Thais and foreigners is prominent. In "Farang", the Thai male, a "half-blood" protagonist whose American father left him and his mother, has tried to develop a successful

relationship with an American woman but has been faced with repeated disappointments. In "Priscilla the Cambodian", the Thai boy becomes friends with Priscilla, a Cambodian immigrant, although at first he is loaded with disgust and contempt for the immigrants. In "Cockfighter", a tender relationship between Ladda, a Thai girl and, Ramon, a Filipino boy, is suggested. In "Don't Let Me Die in This Place", Mister Perry, an American expatriate in Thailand, has a difficult relationship with his Thai daughter-in-law, niece, and nephew; but, at the end, a sense of reconciliation is achieved.

Normally, the approach to the analysis of foreigners in literature is the literary one. Narrative arcs, for example, are examined or the plots are analyzed, whereas CDA frameworks are rarely used. Hua and Hirakawa's collection of papers (1997), for instance, explores how the plots or stories in Chinese and Japanese literature convey particular images of westerners. This chapter, therefore, attempts to differently use the tools of critical discourse analysis to explore the literary text. In particular, this chapter employs Reisigl and Wodak's referential and predicational strategies which involve positive self-representation and negative other-representation (2001) and van Leeuwen's concept of social actors (1996) to analyze the foreigners' images as ideological constructs.

Referential and predicational strategies

Referential strategies or nomination strategies are used to construct and identify social actors (or participants) by naming, addressing, and referencing. In other words, referential strategies are the way in which social actors are referred to by, for example, using proper names, pronouns, or phrases. Moreover, these referential strategies can also signify an ideological belief through the way social actors are represented (Reisigl and Wodak 2001).

The categories of referential strategies employed in this chapter are as following. First, the category of *collectivization* is realized through such linguistic means of deictics and collectives as "we" and "they". Second, *de-spatialization* refers to de-toponymic anthroponyms or reference grounded in geographic origins. That is, the words used to reference given persons are based on their native locations. Examples from the study include "the Germans", "the Americans", and "farangs" (westerners). For *dissimilation*, it is the explicit words that convey a sense of difference such as "this lanky foreign boy". *Actionalization/professionalization* involve terms that refer to the related activity or work such as "refugees", "the sergeant", and "the guests". Next, *somatization* is the linguistic construction

of social actors by a part or characteristic of a person's body or being, such as race or gender (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: pp. 46-54). Examples from the study include "Madam". As for *nomination*, it refers to proper nouns which can be formal (a surname, with or without honorifics, or a name and surname with honorifics) such as "Sergeant Marshall Henderson"; *semi-formal* (a given name and surname or a name with honorifics) as in "Miss Elizabeth" and "Mister Perry"; or *informal* (a given name only) exemplified by "Lizzie", "Priscilla", or "Ramon". With respect to *identification* (*physical identity*), social actors are referred to by means of their physical characteristics such as "a *large* farang" and "That *tiny* Cambodian girl".[1] For *identification* (*classification*), social actors are represented according to such generic types as age, gender, class, race, ethnicity, and religion. The example from the study is "that farang slut". Lastly, for *identification* (*relational identification*), social actors are represented in terms of their personal, kinship or work relation to each other. This strategy is realized by a closed set of nouns showing relations, such as "friend", "colleague", "brother" (van Leeuwen 1996: pp. 32-70). Examples from the study include "his new friend", "my American angel", "grandfather" and "her father".

However, as referential strategies just capture the particular word or phrase that refers to a particular thing or person, it may not be sufficient to analyze the image of a foreigner in detail. The use of predicational strategies is also necessary. For example, as concerns referential strategies, "the Germans" belongs to the category of de-spatialization. It may not, in itself, convey much information toward forming an image. However, a participial phrase that belongs to predicational strategies – for example, "speaking like spitting" – can convey a more negative image. Predicational strategies are clearly important because they refer to the process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena. They are materialized through various linguistic means. One way is through specific forms of *reference* that are channeled through denotation or connotation. Another is via *attributes*, in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses. *Predicates* are a further type of predicational strategies; they are realized by predicative nouns, adjectives and pronouns. Another type is that of *collocations* in the form of explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors, and implicit allusions (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: p. 54). However, although Reisigl and Wodak (2001) define some specific forms of reference as part of predicational strategies, my scheme assigns them to referential strategies. For example, when one foreign character in the story is called a "farang slut" (p. 13), it can be

viewed as part of a predicational strategy for assigning a certain quality to a certain person. However, in this study, I elected to categorize such cases as part of a referential strategy about a social actor within the story.

In specific terms, this chapter explores three research questions: First, how are the foreigners in *Sightseeing* named and linguistically referred to? Second, what characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them? Third, does *Sightseeing* reconfirm or disregard the foreigners' stereotypical images as negative others? The first research question will be answered through the use of referential strategies and the second one through predicational strategies. After answering the first two questions, the answer to the last question will be discussed.

Referential strategies: Ambivalent images of foreigners

Foreigners in *Sightseeing* can be categorized into two main groups: westerners (as tourists and expatriates) and immigrants (as labor). However, the foreigners' images in *Sightseeing* are not communicated in a linear straightforward way; they are quite ambivalent. On the one hand, foreigners are likely portrayed as the negative others. On the other hand, they are also depicted as normal humans.

For referential strategies, the way social actors are constructed through words in texts bears ideological significance. There seems to be two sides of representation of foreigners. On the one hand, an image of a foreigner as a distant other is reflected. Westerners in particular are depicted as others through various categories of referential strategies. De-spatialization or reference based on local orientation helps reinforce a sense of "otherness" as the fact that characters are from places other than Thailand is emphasized. From a Thai perspective, they are "the Americans" or "the Germans", thus emphasizing that they are not part of Thailand's sense of "us". More specifically, the word "farangs" means "westerners" in Thai and it is used repeatedly to refer to western foreigners in the collection's short story of the same name. For instance, Surachai, a Thai in "Farangs", tells his friend, the protagonist, to get over "these farang girls" (p. 20) and look for Thai girls instead. In the same way, actionalization/professionalization is also used to cast a foreigner as a "distant other". When the foreigners in "Farangs" are called "the guests", it signifies they do not belong here; they are just outsiders who temporarily come to visit Thailand as tourists. The term "the guests" has often been used by the protagonist's mother who hates foreigners since her American husband left her with their son. She always warns her son not to have a sexual relationship with "one of the guests" (p. 3). Similarly, when the

male protagonist in "Farangs" calls his American father "the sergeant", a sense of otherness and distance is created. The son always calls his own father "the sergeant" (actionalization/professionalization) instead of "father" or "dad" (relational identification).

In addition, use of the term "they" as part of collectivization that is realized through the linguistic means of deictics stresses that "they" do not belong among us. Even the simple word "they" that the male protagonist in "Farangs" repeatedly uses to refer to the foreigners can reveal a sense of difference and separation. In this story, the protagonist rarely uses collectivization ("we") to include a foreigner. At the end, Elizabeth leaves him and goes back to join her American group. The protagonist refers to Surachai (his Thai friend) and himself as "we" fighting against the American boys who are called "they". Through identification (physical identity), as in the phrase "a large farang", an image of a large westerner is conveyed. Compared to Thai people, a westerner indeed tends to possess a larger body frame – and this difference is registered in the collection of stories. In the protagonist's narrative, Hunter, an American man, is called "a large farang" (p. 16). Through identification (classification), the idea of promiscuity is imposed upon a foreign woman through the word "slut". The protagonist's mother calls Elizabeth "that farang slut" (p. 13) when she knows that her son is attracted to her.

Not only westerners, but immigrants are also depicted as negative others. Similar to westerners, immigrants are referred to through de-spatialization such as "Cambodians" and through dissimilation such as "this lanky foreign boy". In "Cockfighter", Ramon, a Filipino, is often referred to in Ladda's narrative as "the Filipino boy" rather than by his name. This mode of address seems to reinforce his alien status. Similarly, in "Priscilla the Cambodian", Priscilla is often addressed through dissimilation as "the Cambodian", and not just by her name. A sense of otherness is also realized through the collectivization of using "they". In "Priscilla the Cambodian", the Cambodians are portrayed as "they" and as being different from and not belonging to "us" Thai people. The protagonist's opinion that "they'd always spoken to each other in that gibberish" (p. 99) reflects how he thinks less of Cambodians for speaking differently than Thais. In the same way, through actionalization/ professionalization**,** in "Priscilla the Cambodian", the term "refugees" – outsiders who seek safety in a country beyond their own – is always used by the protagonist's parents to convey a negative meaning. The term "fuckers" in this context reflects the stereotypical image of Cambodians who produce so many children and simultaneously shows the overwhelming fear that Cambodians would outnumber Thais. Through

identification (physical identity) – from calling Priscilla "that tiny Cambodian girl" (p. 100) and "the little girl" (p. 101) rather than by her name and describing Priscilla's mother as "the shortest woman I'd ever seen" (p. 102) – a sense of their status as smaller is evident. For Thais in *Sightseeing*, the physical characteristics of a foreigner are strikingly different from their own. Whether bigger or smaller, the same sense of otherness is suggested.

Although both immigrants and tourists are portrayed as others, immigrants are treated as coming from a lower social status. An investigation of referential strategies shows that a different social status is assigned to each race. Through nomination with the titles "Mister" and "Miss" or through the address "Madam" (somatization: engendering), an impression of a semi-formal relations with westerners is generated and implies that a speaker using these titles feels socially inferior. In "Don't Let Me Die in this Place", the Thai wife of a westerner always addresses her western father-in-law as "Mister Perry". In "Farangs", the Thai protagonist and Surachai, his Thai friend, usually address Elizabeth, an American, as "Miss Elizabeth". In contrast, the formal nomination is not seen when the protagonists interact with Cambodians or Filipinos. From a Thai perspective, this implies that the perceived social status of different groups of foreigners varies across a wide scale.

So far, so CDA in finding chauvinism about the others in the text. Are there, however, any tensions or slippages of which to take note? Indeed, the foreigners' images in this collection are quite slippery. The image can change according to perspective and the moment within the narrative arc. They are, in some respects, also portrayed as positive and belonging to "us", the Thai people. The positive images of foreigners are depicted through somatization (engendering/engaging), nomination, identification (relational identification) and collectivization. I discuss three examples below.

The first ambiguously constructed character is Elizabeth, or Lizzie, an American tourist in "Farangs". Through somatization, she is addressed in a narrative as "a girl" many times instead of using de-spatialization. When situated in the story's context, it signifies a possibility of a Thai male protagonist to develop a romantic relationship as lovers. At first, the male protagonist tells the reader that he met "the girl" (p. 3), in reference to Elizabeth. What strikes the protagonist is her liveliness and he does not pay much attention to the fact that they are of different races. Similar to somatization, through nomination that is informal ("Lizzie"), a sense of social status and otherness are reduced suggesting a possible relationship later on. However, use of the term "Lizzie" is quite complicated. When

the protagonist in “Farangs” talks to Elizabeth, he addresses her as “Miss Elizabeth” (p. 4 -17), but when he tells the reader her story, he uses the informal term “Lizzie” and signifies at least a desire for an intimate relationship. Through identification (relational identification), a possible relationship between Elizabeth and a Thai protagonist is also suggested. For example, the concept of “Us and Them” is undermined when the Thai protagonist characterizes the American female as the “new friend” of his beloved pig (p. 3). Although he refers to the pig, it also implies a possibility and the desire for Elizabeth to also be *his* new friend.

Second, the young female title character in “Priscilla the Cambodian” is also portrayed positively in some aspects. Through somatization, she is sometimes called “girlie” (p. 96), a description that avoids de-spatialization. Through such informal nomination as “Priscilla”, a sense of otherness is also lessened. At first, Priscilla is addressed as a “tiny Cambodian girl” (p. 100) but later she is called by her name. Moreover, in a moment of collectivization, the use of “they” changes to “we”. When the Thai narrator in “Priscilla the Cambodian” includes Priscilla, a Cambodian girl, as “we” (p. 113), a sense of otherness disappears. After the Cambodians’ houses are destroyed by fire set by a group of hostile Thai people, the protagonist asks Priscilla to the pool where they like to play together one last time before she leaves. He uses the word “we” at this moment and it is quite clear that, despite the prejudice against Cambodians that the adults hold, he does not mind associating with a Cambodian. Whereas the adults consider Cambodians as “they” or “others” and try to get rid of them, the protagonist feels upset with their tragedy.

Third, the character of Mr. Perry in “Don’t Let Me Die in this Place”, an American expatriate, also suggests the positive relationship between Thais and foreigners. Through identification (relational identification), a relationship between a foreigner and a Thai is reinforced. For example, the half-blood Thai nephew calls his western grandfather “grandfather” (p. 141) and Mr. Perry refers to his half-blood Thai niece as “my granddaughter” (p. 143). At this point, the relationship between foreigners and Thais is made possible through relational identification, undermining the concept of “Us and Them”.

Predicational strategies: Stereotypes revealed

As concerns predicational strategies, westerners and immigrants in *Sightseeing* tend to be portrayed according to stereotypes. In turn, stereotypes can be defined as “a set of consensual beliefs of one group about the attributes shared by members of another group” and “have also

been seen as a 'bias' in person perception" (van Langenhove and Harre 2007: 361). After stereotypes are formed, they often influence how the groups and their members are judged (Kunda and Sherman-Williams 1993; Sagar and Schofield 1980). This is the reason why a raft of research aims at uncovering the stereotypes embedded in the media texts that have the potential to influence and distort an individual's attitude towards a foreigner. In order to analyze the foreigners' images through the predicational strategies in *Sightseeing*, each foreign group should be examined separately.

Westerners are first up. In "Farangs", they are likely to be negatively represented. Their physical appearance is mostly depicted in a distinctly negative way and according to stereotype. The Germans, for example, are associated with "thick tongues" (p. 1) and the Americans are portrayed as being "the fattest" (p. 1). Apart from the physical appearance, western tourists are also represented in association with various kinds of negative behavior. The first stereotype imposed on western tourists is that of promiscuity. The western tourists in general are described as "sleeping with each other" (p. 2). The stereotype is reinforced again when the mother of the protagonist in "Farangs" says that the western tourists just want "Pussy and elephants" (p. 2). Even Elizabeth, an American woman in "Farangs", is portrayed as sexually appealing and with potentially erotic appetites through the male protagonist's thought of "her grinning at the sight of my bare torso" (p. 11) and despite his mother's denunciation of "that farang slut in her bikini" (p. 13). In addition, the foreigners are often associated with bad manners. Through simile, the way Germans speak is denigrated through the participial phrase "speaking like spitting" (p. 1). The French are depicted as having a penchant for "baring their breasts" and the Americans are "the worst [while] drunk" (p. 1). Furthermore, a western tourist is depicted as being insensitive towards the local culture. In "Farangs", Elizabeth wears a bikini riding an elephant. This act is considered by a Thai elephant owner as "unholy" (p. 10) and he thinks she is a "stubborn farang" (p. 10) since the elephant is the symbol of Thailand and a sacred animal for Thai people. Moreover, there are other negative associations such as the Americans as being "the stingiest" (p. 1). A sense of pretention and insincerity surrounds Hunter, an American male, through the participial phrase "feigning tenderness".

Similarly, immigrants in *Sightseeing* tend to be negatively portrayed through predicational strategies. For Cambodian refugees and immigrants, many negative characteristics are attributed to them. In "Priscilla the Cambodian" various kinds of animal metaphors are used to depict Cambodians. Like dogs, they are described as moving "in packs" (p. 97)

and "barking in Cambodian" (p. 103). They are also believed to have no concept of sanitation and therefore bring "vermin with them" (p. 109). This is the process of dehumanizing immigrants, rather than accepting them as people like "us". While the Khmer Rouge is actually the name given to the followers of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in Cambodia, in "Priscilla the Cambodian", it refers to the disease that ostensibly comes with Cambodians. The boy is taught that "Khmer Rouge probably made you bald and pale and impossibly skinny" (p. 105).

Moreover, an image of foreigners as negative others is also materialized through the theme of incomprehensible languages. The association of a foreign language with mere noise is conveyed through the prepositional phrase "in that gibberish" (p. 99). Similarly, the "guttural phrase" (p. 232) indicates that Thai protagonists cannot understand their foreign counterparts' language. A foreign language here is perceived as an obstacle creating a sense of alienation. Furthermore, the immigrants are once again a "problem" when associated with passivity or insulated secrecy through the participial phrases "being quiet" (p. 106) and "muttering to one another quietly" (p. 112).

Even seemingly positive attributes of physical appearance convey a stereotype of unbridled sexuality and promiscuity. In "Cockfighter", Ramon, a Filipino boy, is considered handsome with "Nice muscles. Good teeth. Sexy lips." (p. 199). Noon, the protagonist Ladda's friend, considers Ramon sexually attractive. Similarly, a sense of promiscuity is conveyed when Elizabeth in "Farangs" is depicted as being in "her Budweiser bikini" (p. 3).

The construction of Thais in the stories

Normally, in discriminatory discourse, "others" will be assigned negative traits and "we" will be depicted as positive in contrast with "them". However, in *Sightseeing* the self representation of Thai people is not always celebratory and some Thais' images are communicated only through negative associations. Little Jui, for example, is a 16-year-old Thai boy who is assigned the attributes of an animal in terms of cruelty and wild behavior. After he loses in the cockfight, he howls "like a wounded animal" (p. 164) and whimpers "like a dog" (p. 165). After the disgusting act of biting a live chicken's head, he is described as a "barbarian" and "animal" (p. 168). As a result, a sense of "Us and Them" in discriminatory discourse is undermined. Moreover, the word "slut" and the concept of promiscuity that are associated with western tourists are also used to characterize Saiya, a good-hearted Thai woman, in

"Cockfighter". Saiya is called "a slut" (p. 184) after she tells Ladda's grandparents that their mentally ill daughter was raped by Big Jui. Thereafter, the mentally ill daughter is called "The Slobbering Slut" (p. 208) by everyone else. The evaluative term "slut" in this context makes the reader reconsider its real meaning and implication. The reader may infer that the word "slut" does not signify the female promiscuity but actually the ill of the society that views people through the prism of pejorative biases. In the same way, the question regarding Elizabeth in "Farangs" arises: Is it fair to judge her as being promiscuous according to the stereotypes of western tourists? It should also be noted that the gender identity and the race identity are changeable as in "Cockfighter". Charunee, a Thai tomboy, has changed her name to Charlie "like she hadn't only changed into a man, she'd also become a farang" (p. 197). To some extent, a Thai can even assume the foreign identity. The discursive construction of Thais in *Sightseeing* does not fit the Us and Them framework in which foreigners are represented negatively and the natives are necessarily portrayed in positive terms.

Two competing discourses: Foreigners as negative Others or just humans like Us?

There are the two competing discourses operating against each other in the text. One is the chauvinistic discourse reconfirming stereotypes imposed upon foreigners. The other is the attempt to undermine those stereotypical roles by showing their positive sides and portraying Thais as possessing negative stereotypes as well.

How can the negative and positive traits of foreigners be simultaneously presented? It is important to note that, when it comes to addressing foreigners in general, they are likely to be portrayed through the common negative stereotypes held by society. Consider a passage in "Farangs":

> […] June: the Germans come to the Island – football cleats, big T-shirts, thick tongues – speaking like spitting. […] Americans are the fattest, the stingiest of the bunch. […] They are the worst drunks. (p. 1)

However, when a foreigner is addressed individually, some anti-stereotypes emerge. For example, Cambodians are depicted as lowly laborers lacking in knowledge of sanitation. At the same time, Priscilla's father was actually a dentist when he was in Cambodia. Additionally, the male protagonist in "Priscilla the Cambodian" knows that "the refugees had built a proper outhouse hidden discretely behind a hedge" (p. 114). In

contrast, adults in the story believe that Cambodians are unsanitary and spreading diseases.

Sightseeing also suggests a possible relationship between foreigners and the native. In "Priscilla the Cambodian", the Thai boy makes friends with a Cambodian girl. In "Cockfighter", the Thai girl and a Filipino boy at the end of the story help each other despite the initial suspicion. In "Don't Let Me Die in this Place", Mister Perry ultimately reconciles the conflict with his Thai daughter-in-law, niece and nephew. Nevertheless, in "Farangs", Elizabeth is portrayed positively in terms of beauty and compared with an angel, although the Thai male is not successful in developing a meaningful relationship with her.

In the light of these moments in the text, the question is begged as to whether the negative image of foreigners reconfirmed? The answer is not simply straightforward as the foreigners' images are ambivalent. Although the stereotypes of foreigners as negative others are quite prevalent in the text, the counter-images in the same set of stories challenge the discriminatory discourse. When foreigners' images can be both positive and negative in the same text, a stereotype and a concept of "Us and Them" is destabilized. Moreover, when Thai characters in the stories are depicted as possessing negative characteristics (that are also similar to those of the stereotypical foreigners), it undercuts the discriminatory discourse that tends to demand positive self representation.

The world that the author represents in the story is not simply the ideal one where there is no prejudice and all the foreigners' images are positively conveyed; and it is not as simple as all the foreigners are written about more positively at the end of a short story than at the beginning. In "Farangs", the opposite is true as the Thai protagonist feels that he is betrayed by Elizabeth at the end of the story. In this view, a more realistic world is depicted in which identities and relationships across cultures are complicated. Some foreigners and Thais in the stories develop better understanding – but some do not. The concept of different social statuses still exists between races. Through nomination in "Farangs", the protagonist never directly addresses Elizabeth by the informal, intimate name "Lizzie" when he talks to her. Similarly, a Thai wife in "Don't let me die in this place" always calls her American father-in-law "Mister Perry" and serves him. However, the concept of social status also exists among Thai people. "Miss Mayuree" (p. 171), a Thai woman in "Cockfighter", is always addressed by the semi-formal title "Miss" as she is a company's representative who is hiring the protagonist's mother. In these ways, the text negotiates the meaning of the relationship between

foreigners and Thais. A sense of "otherness" can exist both between different races – *and* within the same group of people.

Through this point of view, *Sightseeing*'s technique of presenting foreigners as "positive", "similar to", "negative" as well as "different from" Thai people makes the concept of "Us and Them" seem vexed and contingent. Consequently, foreigners in this text are not total aliens from different planets, speaking an incomprehensible language and having exotic cultures; but, rather, as humans who can be as good or as bad as "us". Although CDA has made important discoveries in analyzing ideology that is insinuated into text, its method do seem to assume that discourse is always – somehow – chauvinistic. This chapter, however, aims to show more of the tensions embedded within a sophisticated work of fiction. The interaction between foreigners and the natives may not always be antagonistic as "Us and Them". Anxiety around "Others" may also be tempered with curiosity and even shadings of acceptance.

Notes

[1] Notice that these examples enact more than one strategy; to wit, physical identity ("large", "tiny") as well as de-specialization ("farang", "Cambodian").

Bibliography

Batziou, A. "Framing 'Otherness' in Press Photographs: The Case of Immigrants in Greece and Spain". *Journal of Media Practice* 12, no. 1 (2011): 41-60.

Bercovitch, S. and M. Jehlen, eds. *Ideology and Classic American Literature*. London: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Carson, J. "Literature and Ideology (Review)". *Philosophy and Literature* 8, no.1 (1984): 146-47.

Erjavec, K. "Media Representation of the Discrimination against the Roma in Eastern Europe: The Case of Slovenia". *Discourse and Society* 12, no. 6 (2001): 699-727.

Flowerdew, J., Li, D. and S. Tran. "Discriminatory News Discourse: Some Hong Kong Data". *Discourse Society* 13, no. 3 (2002): 319-45.

Hua, and S. Hirakawa, eds. *Images of Westerners in Chinese and Japanese Literature*: *Volume 10 of Proceedings of the XVth Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association "Literature as Cultural Memory"*, 16-22 August 1997. Leiden, Holland.

Huguet, J. W. and S. Punpuing. *International Migration in Thailand*. Web. 2005. 5 August 2012. http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/iom_2005

_international_migration _in_thailand_15.pdf.
Kellner, D. *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and Postmodern*. New York: Routledge, 2003.
KhosraviNik, M. "The Representation of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Immigrants in British Newspapers During the Balkan Conflict (1999) and the British General Election (2005)". *Discourse Society* 20, no. 4 (2009): 477-98.
Kunda, Z., and B. Sherman-Williams. "Stereotypes and the Construal of Individuating Information". *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 19 (1993): 90-9.
Lapcharoensap, R. *Sightseeing*. New York: Grove Press, 2005.
Monsa-ard, P. **"**Image of Chinese in Thailand in Thai novels 1969-1980". MS thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 2007.
Mullins, W. A. "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science". *The American Political Science Review* 66, no. 2 (1972): 498-510.
Reisigl, M. and R. Wodak. *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*. London: Routledge, 2001.
Sagar, H. A. and J. W. Schofield. "Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 39 (1980): 590-98.
Shaheen, J. G. *The TV Arab*. Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1984.
Sirasart, E. ""Khu-Karma" and Perception of the Thai Consumers on Japanese and Japan-ness." MS Thesis Chulalongkorn University, 2010. Print.
Smitherman, G., and T. van Dijk. *Discourse and Discrimination*. Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1988.
Stewart, C. O., M. J. Pitts, and H. Osborne. "Mediated Intergroup Conflict: The Discursive Construction of "Illegal Immigrants" in a Regional US Newspaper". *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 30 (2011): 8-27.
Tileaga, C. "Accounting for Extreme Prejudice and Legitimating Blame in Talk about the Romanies." *Discourse and Society* 16, no. 5 (2005): 603-24.
Tourism Authority of Thailand. (2008). "Tourism Statistics in Thailand 1998-2007". (2008), http://www2.tat.or.th/stat/web/static_index.php.
van Dijk, T. A. "Ideology and Discourse Analysis." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11, no. 2 (2006): 115–40.
—. "Politics Ideology and Discourse" (2004), http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Politics,%20Ideology%20and%20Discourse.pdf.

van Leeuwen, T. (1996). “The Representation of Social Actors”. In *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by C. Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard, 32-69. New York: Routledge, 1996.

van Langenhove, L. and R. Harre. “Cultural Stereotypes and Positioning Theory”. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 24, no. 4 (2007). http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5914.1994.tb00260.x/pdf.

Waters, H. *Racism on the Victorian Stage: Representation of Slavery and the Black Character*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Wodak, R. and M. Reisigl. “Discourse and Racism”. In *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, edited by D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H. E. Hamilton, 372-97. Oxford: Basil-Blackwell, 2003.

PART II:

IDENTITY REFRACTED THROUGH NATIONS AND TRANS-NATIONS

CHAPTER FOUR

GLOBAL LATINO: CORPORATE ADVERTISING DISCOURSES AND THE RE-IMAGINATION OF SPACE

CHRISTOPHER CHÁVEZ

Introduction

In the spring of 2012 advertising executives from agencies throughout Latin America including Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo and Mexico City gathered in Miami to attend the annual Festival Iberoamericano de Publicidades (FIAP). During the conference, which organizers describe as the "largest advertising exhibition in Latin America" (FIAP 2012), marketing practitioners had an opportunity to debate current issues in advertising, foster joint projects between agencies from across the globe and attend various networking events. The marquee event of the conference, however, is the creative awards show in which various agencies compete for the coveted Golden Sol award.

In previous years, the conference has been held in Buenos Aires, but it is likely no accident that the 2012 conference was hosted in Miami, a city located in the American South. Miami has a substantial and diverse Latino population and the city has become an important center for the transnational production and distribution of Spanish-language television and popular music as well as becoming a thriving new media hub. Such activity has earned the city various designations including "Silicon Playa", the "Hollywood of Latin America" and the "Capital of Latin America" (Sinclair 2003).

The decision to host the conference in Miami also demonstrates how the advertising industry has transformed into what Leslie (1995) describes as a "transnational business community," in which members of advertising agencies work outside the nation-state and move easily between countries. As its name indicates, FIAP is specifically designed for agencies based throughout Ibero-America, former colonies of Spain and Portugal. That

said, Spain remains a significant presence at the conference. Given its scope, however, the conference, along with its satellite conferences held throughout Latin America, have become instrumental in the development of a global professional community. Furthermore, through professional development and the showcasing of creative work, this conference essentially helps to set the creative aesthetic for the Spanish-speaking world.

Much has been written about the destabilization of regional identity in the wake of globalizing forces (Garcia Canclini 2001; 2005; Martin-Barbero 1993). This chapter builds on this body of scholarship by focusing on the particular role that advertising institutions play in discursively constructing and reconstructing the world in ways that reproduce capitalist ideologies. Specifically, I am interested in the diverse ways in which the global advertising industry imagines, represents and codifies physical space in ways that correspond with their strategic and economic objectives.

While there is a substantial literature that has examined the ways in which ideologies are embedded within advertising texts (Bonsu 2009; Schroeder and Zwick 2004; Williamson 2002), less attention has been paid to the corporate discourses that set the pre-conditions for advertising. By focusing on the exchanges between advertising organizations and their financial stakeholders, I examine the ways in which global advertising organizations define and redefine the physical world for administrative purposes. To this end, I begin this chapter by placing the common advertising practice of market segmentation within its historical context. By focusing on the evolution of industry practice, I follow the tradition of scholarship that posits that the study of institutional practices that are divorced from historical context merely gives the investigator a snapshot of the field at a given moment in time (Schultz 2007). That is, while advertisements are artifacts that largely embody their particular place and time (Mick 1986), the ideologies and practices of advertising agents may be seen as a larger work-in-progress rather than static phenomena.

I continue with a discussion of changes to advertising practice in the context of globalization**.** Transnational advertising agencies with satellite offices scattered across the globe require discursive tools to make the world manageable. In response to this global grid, I focus on the discursive *re*-construction of Latin America, a region that has long had an ambivalent relationship with globalizing entities. Over the course of five-hundred years, Latin America has been an evolving geo-political structure, albeit one that has been historically permeated with a European perspective. Thus, I am interested in the degree to which modern marketing discourses

have inherited colonial discourses. To ground my argument, I employ an ideological critique of internal corporate discourses that allow advertising agencies and their stakeholders to reconstitute the boundaries of Latin America in accordance with their organizational objectives.

Marketing practice and the re-imagination of space

While the idea of Latin America is deeply rooted in European colonial discourses, the modern conception of a transnational, Latino consumer market whose borders are porous and indistinct may be tied to two important developments that began at the onset of the twentieth century. The first involves the technical and cultural changes that enabled individuals to see themselves as members of an "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) of consumers. The second is the emergence of a professional class of advertisers who play an active role in constructing these communities.

Beginning in the early 1900s, significant technological, economic and cultural changes transformed the practice of consumption from a local to a national phenomenon. During this time, the production of goods became centralized within a few industrial markets for subsequent distribution to retailers across the country. Consequently, objects that were once produced in the home were replaced by those that could be purchased in the open-marketplace (Pope 1983). Innovations in production, packaging, labeling, physical distribution and personal salesmanship ultimately lead to the development of national markets for branded, standardized products. Collectively, these developments made possible the emergence of a formal advertising industry that made effective use of mass media. Thus, advertisers were empowered to participate in the circulation of shared symbols, myths, memories and traditions that enable consumers to see themselves as members of a larger collective.

In an emerging consumer society, products could now be consumed symbolically as well as physically. For much of the past century, however, advertising practices were relatively confined within national boundaries. Radio and television disseminated local knowledge while advertising encouraged consumers to buy national products. As globalizing forces accelerated after World War II, consumer practice evolved from a national into a more global phenomenon (Garcia-Canclini 2001). Today, advertising is said to play an increasingly important role in promoting narratives about commodities and consumers in ways that are tied less to regional affiliations and more oriented toward global patterns of consumption.

The meanings of products, of course, are not naturally occurring and we must account for the practitioners who are directly responsible for developing the recurring figures, tropes and forms in advertising. As with other forms of cultural production, the interactions within the advertising profession are inextricably linked to relations of power within the larger social space (Chávez 2012). Schroeder and Zwick (2004) argue that to interpret advertising images is to acknowledge their representational power both as cultural artifacts and as bearers of meaning that reflect broad societal, cultural and ideological codes. The ideological biases held by advertising practitioners become particularly evident in the common practice of constructing consumer markets. According to Odih (1999), a central tenet of market segmentation is the precise classification of groups in order to facilitate efficient channeling of resources. However, what is often presented as objective, irrefutable discovery is, in fact, the product of a given social orientation. Such constructions, however, have real implications in that they determine a range of practical decisions, such as who specifically is included in the target market, which messages may be relevant to the target and how resources will be allocated in their pursuit.

As transnational corporations have become increasingly important conduits for global flows, the practice of market segmentation raises new issues about the relationship between physical space, collective identity and profit motive. Corporations have crossed national boundaries in search of new markets and, in the process, have created a need for large, global consumer segments. In turn, advertising agencies commonly advance strategies, concepts, and campaigns congruent with their transnational structures (Leslie 1995). Furthermore, as a result of deregulatory policies, the advertising industry has experienced tremendous consolidation where much of the world's advertising dollars are in the control of just a handful of multinationals. In recent years, sixty percent of the world's advertising revenue goes to six major holding companies (Deuze 2007).

The global span of the advertising industry requires administrative mechanisms for the governance of its affiliates across various regions. The need for discursive tools that make global presence more manageable and comprehendible is not, however, a new phenomenon. Anderson (1991) points to the particular role that maps and censuses served in enabling colonial empires to substantiate and govern their global resources. However, as Anderson points out, such devices are not scientific abstractions of reality but rather approximations of physical space that are ideologically driven. From this perspective, maps and market segments work hand in hand by symbolically legitimizing one another.

Two key questions are thusly begged. First, how does the global advertising industry represent physical space? Here, I am interested in the ways in which global advertisers imagine Latin America. By exploring this question, I draw from Mignolo's (2005) argument that Latin America is a discursive construction that reflects a history of domination. Second, I am interested in locating the recurring regional centers that figure prominently in the advertising industry's discursive construction of Latin America. Here, I summon Castell's argument that, while the global economy spans the planet, regions and people do not participate equally. Rather, wealth, technology and power are concentrated in just a handful of specific locations, networked with other hubs of wealth and consumption in a global network (Sassen 2000). Thus, I am interested in identifying the specific countries and cities that drive global advertising's presence in Latin America.

To interrogate this issue, I present an ideological critique of global advertising agencies' professional discourses that inform and reassure their financial stakeholders. Here, I draw from Thompson's (1984) argument that ideology is a symbolic form of discourse that sustains relations of domination. Furthermore, ideology is theorized to be enacted in institutional settings and promoted through cultural texts that are inherently political and ultimately work in the interests of the powerful against the interests of the powerless. According to Thompson (1990), mass communication plays an important role in maintaining asymmetrical relations of power by circulating and privileging the cultural texts that favor existing power relations while marginalizing rival forms of thought.

As it relates to the topic of global advertising, I focus on the promotion of capitalist ideologies. These are, in turn, expressed through the practices and texts that support (implicitly or explicitly) the interests of the dominant groups that benefit – socially, politically, economically and culturally – from the prevailing economic organization of society (Storey 1993). As with other forms of ideology, capitalist ideology is inherently repressive. These forms of repression, however, are not always readily apparent. In his discussion of the marketplace as a site of domination, Goss (2000) argues that the relationship between ideology and repression is clearer in instances when culture is used to achieve objectives that force alone cannot. To illustrate, Goss discusses the history of exploitation of Mexico by the US. According to Goss, what was once achieved through military force has been more recently achieved through cultural (specifically, economic and neo-liberal) ideology. In the modern context, powerful corporations have continued the tradition of exploiting less

powerful Mexicans (and Mexican Americans) but do so without repressive force when exploitation is channeled through the marketplace.

As one of the "fixers" of capitalism (Thrift 1987), the advertising industry becomes an essential institution for enacting and legitimizing capitalist ideologies (Schudson 1984). Capitalist ideologies are said to be embedded within advertisements, which openly celebrate consumer choice and portray consumer satisfaction in its idealized form. As Schudson pointedly describes this process, "advertising is capitalism's way of saying 'I love you' to itself" (1984: p. 232). But while advertisements themselves are softer and ideological as they bid for consent, internal advertising discourses may be seen as more openly aggressive. The conversations circulated amongst advertising practitioners often invoke the language of war. After all, advertisers "identify targets", "develop strategies" and "launch campaigns" with the primary goal of "capturing market share."

Internal advertising discourses clearly articulate methods by which promotional campaigns will be enacted; these discourses, in turn, warrant critical examination. With a focus on these professional forms of discourses, I attempt to move beyond the manifest content of the texts and focus on their underlying ideological and cultural assumptions This necessarily requires the researcher to identify the implicit power relations embedded within forms of communication and how they are they made to appear normal. As part of this critical process, particular attention must be paid to the connotative and denotative meanings of imagery and copy choices and how such stylistic choices contribute to the overall meaning of the text (McKee 2003). Furthermore, informed by Mignolo's (2005) and Anderson's (1991) argument that maps are semi-arbitrary social constructions and inherently ideological, I focus on recurring visual tropes and themes that serve to spatially define Latin America and frame its importance to global advertising organizations.

At the same time, ideology involves masking, distortion and concealment (Fürsich 2009). While certain people, classes, areas of life and experiences are privileged, others are left out, silenced and rendered invisible. Consequently, I attend to omissions within the textual data. Guided by Sassen's (2000) point that the everyday work of running globalized networks is often conducted in regionally centralized locations, I seek to tease out the recurring nodal points within this discursive construction of Latin America while attending to regions that were excluded.

The corpus for this study includes online corporate communications generated by the top ten global advertising agencies that operate from centralized locations, but with satellite offices distributed across the world.

I focus on these networks because they represent the consolidation that has become pervasive within the advertising industry. Furthermore, I focus on the genre of corporate communications because it is designed to facilitate the sharing of information to various stakeholders to whom an organization is beholden (Cornelissen 2004). These shareholders include investors, potential clients and media analysts. The types of corporate communications under examination include the networks' home pages – as well as press releases, annual reports and micro-sites specifically related to Latin America. These artifacts were accessed through the main corporate websites of each of the advertising networks. From each of the network's home page sites, I obtained relevant information using the search terms "Latino", "Latin America" and "Hispanic" between June and August of 2012. A corpus of 87 separate artifacts (132 printed pages) was analyzed.

Findings

The boundaries of Latin America

My first research question was designed to ascertain how the global advertising industry discursively constructs Latin America. As a form of corporate communications, the web pages, online press releases and financial reports generated by the top ten advertising networks are written primarily for an intended audience of potential clients, industry analysts and employees, both current and prospective. In this capacity the visual imagery and written text appear to serve three goals: to categorize the world into distinct administrative units, to articulate the network's identity as a single cohesive unit, and to establish its advantage over competing advertising networks.

At a practical level, these forms of communication made the network more manageable by dividing the world into distinct administrative units that are organized, to varying degrees, in alignment with the Mercaturial Map. For example, Young & Rubicam's (Y&R) representation of the world includes seven distinct regions that correspond to the logic of seven continents: North America, Latin America, Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa and Australia/New Zealand. Conversely, DDB recognizes only five geographic regions. In their organization of the world, the "Middle East" and "Africa" are collapsed into a single administrative unit while Australia and New Zealand are absorbed within the "Asia Pacific" region.

Dentsu, Inc. organizes the physical world according to a different logic. Unlike the other advertising networks, Japan is distinguished from Asia and is considered a solitary unit. This is undoubtedly a function of where

organizational power is concentrated. Unlike competing networks, Dentsu, Inc. is headquartered in Tokyo, not New York, and it is certainly the base of power that drives the orientation of the network. Given its Japanese heritage, Japan still represents a significant portion of the network's business and thus demands its own regional identity.

The data suggests that geographic divisions are based on the concentration of wealth and the administrative resources that accompany economic capital. While these geo-mapping discourses served the practical function of rendering the world "manageable", I also found that they establish each agency's global credibility. To this end, I found remarkable similarities in how competing networks established their global credentials in ways apparently intended to be consistent with the transnational structures of potential global clients. For example, a common visual motif was for a firm to illustrate its global span by representing offices as pinpoints on a world map. Within the written copy, global reach was represented through the use of numeric figures that appear to serve as short hand for the breadth of agency presence. For example, TBWA touts the number of employees and offices throughout the world (TBWA 2012):

> Our focus is not only to be the best advertising agency network but also to be one of the most creative companies in the world. This 21st-century goal is ambitious, and it has proven to be a catalyst in uniting over 11,000 people, operating in 274 agencies, in 100 different countries and across 22 specialty disciplines. […] And with the world, and our network, growing even more complex, it is important to have common ground.

In a similar fashion, an excerpt from Y&R's home page includes copy that describes the agency as a "global boutique" and features the organizational mantra: "Local power. Global strength". Y&R's web site reinforces their global positioning in body copy that states that the organization includes, "6,500 people in 186 offices in 90 countries, all on a mission to Resist the Usual for our clients" (Y&R 2012). It was typical of the networks to use corporate communications to negotiate competing goals. On one hand, the network must promote the diversity of its services as well as the span of its presence across the globe. In doing so, it positions itself as capable of serving any marketing communications need in almost part of the world. On the other hand, it must unify very different services and locations under the auspices of a singular vision that can be relevant in a variety of contexts and regardless of regional differences.

In an effort to brand themselves, the agencies accomplished seemingly incongruous imperatives by asserting a generalized creative philosophy

such as "resisting the usual." But unity was also achieved by avoiding meaningful differences between nation-states and populations. This was accomplished through the use of the generic term, "diversity" and its variations. For example, DDB includes copy on their website stating: "We are many things. Insight generators. Architects of influence, stewards of brands, advocates for customers, and citizens of the planet. We are 13,000 individuals in more than 90 countries. By the very nature of our global embrace, we are diverse." (DDB Worldwide 2012). In a similar fashion, Leo Burnett describes itself as a "HumanKind communications company" (Leo Burnett Worldwide 2012) that is primarily interested in connecting people through advertising.

Such use of democratic language appears merely to serve the function of positioning each organization as everything to everybody. But these broad gestures of inclusivity do not necessary play out as potential clients and investors become more specific in their search for services. To gain clearer insight on the agency's global presence, stakeholders are generally invited to scroll across a virtual map and click on any of the pre-determined regions of the world. The user is then redirected to a micro-site specific to that region. It is here where stakeholders can ascertain how agency resources are allocated; as it turns out, they are not equally distributed across regions.

In every configuration of the world, each of the networks included an administrative region identified as "Latin America." A review of the data indicates that discourses involving Latin America generally centered on the region's economic and strategic value to the larger network. The following text from the homepage of Dentsu, Inc. was typical of how the Latin America was addressed:

> Under the leadership of Renato Loes, CEO of DNW Latin America, who has reorganized operations and attracted excellent new talent, the Dentsu network offices in Brazil and Argentina are making very good progress. Current clients appreciate the improvements, and new clients are taking notice. This is critically important, because with Brazil hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016, it will be a very lucrative market. As a whole, Latin America is projected to grow faster than any of the world's developed economies. DNW is examining every strategic opportunity to enable the Dentsu network to participate in this growth (Dentsu Inc. Annual Report 2012).

The above quote illustrates the typical role these discourses serve. First, they reassure corporate investors and analysts that the region is under steady leadership. It is customary to announce key administrators

within the territory and to communicate their credentials. But the discourses were also meant to indicate that the region was accomplishing its primary task of generating profit. Such discourses are striking in their specificity and indicate how human and physical resources may be exploited. In an effort to reassure stakeholders about the viability and economic growth of the organization, it was common for the ad firms' promotion of themselves to point to the resources available within the region. It was also common, however, for corporate discourses to highlight the acquisition of symbolic resources including recognition by *Adlatina* as well as international creative awards such as the Cannes Lion. Such accolades are intended to contribute to the network's overall cultural capital (Bourdieu 1993).

The regional centers that constitute Global Latino

An objective of this study was to identify the key strategic locations within the global advertising industry's construction of Latin America. As a global market, the concept of Latin America generally referred to a geographic span beginning at the northern border of Mexico and extending through southern Chile. That said, the specific boundaries of Latin America were much more fluid and differed by network. Furthermore, these boundaries were flexible and appear to be driven by economic and strategic interests. Of the nation-states that typically fall within the rubric of Latin America, Brazil and Argentina appear to play a particularly prominent role in the companies' discourse on the region. Human and economic resources are poured into these countries and the networks have placed key offices within these territories. The dominance of Brazil and Argentina within corporate discourses appears to be driven by economic interest. Attention to Brazil is heightened by anticipation of a financial windfall associated with the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, Brazil boasts the world's fifth largest economy while Argentina possesses the second largest among Latin American nations. These particular economies are also sustained by the presence of large, international clients. Both countries also have thriving advertising communities with ties to US-based agencies that have been cultivated for close to a century (*Advertising Age* 2003). Given the longstanding presence of agencies within these markets, Argentine and Brazilian firms maintain a high profile in the creative awards circuit.

A further review of the corpus indicates, however, that only a handful of large metropolitan cities play a key role in the imagination of Latin America. According to Leslie (1995), the advertising industry has in

general moved away from regional centers and concentrated on huge metropolitan centers such as New York, Tokyo and London. Similarly, South American cities such as Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Lima, Santiago and Caracas, as well as the Brazilian cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo, have a consistent presence in these networks. These cities host large (white-collar) financial centers and serve as strategic nodes of information, knowledge and culture.

An unexpected finding was the prominence of US cities within global advertising networks' version of "Latin America." For example, J. Walter Thompson includes Miami as a nodal point in their Latin American network, JWT-LATAM. TBWA includes an agency based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory of the US, as part of their Latin American network while Miami serves as its headquarters. In the following text taken from TBWA's corporate website, the network articulates the strategic purpose of their network (TBWA Latin America 2012):

> In Latin America TBWA has presence in over 19 countries and the hub, TBWA\Latin America, located in Miami. The regional office has three goals: to serve international Clients as a point of entry for those who are looking to start their business in the region and as a hub for those who centralize their operations, to grow our business in the region, and to take care of TBWA's brand in Latin America.

Such discourses demonstrate how the representation of space has become less dependent on national identity; but, while the presence of US cities within Latina America may seem unintuitive, the inclusion of Miami and San Juan are a logical fit from an organizational standpoint. As the above excerpt indicates, Miami is physically situated near much larger markets in South America and has become a conduit for corporations based in South America. Miami's physical proximity to both New York and cities throughout Latin America allows for the expedited movement of bodies and materials between locations.

Discussion

Representations of place

Marketing practice is said to invoke the discourse of science, which presumes objectivity in the natural world. From this perspective, the process of constructing consumer markets is based on the assumption of homogeneity and natural cohesion within groups that are, in actuality,

quite diverse. In this chapter, I have sought to understand the logic by which the natural world is symbolically constructed through professional corporate communications. In doing so, I build on Anderson's (1991) argument that maps are instruments of domination that ultimately create illusions about how the physical world is classified.

This process of orienting the physical world from one's own perspective dates back to the development of the Beatine map, in which Western Christians first divided the world into three regions, assigning one to each of Noah's three sons: Asia to Shem, Africa to Ham, and Europe to Japeth. From this perspective, Mignolo (2005) argues that Latin America must be understood not as a geographical location, but rather as an idea that is rooted in colonialism that has evolved significantly over the past five hundred years. According to Mignolo, the "discovery" of the new world, along with the expelling Jews and Moors from the Iberian Peninsula, gave Europeans the belief that they occupied the "universal" position from which the world and its people could be classified. This orientation was codified in the development of the Mercatorian map that was later refined as innovations in cartography made possible more precise calculation of the planet's surface.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Mignolo argues that the idea of America as a whole began to be divided according to imperial histories, with Anglo-America placed in the North and a Latin America in the South. During this time, France advanced the project "Latinidad" after Spain had lost its standing in the world system. This effort was intended to create a transnational identity that united countries that considered themselves to be direct heirs of the Roman Empire with a "Latin" ethos embedded in the Latin language. "Latinidad" was meant to reposition former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the modern world order, with France as its economic, cultural and intellectual leader.

Today, transnational corporations occupy the space once held by national powers and it appears that commercial discourses reflect colonial discourses. Furthermore, maps that once served as administrative mechanisms for colonial enterprises appear to serve very similar purposes for the global advertising networks. Conventional wisdom holds that a map is a scientific abstraction of reality, merely representing something that is objectively "there." However, institutional discourses suggest that the representation of space is only loosely connected to geographic location or national identity. This was particularly evident in how maps were re-shaped to include certain cities, regardless of national affiliation, while excluding others. Furthermore, in an effort to maximize their economic and strategic value, spatial territories are disconnected from

their national, political, linguistic and ethnic characteristics. To borrow Anderson's words, such representations of physical space have become "pure sign, no longer compass to the world" (1991: p. 175).

At the same time, in corporations' discursive efforts to achieve global unity, I found that divisions that exist between nations were suppressed. In his discussion of the nature of cultural production, Bourdieu (1993) writes that, in fields where economic interests are paramount, players tend to act conservatively in an effort to avoid divisive practices. If these producers want to reach a broad audience, they necessarily dispense with sharp edges and anything that might divide or exclude readers. They must attempt to be inoffensive and never bring up problems. To this end, Bourdieu argues that cultural producers think in clichés, comparing them to Flaubert's notion of "received ideas" (1954) that are the banal, conventional, common notions that are well-received generally.

Consider that, during this investigation, I encountered a curious incident in which one of the global advertising networks publicly disciplined one of their satellite offices for the offense of privileging national interests over those of the global organization. The case involved a Y&R office based in Buenos Aires. The office, a subsidiary of Y&R's corporate parent WPP, produced a television advertisement on behalf of the Argentine government. The spot was designed to generate interest amongst Argentines in the 2012 London Olympics. However, the commercial was filmed secretly on location in the Falkland Islands, an archipelago under British rule, but to which Argentina lays claim. The spot was clearly meant to prompt nationalist sentiments and specifically identifies the location as "las Islas Malvinas," the Argentine name for the territory. Furthermore, the spot follows Argentine hockey player, Fernando Zulbergerg, as he trains for the forthcoming games and concludes with the copy "*para competir en suelo Inglés, entrenamos en suelo Argentino*" (to compete on British soil, we train on Argentine soil).

The spot prompted immediate outrage by the British government. While Argentina's claim to the territory in the commercial was entirely a symbolic gesture, the spot was widely criticized for allowing national politics to enter the purity of commercial discourses. The episode prompted WPP head Sir Martin Sorell to issue the following press statement (BBC 2012):

> It has come to our attention that our agency in Argentina created an ad for the Argentine government that has deeply offended many people in the UK and around the world. We strongly condemn this work and have asked the Argentine government to pull the spot. While we don't believe it was ever the intention of the ad's creators to desecrate a war memorial, they

> behaved in a manner that is unacceptable to our company. Furthermore, it is against our policy to be involved with anything that is politically motivated. In addition, this spot was also offensive to the Olympic spirit. Whatever it was the creators set out to highlight, what they produced was contrary to everything that we as a company stand for. We are deeply regretful for the pain this ad has caused and apologize to the many who have been rightly disturbed by it, as have we.

As the above case illustrates, the economic and strategic value of Latin America lies in construing it as an undifferentiated (tension-free) collective. In this view, the divisions that exist between nation-states also become problematic and must necessarily go unaddressed; or, if they are, they must be presented in ways that do not disrupt the economic mission of the corporate network.

Practices of distortion

A primary assumption of this study is that advertising discourses are more or less controlled by powerful symbol producers and thus serve as a fundamental way to reproduce dominance and hegemony. But institutional discourses are also said to shape audiences' mental representations that, in turn, shape their understanding of the world. As it relates to this discussion, institutional discourses anticipate spatial reality – not vice versa. By codifying and reorganizing the physical world, these discourses become a model *for*, rather than a model *of*, what they purport to represent. This has important implications as a growing portion of the world's cultural production has become concentrated in a few hands. Given the trans-nationalization of the advertising industry, agencies develop strategies, concepts, and campaigns that are congruent with their organizational structures. These institutional discourses, in turn, condition the economic and administrative resources that shape what Latin America will ultimately become.

There are a large number of independent nation-states that exist within the rubric of Latin America. However, in an effort to efficiently channel resources, marketers must minimize the cultural, political, national and linguistic differences that persist among, for example, Mexican, Brazilians, Argentines and Dominicans. In doing so, Ortiz argues that marketers construct and circulate an "international popular culture," a collective memory composed from the cultures of different nations. The Spanish language, of course, makes this process easier because it provides a unifying framework (Del Valle 2009), but it is not necessary. Brazil, a Portuguese speaking country, remains a focal point in global Latino.

Global advertising's Latin America is a polyglot, but that is not to say that it is particularly democratic. Economic standing gives one the right to exist symbolically in the world. Advertising practitioners focus disproportionately on those who have the means to participate in a capitalist economy. As Yudice (1995) argues, membership in and access to the institutions of "civil society" via consumerism are largely determined on a class basis. Thus, the citizens of global advertising's Latin America are not poor. Rather, they are squarely middle class. At the same time, marketing discourses only reinforce the absence of indigenous people and Afro-Latinos that had began with colonialism.

This is particularly problematic in Latin American countries, which are characterized by their urban primacy and economic disparity. According to Sassen (2000), inordinate concentrations of a nation-state's population and economic wealth are often bound within a single city, typically the capital. Consequently, these mega cities account for a disproportionate share of various nations' population, employment and gross national product; and, as Sassen (2000) observes, these "global cities" are often more organically linked with other global cities than their own nations, or even their own peripheries. I also found these cities to be the crucial nodal points for the coordination and servicing of the global advertising presence, which is not surprising given their dominance in the region. Thus, it is no accident that Mexico Distrito Federal is the only Mexican city to be included in the global advertising industry's concept of "Latin" America, while more marginalized cities such as San Cristobal or Oaxaca City are excluded. The populous but "peripheral" cities are further removed from globalization while Mexico Distrito Federal lies at the center of political and economic power in Mexico. In Central America, nations such as Guatemala, Costa Rica and Panama have an inconsistent presence in these networks. Belize, an English speaking country, only occasionally makes an appearance on a Latin American map. The Dominican Republic (BBDO Worldwide) and Barbados (DDB worldwide) are only fleetingly acknowledged, while Cuba remains entirely unaccounted for in the advertising world map. Similarly, Haiti is excluded from global advertising's Latin America despite its location in the Americas and being a French-speaking (Latin based) nation. Its exclusion may certainly be related to economic standing. Haiti is an impoverished country, but racial identification and linguistic practice are factors that exacerbate the country's isolation.

Thus, to be a citizen within the consumer republic of "Latin America" is not necessarily defined by national citizenship, linguistic practice or ethnic identity. The slippage between political nation-state and "consumer

nation" becomes even more apparent with the increasing consideration of US Latinos as a *de facto* nation within the Latin American construct. This is almost certainly related to their economic prowess. By 2004, the estimated numbers of "Hispanics" in the US approached 40 million, a number larger than the populations of Chile (16 million), Bolivia (7 million) and Peru (22 million). Indeed, with the exception of Mexico and Brazil, the US Hispanic population outnumbers any individual country in Latin America. Thus, their inclusion in Latin America, rather than North America, indicates that Latin America was never about fixed geographic space anyway. According to this logic, it is entirely possible for Miami to be considered the "capital of Latin America."

Conclusion

During the 2012 presidential debate on the topic of foreign policy, Mitt Romney, the candidate representing the Republican Party, discussed how American interests might be advanced through the exploitation of resources in Latin America. In a moment of candor, he made the following argument:

> Trade grows about 12 percent year. It doubles about five or so years. We can do better than that, particularly in Latin America. The opportunities for us in Latin America, we have just not taken advantage (of them) of fully. As a matter of fact, Latin America's economy is almost as big as the economy of China. We're all focused on China. Latin America is a huge opportunity for us – time zone, language opportunities.

What is curious about Romney's statement is how his enthusiasm for tapping the financial value of Latin America seems to be disconnected from his stated positions regarding the self-deportation of immigrants, border enforcement and support for strict English only policies. In this debate, Romney had accomplished the task of reducing an entire region to its economic value, while failing to account for the customs, linguistic practices and beliefs of the people who live there, as well as those living in its diaspora.

In this study, I found that corporate discourses work in much the same way. They similarly position Latin America as a resource to be exploited by more powerful, globalizing bodies. In the process, they abstract space from its physical context. With the click of a button, a region becomes a detachable piece of a larger puzzle. As with other discursive constructs – such as the census, the map and the museum, that Anderson (1991)

famously discusses – these discourses shape the way in which powerful global institutions imagine their dominion and enact power.

Ideological critique enables us to understand how power is enacted through institutions and texts. In this study, it has proven to be a valuable tool for examining how advertising agencies distort the world for self-serving purposes. Advertisers' practices will ultimately impact the way in which individuals living throughout the world will be hailed through advertising. Thus, professional practices within the global advertising industry have important implications regarding the formation and reformation of collective identity, a topic that warrants further investigation. My hope is that this exploratory discussion will prompt future lines of research. For example, I have identified some of the nodal centers that figure prominently in the construction of Latin America. There is an important opportunity, however, to study professional dynamics at the local level. As Sassen (2000) points out, global cities are not unbounded from space and are indeed embedded in specific physical places; in this vein, consider the non-jet setter who takes the bus in to clean the white collar "global city" office. Furthermore, while advertising professionals are members of a transnational business community, they are at the same time citizens of their respective nation-states. How do advertising professionals who work at, for example, the TBWA affiliate in Honduras negotiate these hegemonic discourses? Furthermore, to what degree do these practitioners resist hegemonic discourses by re-asserting local identities, customs and language? Such research would help to thicken the description of global advertising.

Bibliography

Advertising Age. Ad Age Encyclopedia of Advertising (2003), http://adage.com/article/adage-encyclopedia/argentina/98324/

Anderson, B. *Imagined communities*. New York: Verso, 1991.

BBC. "Agency Condemns its Own Falklands Advert". http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17963577, 4 May 2012.

Bonsu, S. "Colonial Images in Global Times: Consumer Interpretations of Africa and Africans in Advertising". *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 12, no. 1 (2009): 1-25.

Bourdieu, P. *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

—. *On Television*. New York: The New York Press, 1998

Castells, M. “European Cities, the Informational Society and the Global Economy”. *Journal of Economic and Social Geograph*y 84, no. 4 (1993): 247-257.

Chávez, C. “Hispanic Agencies and Profits of Distinction: An Examination of the Advertising Industry as a Field of Cultural Production”. *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 15, no. 3 (2012): 307-325.

Cornelissen, J. *Corporate Communications: Theory and Practice.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2004.

DDB Worldwide. *Agency culture* (2012), http://us.ddb.com/offices /diversity.html

Del Valle, J. “US Latinos, la Hispanofonia, and the Language Ideologies of High Modernity”. In *Globalization and language in the Spanish Speaking world*, edited by C. Mar-Molinero and M. Stewart, 27-46. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009.

Dentsu, Inc. *2011 Annual Report*. http://www.dentsu.com/ir/data/annual/ 2011/pdf/EAR_h_all.pdf

Deuze, M. *Media Work: Digital Media and Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007.

FIAP. Festival Ibero Americano de Publicida 2012 Conference Website. (2012), www.fiaponline.net.

Flaubert, G. *Dictionary of Accepted Ideas.* New York: New Directions, 1954.

Fürsich, E. “In Defence of Textual Analysis: Restoring a Challenged Method for Journalism and Media Studies”. *Journalism Studies* 10, no. 2: 238-252.

García Canclini, N. *Consumers and Citizens: Globalization and Multicultural Conflicts*. Madison, WI: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.

Goss, B. “Hail to the Subject: The Durability (for the moment) of Neo-Liberalism”. Cultural Studies: A Research Annual 5, no. 1 (2009): 363-393.

Leslie, D.A. “Global Scan: The Globalization of Advertising Agencies, Concepts and Campaigns”. *Economic Geography* 71, no. 4 (1995): 402-426.

McKee, A. *Textual Analysis: A Beginner’s Guide*. London: Sage, 2003.

Martin-Barbero, J. *Communication, Culture and Hegemony: From the Media to Mediations.* London: Sage, 1993.

Mick, D. “Consumer Research and Semiotics: Exploring Morphology, Signs, Symbols and Significance”. *Journal of Consumer Research* 13 (1986): 196-213.

Mignolo, W. *The Idea of Latin America*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

Nesler, M.S., Aguinis, H., Quigley, B.M. and Tedeschi, J.T. "The Effect of Credibility on Perceived Power". *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 23, no. 17 (1993): 1407-1425

Odih, P. "The Women's Market: Marketing Fact or Apparition?" *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 3 (1999): 165-193.

Pope, D. *The Making of Modern Advertising*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983.

Sassen, S. *Cities in a World Economy*, 2nd Edition. Thousand, Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2000.

Schroeder, J. E. and D. Zwick. "Mirrors of Masculinity: Representation and Identity in Advertising Images". *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 7, no. 1 (2004): 21-52.

Schudson, M. *Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion: It's Dubious Impact on American Society*. New York: Basic Books, 1984.

Schultz, I. "The Journalistic Gut Feeling: Journalistic Doxa, News Habitus and Orthodox News Values". *Journalism Practice* 1, no. 2: 190-207.

Sinclair, J. "The Hollywood of Latin America: Miami as Regional Center of in Television Trade". *Television and New Media* 4, no. 3 (2003): 211-229.

Story, J. *An Introductory Guide to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia, 1993.

TBWA Worldwide. *2012 Fact Sheet*. http://open.mytbwa.com/tbwadotcom/TBWA_FactSheet_Jan2013.pdf

TBWA Latin America. *2012 Fact Sheet*. http://open.mytbwa.com/docs/latinamerica/2012_TBWA_LatAm_Fact_Sheet_english.pdf

Thompson, J. *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984.

—. *Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1990.

Thrift, N. "The Urban Geography of International Commercial Capital". In *Global Restructuring and Territorial Development*, edited by J. Henderson and M. Castells, 203.-233. London: Sage, 1987.

Williamson, J. *Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising*. London: Marion Boyars, 2000.

Young & Rubicam. *Agency profile* (2012), http://www.yr.com/about.

Yudice, G. 1995. "Civil Society, Consumption, and Governmentality in an Age of Global Restructuring". *Social Text* 14, no.4 (1995): 1-25.

CHAPTER FIVE

¿VISCA ESPAÑA? *LA SELECCIÓN*: NATIONAL METAPHOR AND THE 2010 WORLD CUP[1]

MATEO SZLAPEK-SEWILLO

In July 2012 the Spanish football team successfully recaptured the European Championships it had won four years earlier, to augment its first World Cup title in 2010. In doing so, the team known to many as *la selección* continued its golden age and became the first national team to win three successive international tournaments, a long time coming after decades of underachievement.

As well as eliciting joy and relief, sporting victory refocused attention on the unresolved tensions of regionalism and identity in Spain. This chapter determines the theoretical prospects of the national team becoming a unifying symbol. To do so, it examines the reaction of Spain's victory in different corners of the country and explores efforts to rehabilitate a truly representative 'national' Spanish identity with the victorious national team as its model. I employ a case study of Spain's national football team to show how and why these discourses are generated through cultural symbols – and, in this case, with the (possible? partial?) effect of rehabilitation of the national team as a unifying entity.

The first part of the chapter develops a model of nationalism which has as its constituent elements Benedict Anderson's formulation of the "imagined community" (Anderson 1983), Michael Billig's theory of "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995), and Eric Hobsbawm's "invention of tradition" thesis (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The focus is then refined to look specifically at the contribution of popular culture to processes of identity formation, referencing Theodor Adorno, Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School, before telescoping in on the role of sport. To do so, I consult the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, Eric Dunning and Richard Gruneau.

The chapter's second section maps the interaction of football and the Spanish state in the twentieth century. It begins by establishing a consistent pattern of state intrusion into the game, from as far back as the 1920 Olympic Games that witnessed the revival of the "Spanish fury" myth as a way of endowing the national team's surprise second placing with politically expedient meaning. Later efforts by the Franco regime are explained as belonging to an invention of tradition that attempted to endow football in Spain with a homogenizing character to assist the creation of a uniform national identity. The second section also looks at how two football clubs, Futbol Club (FC) Barcelona of Catalonia and Athletic Bilbao of the Basque Country, responded in different ways to the cultural homogenization of the Franco regime. Indeed, the two clubs came to resemble imagined communities for their parent regionalist movements. My focus then turns to the national team's continued insinuation with the values of the regime that prompted its ambivalent historical legacy. Moreover, I demonstrate that conservative media in Spain have continued their preferred discursive construction of *la selección* by blaming past sporting failures on "anorexic patriotism" and a deficit of national identity.

This sets the scene for the final section of the chapter, which integrates the insights of bloggers, academics and sports journalists "on the ground" in Spain, as well as considering contrasting reactions of conservative mainstream media to tournament victory. I will show that victory encouraged conservative media in Spain to resume the symbolic permeation of the national team with values of a "New Spain" in an attempt to elevate the team to an aspirational metaphor capable of sustaining the imagined community. Brief analysis of television ratings data for the team's World Cup matches shows that the success of the national team has normalized its presence in Spain's "peripheral" regions. This normalization of the team, as well as its nucleus of Catalan players, augmented the viability of this symbolic construction. This section will thus demonstrate that the national team's World Cup victory inspired attempts to convert the national team into a representative institution for all Spaniards and sparked a brief euphoria linked to the "new hope" of the nation.

The chapter ends on a note of cautious optimism. The severity of economic and political crisis and the unresolved tensions of regionalism in Spain mean that the project to convert the team into a unifying institution and common point of reference for all Spaniards is, for now, neither credible nor viable. It was, to borrow a phrase from a Basque senator, "based [...] on an impossible hope." However, victory and the squad's heavy Catalan composition presented the image of a rehabilitated team to

different corners of the country. This contributed to the normalization of the team as a national symbol after decades of fascist rule had invested it with the symbolism and imagery of the regime. For those in the Spanish media with an affinity for a single, coherent national identity, the World Cup victory was an opportunity to embark on a narrative to imbue the national team with the characteristic qualities they want to see in the "New Spain" – collective labor, solidarity and an ability to learn from the mistakes of the past.

Ultimately, this chapter details efforts made to convert the Spanish national football team into a nationalizing institution and metaphor by those observers who seek a symbol of a Spain that is shorn of divisive historical baggage. I also assay to make a contribution to the canon of nationalism literature that is indebted to the theories of scholars who contend that the nation is discursively constructed and sustained in the minds of its members.

The key finding is that the "impossible hope" of a reorientation of Spanish national identity did drive such discursive efforts, primarily in the traditional centers of Spanish nationalism – but that these efforts were also greeted with skepticism. However, the analysis also shows that, though enveloped by economic and political crisis, World Cup victory normalized the Spanish football team and helped to divest it of the legacy of years of political intrusion and sporting failure. What follows is, finally, an attempt to understand the genesis, context and limits of 2010's bout of nationalist euphoria.

Nationalism, popular culture and sport

This section of the chapter begins by tackling the phenomenon of nationalism and the nation via theories put forward by Anderson, Billig, and Hobsbawm. Each posits the construction of the nation and the importance of common cultural touchstones to cement allegiance and promote unity. From this starting point, I will focus on the role of popular culture in contributing to the development of alternative, non-state identities, pausing to consider the Grasmcian notion of cultural products as an instrument of control. I will then explore the growing field of sports scholarship surveyed by Pierre Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, Eric Dunning and Richard Gruneau. The first two wrote extensively about sport as a product of modernization and the "civilizing process", while the latter two, especially Gruneau from the so-called "Massachusetts School", emphasize a political economy approach and the role of sport as an agent of identity formation.

The goal of this introductory section is to establish the dynamic process by which cultural symbols and institutions catalyze identity formation, introduce sport as a discipline of popular culture and address how sporting teams can become nationalizing cultural institutions capable of sustaining the imagined community of the nation. The next section details the interaction of sport and the state in twentieth century Spain and will define the political character of football in Spain. I posit that the national team possesses sufficient symbolic meaning to prompt the discursive construction of a potent "national symbol", as Spanish nationalists have clearly recognized. The final sub-section will look at just how those attempts to enthrone a national symbol have been made.

Defining nationalism

Nationalism is a political doctrine that asserts that the world's people are divided into nations, each of which "has the right of self-determination" (Ignatieff 1993: p. 5). Though there were clear assertions of national consciousness before the French Revolution of 1789, none made explicit reference to self-determination and collective popular sovereignty. The men and women of the nascent Republic needed to be "molded into some sort of unity" (Kamenka: p. 10). Thus, the French school of nationalism asserted that "the state [the political, administrative unit] defined the nation" (Ignatieff 1993: p. 7). With this, "civic" nationalism was born as a doctrine that considers only a person's willingness to adhere to a political identity (Ignatieff 1993: p. 6). Civic nationalism demands only the will and compliance to belong to the basic social unit, the state; thus, membership is open to all those who assent.

This development met resistance in Germany, which opposed the ideals and aspirations of its neighbor's revolution. In response, an opposing theory of nationalism claimed that nations were "organisms of which the individual was a subordinate part" and that "divisions between nations were thus fundamental human divisions" (Kamenka 1973: p. 11). So was born the concept of the *Volksgenosse*, the man who shares "your blood, your language, your history and your national aspirations" (Kamenka 1973: p. 11). Ethnic nationalism was so configured and it circumscribed the membership of the nation much more strictly.

Though these competing theories are instructive, the approach which will be of most value to this chapter is the one established by scholars who emphasized the subjective, quotidian "construction" of the nation. Here, there is common ground between Anderson, Billig and Hobsbawm. In their shared view, the nation is a fictitious, subjective entity and so must

be 'imagined' in ways that separate the processes of nation and state building. I will use these approaches, particularly those of Billig and Anderson, to argue that national identity is symbolically constructed through reference to nationalizing institutions as well as ubiquitous cultural practices and rituals.

Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* considers how a coherent sense of national identity can be constructed in a society which is too vast for its members to have met one another (hence its status as "imagined"). To synchronize the physical boundaries of the state and the undefined borders of the nation requires the presence of national symbols to hasten ritual processes of nationalization. Anderson offers examples of institutions that fulfill this role of a symbolic, discursive national construction: newspapers, linguistic consolidation and homogenous schooling. Print capitalism and improving literacy greatly accelerated this nationalization process since, by promoting linguistic homogeneity, they circumscribed a set of national practices and stories that could easily be transmitted. Crucial to Anderson's nationalization is the simultaneity of cultural transmission: the daily newspaper assumes and produces shared interests and addresses each member of the imagined community at once. The idea of simultaneity has major implications for my consideration of the Spanish national football team as a unique cultural institution that speaks to all Spaniards. Though Anderson overemphasizes the printed word at the expense of other media, I will broaden the scope when discussing the significance of television ratings for Spain's World Cup matches and their role in the normalizing of the national team.

Another entry point into a discussion of popular culture's role in the creation of national identity can be found in Billig's "banal nationalism" thesis. Billig coined the phrase to describe the observed phenomenon of the continual "flagging" of nationhood through modest, otherwise trivial gestures and routines (Billig 1995: p. 6). The collective performance of these rituals – saluting the flag, attending sporting events, national figures on currency, and idiomatic turns of phrase – constitute the "daily routine" of the nation. In so doing, Billig argues, national sentiment is perpetually on the verge of mobilization and behaves according to a set of markers immediately understood by members of a community. His contention that the nation is best understood not through the exotic or the extreme – but, instead, through mundane rituals – will guide the analysis of the reactions to Spain's tournament victory.

A significant contribution to the understanding of how nations accrue legitimacy was developed by Hobsbawm. Writing in tandem with Terence Ranger, Hobsbawm argues that nations respond to social upheaval by

consciously engaging in the reconstruction and "invention" of ritual social and cultural traditions to promote group solidarity and social cohesion. Not only does nationalism "make use of history to legitimate its innovations, but much of its own contents rests on invented traditions" (Smith 1993: p. 12). Hobsbawm explains:

> "Invented tradition" is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. A striking example is the deliberate choice of a Gothic style for the nineteenth-century rebuilding of the British parliament, and the equally deliberate decision after World War II to rebuild the parliamentary chamber on exactly the same basic plan as before (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983: pp. 1-2).

The post-World War II reconstruction of Britain's Parliament building was done according to an anachronistic architectural style in order to establish a narrative of "business as usual" and to revive and promote a historic ideal of Westminster as metonym of democracy. In so doing the Parliament building becomes a tacit point of reference for all Brits seeking to isolate the essential characteristics of "Britishness". The invention of tradition suggests an overtly political motive: to smooth the bumpy road of history into an expedient, contiguous national narrative.

Anderson, Billig and Hobsbawm have made important contributions to our understanding of how the nation can be created and how it is sustained in the minds of its members. The nation is effectively imagined by referencing historical and social practices governed by a set of homogenizing national institutions. These institutions are infused with specific meaning and become a way of "teaching" national behaviors. These nascent horizontal kinships are further consolidated by subconscious adherence to symbolic, ritualized routines and cemented by historical commemoration. The subjective construction of the nation thus makes membership voluntary, not coercive.

Beginning with a deconstruction of how "popular" culture represents a break from the "high" culture which came before it, the next sub-section will explore how cultural symbols can teach national behaviors and how the "legitimate" sphere of cultural influence moved away from the state. In turn, the unique characteristics of sport make it ideally suited for this inquiry.

Culture, sport, and identity

When considering the role played by cultural symbols and institutions in habituating a population to a given identity, it is worth examining the emphases given to "high" (elite) and "low" (popular) culture, their respective contributions and how they influence this chapter.

Ernest Gellner claims that state-led efforts foster national loyalty by institutionalizing a national "high" culture – a set of products that are mediated, codified and carefully supervised. For Gellner, the most prominent of these cultural institutions has been state education, as he contends that it is "by far his [humankind's] most precious investment and the primary conduit for the nationalization of a community" (Gellner 1983: p. 36). The unwieldy demands of the nationalization project meant that only elites were capable of its creation. For Gellner, the "high culture" that he defines as a "literate codified culture which permits context-free communication" is what best allows for the construction of a coherent identity (Gellner and Smith 1996: p. 368).

Other notable proponents of the homogenizing effects of culture include the so-called Frankfurt School, represented by Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin, among others. In *The Culture Industry*, Adorno, alongside Max Horkheimer, writes that "films, radio and magazines make up a system which is uniform as a whole and in every part" (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: p. 120). The output of what we would recognize as mass or popular culture were, to Adorno, debasing products of a society hopelessly given over to "commodification, fetishization and standardization" (Witkin 2003: p. 3).

Adorno's characterization of popular culture as an efflux of adversarial capitalist-proletariat relations is allied with Antonio Gramsci. According to Gramsci, the mass media and popular culture can be interpreted as instruments of control intended to reinforce hegemony and to create a permissible space for an "escapism" which allows for the "dreaming of the people." Gramsci also formulated his conception of the "national-popular" that contends that the feeling of "belonging to a specific national collective" can only be complete if the non-elite classes lend their support and are permitted to participate in the common imagining of a national history (Holub 1992: p. 67). The Italy of the early twentieth century, Gramsci observes, was characterized by an elite class which divested itself of any responsibility to contribute to a unified national culture. Gramsci's account of the national-popular dovetails with Anderson's theorizations, insofar as state-led efforts to direct a single identity via high cultural forms are posited to lack popular legitimacy. The question of popular acceptance

will be acknowledged throughout my efforts to establish Spain's national football team as wielding substantial symbolic and transformative non-elite status.

The critical accounts of Gellner, Adorno and Gramsci are of substantial merit but, in the face of globalization and the fluidity of cultural transmission, they rely heavily on class-based interpretations and may look archaic and reductionist. Though they are a necessary component of any serious attempt to establish the role of culture in the nationalizing process, my synthesis will integrate contemporary theorizing of culture that reveals the intersection of popular culture and processes of identity formation.

Technological acceleration and the ability to mass-produce and transmit cultural forms have weakened the state's monopoly as "the pre-eminent entity around which identity is shaped" (Edensor 2002: p.vi). Identities had largely been shaped by traditional efforts to promote a single political identity vis-à-vis a dominant national culture. However, as cultural transmission increasingly flouts national borders, it has ceased to be the sole domain of social elites and the state. Tim Edensor argues that the failure to consider anything other than the nation as "the space in which culture and everyday life operates" can be attributed to our overzealous belief in its permanence (Edensor 2002: p. 1). Indeed "the rise of popular forms of entertainment… is not generated by national elites but is facilitated through…advances in transport and communication technologies" (Edensor 2002: p. 4).

Relatively little attention has been paid to conceptualizations of nationalism that were produced outside of the context of "nation-state, citizenship and national society" (Edensor 2002: p. 1). The development of artistic styles dedicated to the eradication of the boundaries between "high" and "low" or popular culture nonetheless produce tension for advocates of high culture (Inglis 2005: p. 78), as well as for commentators who point to globalization's role in eradicating these boundaries. In the words of Jason Dittmer:

> Processes of globalization have not eliminated identity […] but instead have heightened attention both to it and the efforts needed to bolster stable place-based identities in the face of ongoing processes of migration and other global circulations of people, goods, and ideas (Dittmer 2010: p.xvii).

Academic studies of the interaction between popular culture and identity formation that looked outside the domain of the state as its primary transmitter have taken on a new resonance. Popular culture has assumed pre-eminence as the dominant mode of cultural transmission within societies and a primary determinant of identity. In a world where

news and entertainment are freely available from overseas sources, there are no longer readily defined, geographically grounded limits to our cultural consumption.

Crucial to understanding how "popular" culture came to usurp traditional "high" culture is the inevitability of such a process under a regime of media saturation. Economic and technological change has created a world where national boundaries no longer regulate or inhibit cultural exchange. Critics of popular culture – Gellner disapprovingly calls it "wild" – frame the issue as a normative one and show concern for the quality of citizens it produces or what it says about power relations within a society (Edensor 2002: p. 4). This chapter is not concerned with a debate on the relative merits of high versus low culture; it merely illustrates the decline of the "stable, place-based" identity and the commensurate uptake of identities derived from alternative sources.

As concerns sport specifically, I will consider the contributions of Norbert Elias, Eric Dunning, Pierre Bourdieu and the "Massachusetts School". Working in the sociological tradition, these thinkers contributed to an understanding of sport not only as a product of popular culture abstracted for cultural consumption, but also as a reflection of evolving social norms.

Norbert Elias theorized what he called "Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation" ("The Civilizing Process"). The basic premise is that the emergence of the modern state imposed external social/moral and internal behavioral constraints on the expression of interpersonal violence (Elias and Dunning 1986). Owing to our "lengthening chains of interdependence", we mask our emotions to better interact with the other members of our community and develop more appropriate forms of leisure and games. Elias and his British protégé Eric Dunning contend that, in this routinized, civilized society, we seek the release of tension; and we find it in professional sport. In so doing, sport assumes the character of something like theatre – but more popularly contested, effectively becoming "a mock contest with the tensions engendered by it and the catharsis, the release from tension at the end" (Elias and Dunning 1986: p. 159). Thus sport, or what Elias and Dunning label "sports-games", fit within the contours of modern, rule-governed society, but offer a safe space for emotional catharsis.

French scholar Pierre Bourdieu, in his widely cited "How Can One be a Sports Fan?", takes a decidedly more class-based approach when determining the evolution from games – vulgar, unregulated, non-cathartic – to sports that have rules and constrain the legitimate range of participant behaviors (Bourdieu 1999: p. 429). In doing so Bourdieu draws a direct

link between folk dances and high-art musical forms. He considers how this division of regulated sport and amateur game creates a different purpose for the pursuit of each. "The bodily exercises of the 'elite'," says Bourdieu, "are disconnected from the ordinary social occasions with which folk games remained associated", becoming an exercise that treats the body as "an end in itself" (Bourdieu 1999: p. 430). The abstracted pursuit of physical health that is oriented toward "well-being" and "self-development" divests the practice of elite sport of overt, socially constructed meaning. However, the door is left ajar for the suffusion of values (such as subordination to the team, the will to win, courage, physical sacrifice) into ritualized team sports that are more the province of the non-elite strata.

Where Bourdieu's analysis is most pertinent to my own is his ascription of sport as a practice that incubates characteristic "values": "sport is conceived as a training in courage and manliness, 'forming the character' and inculcating the 'will to win' which is the mark of the true leader, but a will to win within the rules" (Bourdieu 1999: p. 430). The presumption of values will be crucial when exploring the infiltration of the Spanish national team with fascist imagery and the *furia Española* myth. According to Bourdieu, sport can thus assume a moral relevance, but it gains an oppositional quality and becomes "an object of struggles… between the social classes" (Bourdieu 1999). Bourdieu's characterization of sport, its purpose and its meaning, along with the contributions of Elias and Dunning, has done much to elevate sport to the subject of critical inquiry.

Writing in the 1970s, Richard Gruneau and other members of the "Massachusetts School" sought to reposition sport into a political economy framework. They took inspiration from the Gramscian notion of hegemony discussed above. This school argues that modern sport is "viewed as a celebration of modern values of competition and winning and organized around principles of the division of labor, capitalism, and professionalism" (Crosstet 2001: p. 14,933). By extension then, modern professional sport is a place where meaning is "constructed, challenged and reconstructed" (Crosstet 2001). Sport's ambiguous significations provide the link between it, popular culture, and identity formation. Moreover, in international team sport, which pits nation against nation, athletes and supporters seek sporting victory but also the validation of their set of cultural and ideological practices.

I have already discussed how elites and central political actors are increasingly unable to project a single national identity as capital, labor and information become more mobile. This loss of the state's hold on

identity has been exacerbated by the contemporaneous assertion of alternative identities, prompting a fundamental transformation of the way communities form. In this view, "The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people" (Hobsbawm 1990: p. 143).

Elias, Dunning, Bourdieu and Gruneau demonstrate that following sport is a significant means for people to create "a sense of difference and a way of classifying themselves and others" (MacClancy 1996: pp. 2-3). Moreover, the practice and consumption of sport allows sporting teams, governed by common rules, to become the common institutional points of reference that contribute to identity formation.

In keeping with these themes, Frank Lechner explains a Dutch tendency to retrospectively attribute their style of football to innate "national" characteristics and their nation's place in the world (Lechner 2007: p. 219). Though he is cautious about tracing the status of the game in the Netherlands to any shared national trait, his analysis shows how pervasive the association of "national traits" to a culture and style of play can be. Dutch football tradition and reportage has all the components of the national institution discussed earlier: a point of reference to foster allegiance, the valorization of past sporting achievement in a bid to reconstruct the past, a sense of representing all Dutch men and women, and the linking of the team's fortunes to the nation's own, in an effort to convert the team into a sort of national metaphor (Lechner 2007: p. 219). In this vein, Tony Ward recounts a remarkable occurrence when the Netherlands defeated Germany in the semi-finals of the 1988 European Championship semi-finals. Though the game took place on a Tuesday night in Hamburg, "nine million Dutch, 60% of the population, turned out onto the streets to celebrate" (Ward 2009: pp. 518-519). It was to that point the single largest public celebration since the end of German occupation in World War II. A Dutch war veteran proudly claimed, "It feels as though we've won the war at last" (Ward 2009: p. 519).

According to the framework which has been developed throughout this section, there is a link to be made between the imagined national community and its representative symbols and institutions. If so, then it becomes hard to resist the notion that the significance of national sporting victory can transcend the playing field and provide succor to those in search of narrative and identity. By the logic and lexicon of the imagined community, the sporting team can become a common symbolic point of reference.

Football in Spain: sport, politics and nationhood

Building on the previous section's discussion of the imagined construction of the nation, I now examine football's interaction with the Spanish state in the twentieth century. It was during this time that football, which developed as a leisure activity, gained an explicitly political dimension. The major Basque and Catalan clubs, Athletic Bilbao and Futbol Club (FC) Barcelona, acted as imagined communities that offered a forum for the expression of non-state identities. These developments will be related to the theoretical concepts developed earlier and contextualized against the backdrop of Spain's tradition of peripheral nationalism (*i.e.*, regionalism). I will then consider the historical legacy of the Spanish national team, the extent of its ideological exploitation by the Franco regime, the symbolic status of the team before its current run of success, and the project of those who seek to convert the team into a national metaphor.

The objectives of this section are threefold: first, to argue that football in Spain has been so profoundly influenced by the nation's history that it is impossible to consider it apolitically. The second aim is to show that, as a response to the cultural repressions of the Franco regime and the plight of their parent regional movements, FC Barcelona of Catalonia and Athletic Bilbao of the Basque Country behaved as imagined communities, reinforcing their supporter identities. Third and finally, I show that the national team was unable to escape Franco's propaganda and that this circumstance contributed to the team being "disowned" by many Spaniards. As a result, contemporary discourse recasts the team as a neutral point of reference, free of residual associations with the regime.

Football is nationalized

Consistent with the pattern observed by Bourdieu, Gruneau and Dunning, the urbanization and modernization of Spain in the early twentieth century facilitated the emergence of football as a cheap leisure activity. The national team did not develop any auxiliary political associations until the 1920 Antwerp Olympic Games, where a surprise second-place finish "established a set of folkloric values about the nature of 'Spanishness' itself" (O'Brien 2010: p. 3). The *furia Española* (Spanish fury) myth, which sought to describe the Spaniard as impetuous, hard-working and aggressive can be attributed to the wishes of those in the Franco regime and media to construct a fledgling national sporting unity (Llopis Goig 2008: p. 58; O'Brien 2010: p. 3). The eagerness to appropriate the *furia* myth can best be explained by reference to Hobsbawm's invention of

tradition and Anderson's imagined community theses. The former explains the regime's attempts to bolster its own legitimacy by creating and celebrating a set of values (the aforementioned *furia* in conjunction with an essentialist Catholic vision of Spain) which it saw as desirable and innate to the national character. The latter approach concerns the inculcation of national loyalty and a set of values which all Spaniards could simultaneously understand as belonging to their nation and so aspire to emulate. Throughout this section, we will see that the Franco regime assayed to invest its preferred symbolism and iconography in the national team.

In parallel with the *furia* mythology, FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao, the largest clubs in the most vociferously anti-Franco and separatist regions of Spain, came to resemble imagined communities for their respective causes. Along with the fate of the national team, discussion of the regional teams offers an explanation for how football in Spain both reflects Spanish society and influences it, consistent with the model developed previously. To situate the national team as a national symbol that had previously been tarnished by losing in international competitions, and by its association with Franco, also furnishes historical precedent for Spain's polarization. At the same time, this back story explains the hopes of Spaniards who would gladly see the national team flourish into a national metaphor capable of closing old wounds.

Both FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao were victimized by the Franco regime. In keeping with the policy of suppression of peripheral identities and banning of regional languages, notably Catalan and Basque (*Euskara*), the game was "Hispanicized". Athletic Bilbao of the Basque Country and FC Barcelona of Catalonia had their names changed (Nili 2009: p. 255). The latter club's crest, which featured the Catalan *senyera*, was altered to instead display the Spanish flag. All non-Spanish flags were banned from stadia (Nili 2009: p. 255). This shows that the Franco regime was aware of the significance of depriving these institutions of symbols. The bans were consistent with Billig's thesis of banal nationalism (explored earlier) and theories of cultural performance and recreation, in this case as preventive measures against Basques and Catalans engaging in a process of glorification and commemoration.

Because of its role as a bulwark of Catalan nationalism, FC Barcelona suffered most at the hands of Franco during and after the Civil War. Josep Sunyol, the club's President and a vocal advocate of Catalan nationalism, was murdered in 1936 by Falangists (Nili 2009: p. 265). Another illustrative event was the semi-final of the 1943 Spanish Cup. With Barcelona leading Real Madrid three goals to nil after the first game, the

Catalan side's dressing room was paid a visit before the second match by a government official who made it clear that "some of you [Barcelona players] are only playing because of the generosity of the regime that has forgiven your lack of patriotism" (Foer 2004: p. 198). The hint was easy enough to take; the eventual result was 11-1 in favor of Real Madrid and the game lives on as a reminder of the intertwining of politics and football**.**

Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao responded to the external political pressures of the Franco regime and the eventual globalization of the game in very different ways. In an intentional attempt to accommodate the civic, cosmopolitan character of Catalan nationalism, FC Barcelona insisted on signing foreign players throughout the Franco regime, attracting the ire of the regime (Castro-Ramos 2008: p. 700). Such gestures helped to show how membership of the Catalan nation can be acquired through assent (Nili 2009: p. 265). Athletic Bilbao chose another way to demonstrate its commitment to the cause of Basque nationalism. Since 1919, the club has consciously signed only Basque players, and though its own definition of "Basque" has since relaxed to include players with Basque grandparents and/or those brought up in the region, it remains a policy to which the club is devoted (Llopis Goig 2008: p. 58). This stands in stark contrast to virtually all other professional teams (Nili 2009: p. 261). Setting ethnic limits on membership of its playing roster mimics the essentialism which underpins Basque nationalism.

Though Athletic's policy was received more warmly by the regime than Barcelona's – they were at least signing Spaniards – the club's association with the Basque nationalist movement attracted substantial antipathy. In 1937 the club formally lent its support to the campaign for Basque independence and encouraged its players to join the Basque (Euzkadi) national team (Llopis Goig 2008: p. 58).

Franco drew heavily on the popularity of football to cement his own legitimacy and "define an incumbent sense of national identity" (O'Brien 2010: p. 3). Football is a sport well-suited to such manipulation. It is governed by rules and resembles a standard, commodified product of popular culture. A Gramscian interpretation explains football as an instrument to placate the masses. Elias and Dunning, however, suggest more about football's status as a harbinger of modernity that allows for the expression of unrestrained, anti-regime sentiment. There is ample evidence of the state's intervention into football during the Franco era to suggest that the "mass appeal of the game [was used] to construct a homogenous notion of Spanish identity whilst suppressing many of its roots as an expression of local and regional difference" (O'Brien 2010: p. 4). I will explain how the Spanish national team was exploited for these ends; but

first I will further explore the status of FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao as imagined communities that offered a safe harbor for Catalan and Basque nationalism.

FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao as imagined communities

The Franco regime's suppression of peripheral, "non-Spanish" identities and interventions into the governance of football clubs clearly affected Barcelona and Athletic. The two clubs chose to respond to these exogenous pressures in diametrically opposed ways. However, what these responses had in common was that, by imitating their parent nationalist movements, the clubs were elevated to the status of cultural and political institutions, leitmotifs for Catalan and Basque nationalism, and visible symbols of the movements they represented (Nili 2009: p. 246; O'Brien 2010: p. 3). In so doing, they sustained the imagined communities of each, blending mythology, dissent, and the opportunity to protest against the regime at the stadium during the match day event. I will now explore the behavior of stadium audiences during the time of Franco that contributed to processes of identity formation.

According to Chris Stone, the match day event is a "physical manifestation of certain regularity that fuels an ongoing process of identity formation within the day-to-day lives of those involved" (Stone 2007: p. 171). Attendance at FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao games throughout the years of the Franco regime allowed for the symbolic performance of regional identity in two ways. The first accords with Billig's banal nationalism – the match day event is a quotidian regularity, a habit that, consciously for some and subconsciously for others, reinforces a bounded set of subjectively constructed values. The second interpretation owes more to Anderson's imagined communities. During the time of Franco, the crowds in Barcelona and Bilbao behaved like these imagined communities – they were physically circumscribed, largely unknown to one another, and yet shared a common point of sympathetic reference (Nili 2009: p. 249).

To accept these interpretations strengthens the claims of Barcelona and Athletic fans that their clubs were more than mere receptacles of anti-regime sentiment, but also institutions capable of nurturing these quasi-national communities and reproducing and celebrating their culture. In so doing they became symbolic institutions capable of fostering allegiance and "nationalizing" their supporters. In sum, the match day event for Barcelona and Athletic allowed for the celebration and consolidation of Catalan and Basque identities. Each victory was converted into a symbolic

triumph against the regime (Nili 2009: p. 256). Jeremy MacClancy explains that for supporters of Athletic, "football became one of the very few legal ways by which Basques could demonstrate who they were and what they were made of" (MacClancy 1996: p. 192). The same claim could be made for Barcelona's supporters.

Spanish writer Manuel Vázquez Montalbán argued that the regime acknowledged the value of these dissident clubs as "safety valves" and allowed for a permissible degree of expression of anti-regime sentiment (Llopis Goig 2008: p. 60). Montalbán called FC Barcelona and Real Madrid "necessary enemies" which became mutually dependent on one another to affirm and legitimize the identities they represented (O'Brien 2010: p. 4). Whether or not this was official Franco regime policy is not, however, the main issue. Rather, and in line with the findings of the Massachusetts School, it is apparent that FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao had become symbolically-laden institutions by the end of the Franco regime. In turn, the regional clubs incubated regional identities and contributed to the ambivalent reputation of the Spanish national team.

The Spanish national team from Franco to 2008

I have already briefly examined the intersection of authoritarian politics, the invention of tradition and Spain's national team at the beginning of this section while discussing the appropriation of the *furia Española* myth. This narrative was continued throughout Franco's regime as it attempted to embed the team with "fascist values". This symbolic construction was championed by a compliant mass media that eagerly encouraged the myth that the national team was imbued with the values of the regime. In addition to this patriotic discourse, the players of the national team were expected to give fascist salutes before matches and sing fascist songs (Llopis Goig 2008: p. 60).

Duncan Shaw describes another example of the regime's instrumentalization of the national team, describing a scenario which took place at the final of the 1964 European Championships. The tournament was held in Spain and the hosts defeated the Soviet Union in the final. Franco and his ministers were present, undoubtedly aware of not only the potential ideological triumph but the opportunity to continue a narrative of success at home and abroad. The media reaction was expectedly triumphant. *ABC*, a Franco mouthpiece newspaper, was moved to comment, "Spain is a nation [that is] every day more orderly, mature and unified, and which is steadfastly moving down the path of economic, social and institutional development" (Shaw 1985: p. 38).

Instances such as this clarify the association between the national team and the regime (Shaw 1985: p. 38). It demonstrates close links between football and the state – and also explains the continued ambivalence with which the national team is received by regionalists. Just as FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao came to resemble imagined communities, the seminal role of football in homogenizing cultural and political identity in Franco's Spain is wholly consistent with the practice of the invention of tradition.

What about the symbolic potency of the national team in the current era? How have past failures been ascribed to deficiencies of national identity – and how is the practice of imbuing the national team with desirable national traits being sustained post-Franco? Below, I sketch answers.

La selección: anorexic patriots?

The consternation surrounding the Spanish national team's disappointing performances – before it embarked on its current run of three consecutive tournament victories – was articulated by sociologist and current Minister for Education, Culture and Sport, Jose Ignacio Wert. In a 2001 article for national broadsheet *El País*, Wert blamed the team's perennial underperformance on periodic bouts of "anorexic patriotism", a condition which leads to players preferring to represent their club sides and losing "competitive nerve, enthusiasm and bravery in the fight" (Castro-Ramos 2008: p. 705). Wert ascribes this patriotic deficit to a skepticism to adhere to national symbols because of residual association with the regime and the strength of Spain's peripheral identities (Wert 2001). A position such as this from a high-profile figure demonstrates two things: a widely-held belief that the past failures of the national team are not solely attributable to sporting reasons and a wish among conservative commentators for the symbolic and discursive rehabilitation of the national team.

If indeed some players who represented Spain did so without feeling fully Spanish, did those bonds need to strengthen before the national team could begin winning competitive football matches? Or did victory itself strengthen those bonds? There is no evidence suggesting that the Catalans and Basques in the national squad feel any less attached to their regional identities than ten years ago. In fact, it is still common to see the Spanish players draped in their regional flags – though, pointedly, the *senyera* rarely gets an airing – at trophy presentations.

While it is tempting to ascribe the team's success to some resolution of peripheral identities, it seems more prudent to instead credit a coaching and playing style that finally drew the best from a talented group of

players. Winning promotes sporting unity. It also strengthens the symbolic construction of the national team as something "more than a team" (to paraphrase the motto of FC Barcelona). The explicit linking of the fortunes of team and nation would be nowhere near as flattering if the team were not winning. The team's dissociation from the legacy of the Franco regime and conversion to the symbol of a healthy "New Spain" hinges largely on its continued success. For as long as the team keeps winning tournaments and presenting an image of a nation at peace, the metaphor can be sustained. What happens when the team stops winning may well be the topic of future inquiry.

Virtually from the game's adoption, football was appropriated as a staging ground for the expression of non-state identities by clubs such as FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao that assumed roles as imagined communities. The symbolic value of the game was exploited by the Franco regime in a bid to cement its own political legitimacy and establish a coherent national identity predicated on characteristic "Spanish" traits. The outcome of this was the politicization of the aforementioned clubs, a status which survives to this day. The mingling of sport and state also manifested itself through the regime's permeation of the national team with fascist symbolism and iconography. In so doing Spain's football team gained an association with the regime that has been hard to shake and has resulted in disavowal of it by regional nationalists.

Having outlined this back story, I will now orient to the current symbolic construction of the team as a national institution capable of rehabilitating Spanish national identity. I focus on the immediate popular reaction to the team's World Cup win and the reactions of the media.

¿*Visca España*? Reaction, interpretation, and looking forward

The final section of the chapter presents a case study of the Spanish football team's World Cup victory and interprets it *vis-à-vis* the theoretical model introduced earlier. The model is built on the insights provided by Anderson's imagined communities, Billig's banal nationalism, and the intertwining of politics and football throughout the Franco regime that is explained by reference to Hobsbawm's invention of tradition. This examination is informed by television ratings and analysis from academics, bloggers and journalists to better understand popular reaction to the team's victory. I will also look at the impressions of the conservative mainstream media and its appetite for the conversion of the team into an aspirational nationalizing institution.

The decision to present this combination of sources was made because attempts to elevate the team to a national institution that reflects the virtues of Spain are implausible without the weight of millions of people watching. The fact that, especially throughout the latter stages of the World Cup tournament, the team's matches were as likely to be watched outside of Madrid lends some credence to the notion that the team could become a national point of reference. The newspapers that most willingly embarked on a narrative of symbolic rehabilitation undoubtedly belong to the conservative side of Spanish politics. It is, indeed, well-known that Spain's political right has the largest stake in the integrity of a coherent national identity.

The 2010 World Cup victory generated a brief collective euphoria confined largely to the traditional centers of Spanish nationalism. This hope dwindled and has since been wholly enveloped by political and economic crisis. This finding reveals two salient points: First, no matter the desire of Spanish nationalists to construct the team as a symbol capable of reuniting the nation, this outcome is some way off. Second, the melting away of euphoria shows that "the joy and cohesion of sports is short lived" (Delgado 2011). My argument, reinforced by the findings of this section, is an attempt to establish the presence of explicit comparisons between the fortunes of *la selección* and the prospect of a "new", reoriented Spanish identity. The political implications of such symbolic construction, especially considering the current depths of Spain's economic and political crisis in 2013, are clear. Such narratives might not accurately reflect reality but, as Hobsbawm showed, they have been used in the past to engender feelings of national solidarity.

Television ratings and the normalization of the national team

Recalling Anderson's concept of imagined communities and the symbolic construction of national experiences, the physically circumscribed national community is sustained in the minds of its members by points of common, simultaneous national reference. In such ways, a coherent national story can develop and a nation's cultural products can become its common lexicon.

National sporting teams can assume this unifying role if they transcend divisive parochialisms and allow for the articulation of a common aspirational story. The story of Spain's national football team before its historic success did not lend itself well to such a narrative; at best, it was a squabbling, dysfunctional band of "anorexic patriots" and, at worst, the

direct inheritors of a legacy tainted by association with Franco. However, by 2010, the situation had begun to change and an air of positivity surrounded the team. Victorious in the 2008 European Championships, *la selección* had comprehensively outplayed the opposition. On the eve of the World Cup, there was an expectation of success, for once, grounded in fact. This team had already defeated the best Europe had to offer and the nucleus of FC Barcelona players which defined the style of the team – Xavi, Iniesta, Busquets, Pique and Puyol – had two years more experience.

There is little doubt that FC Barcelona's contribution to the team (seven from the first eleven of the national team represented the club at the time) is partly responsible for the surprisingly high viewing figures enjoyed in Catalonia. However this does not detract from the picture that emerges. The preponderance of Catalans in the national team sent a message to those watching: the Spanish team bears the imprint of FC Barcelona and the victory is at least partly attributable to Catalonia (Delgado 2011; Cruyff 2010). This contributed to a normalization of the team in Catalonia and other regions of Spain with strong regional identities.

The television figures from within Spain, broken down by region, show convergence between Catalonia and Madrid from the quarter-final match onward. Average viewership (viewers per capita) in the Basque Country and Catalonia in particular rose for the semi-final and final matches at the same time as viewership in Madrid slightly declined (Szlapek-Sewillo 2011). All told, this means that a Catalan had a slightly higher statistical propensity to watch the national football team play the World Cup final than a Madrilenian.

As discussed earlier, and in part through technological acceleration and the increasing anxiety about national borders, popular cultural forms have usurped "high culture" and efforts of the state to become the principal means by which our identities develop. Those cultural products which become sufficiently visible can, if infused with sufficient subjective meaning, attain the status of nationalizing institution or symbol. Establishing the normalization of *la selección* is crucial to concluding that it can be regarded as one such institution because it fulfills two necessary conditions: ubiquity and the shedding of a historical association with Franco and fascism.

Media analysis and the attempts to create a national metaphor

This section is informed by interviews that I conducted with Borja Barba, author of the widely-read *Diarios de Fútbol* blog, Luisa-Elena Delgado of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and football journalists Tim Stannard and Sid Lowe. Their insights on Spain's response to the 2010 World Cup counter the triumphalist tone that was typical of Spain's conservative-leaning national newspapers in response to the victory. Throughout, a distinct narrative emerges: the attempt to instigate a discursive narrative of collective Spanish triumph and a conversion to the country's football team as the representative model of that unity.

Barba points out that during and after the tournament, mainstream conservative media stressed the strength of collective effort: "[the team] all formed part of a single unit, just from Spain" (Barba 2011). When the media did focus on the different origins of the players, Delgado says that "people chose to focus on where the players were from, rather than what team they played for" (Delgado 2011). Though elements of Catalan media interpreted the World Cup as a victory for FC Barcelona and Catalonia itself, during the tournament there was, at least in Madrid, little mention of club or regional allegiances. This downplaying of Barcelona's contribution and emphasis on collective success was partly due to Real Madrid's numerical inferiority in the national team (just three of the regular players – Casillas, Ramos and Alonso – from the capital's club). At the same time, media discourse betrayed an urge to create a symbolic discourse of "Spanish" triumph.

Ignacio Camacho, writing for conservative paper *ABC* invoked the poetry of Miguel Hernández to talk of "proactive Catalans, brave Andalusians, essential Asturians, generous Madrilenians, and solid Basques" (Camacho 2010). This typifies a class of inclusive patriotic discourse that is intended to simultaneously acknowledge Spain's "personalities" – but without acknowledging a plurality of submerged nations, by positing that differences can be easily overcome for a common purpose. According to conservative media outlets in Spain, the players were striving for two common purposes: sporting victory, yes, but also, obliquely, the hope of resuming a stalled program of nation building. Such emotional appeals for a united Spain still demand firm adherence to national symbols and institutions and demarcate a narrow acceptable range of "Spanishness" (Delgado 2010: p. 271).

These emotional appeals notwithstanding, Delgado points out that this discourse appropriated sporting victory as the culmination of what she

terms the "Normal Spain" myth (Delgado 2010: p. 266). Such an explanation fits Hobsbawm's invention of tradition model by selectively focusing on myths that elicit broad kinship among a state's subjects. In "The Sound and the Red Fury", Delgado traces the origin of this "fantasy" to the mandate of former Prime Minister José María Aznar's first term in 1996 and the "redoubling" of "[…] efforts to proclaim its [Spain's] unquestionable unity and European identity" (Delgado 2011). This program fuelled processes of national identity formation while at the same time "circumscribing the language of trauma and melancholia to non-state [regional] identities" (Delgado 2011). For Spanish nationalists, World Cup victory thus effectively posed the question, "how can a dysfunctional country achieve such success?" The sleight of hand is that, of course, it cannot – *ergo*, Spain has joined the ranks of the "normal".

The construction of the Spanish football team as a metaphor for a new, "normal" Spain is founded on the harmony of the team itself. If indeed Spain can "well learn from this team" (Toharia 2010), then that team must not only be successful, it must also be at peace with itself. The lead-up to the tournament and the event itself points to an amicable arrangement among the players. Xavi Hernández, a Catalan midfielder who has played for Barcelona for his entire career and previously been accused of a deficit of national patriotism (Castro-Ramos 2008: p. 706), straight-batted questions before the tournament: "A footballer doesn't understand politics. What he wants to do is win" (Ghosh 2010). We have already seen that conservative media outlets chose to attribute the harmony of the team to collective aspirations of a New Spain, and a subsumption of regional identities into national solidarity. This powerful rhetorical construction glosses over the professionalism of the playing and coaching staff in South Africa, and the fact that football is a professional sport where internal harmony and morale is maintained by success on the pitch. However, the success of the team is a vital component of the national metaphor because it endows *la selección* with the legitimacy and status of nationalizing symbol.

Euphoria squandered?

Spain's political realities remain unchanged despite the World Cup and have in fact worsened. For example, while acknowledging the "tide of euphoria" generated by Spain's victory, Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) senator Iñaki Anasagasti played down Basque and Catalan contribution to this elation while simultaneously attributing the victory to the Catalan players. He concluded that victory "in large part, involves a certain feeling of rejection based on […] impossible hope" (Anasagasti 2010). Moreover,

sporting victory did not change the objectives of Spain's regional parties, most of whom remain committed to independence or autonomy from Madrid.

Sporting triumph and the team's elevation by some to national metaphor has been countered with resistance to the metaphor and the reality of economic peril. In this view, the ephemeral "tide of euphoria" not only lacked any channels in which it could be fully realized, but it never belonged equally to all Spaniards. The 2010 World Cup gave Spain a successful football team, incrementally reintroduced the team to places it had not been welcome, and contributed to attempts to convert the team into a nationalizing institution that could rehabilitate a splintered national identity. That much we can say with confidence. However, regionalists were not prepared to accept this romantic metaphor. While millions of Spaniards are proud of *la selección* and many of them are proud of Spain, they do not necessarily believe that the fortunes of one are linked to the other.

Spain's decentralization since its transition to democracy has contributed to the loss of the state's grip on national identity. A large share of media is local and bound to regional identity. This has contributed to a feeling that the "emotion was never really linked to a chance to build anything" (Delgado 2011). Confined to the hearts and minds of supporters and those advocates of a homogenous Spanish identity who never needed persuading, euphoria has dwindled.

The World Cup of 2010 was unable to contribute to an enduring nationalization of Spanish identity. There is enormous pride in the team throughout the country but the fortunes of sport are too fickle, political decentralization too ingrained, and regional tensions too enduring for that. This was the success of a team that has, for many conservative Spaniards with an affinity for such gestures, become a metaphor for a Spain that they want to display the same unity and coherence. Ignacio Camacho, writing for *ABC*, says that "we [sic] want the nation to have the determination, consistency and the imprint of the team that represents it" (Camacho 2010). The outpouring of emotion that greeted the team's victory was the ecstasy of sporting triumph and the joy of attaining something that takes a lifetime. It is undeniable that for many it was also an opportunity to cast aside a "negative understanding of Spanishness" (Barba 2011; Delgado 2010: p. 270).

A reorientation of Spanish national identity must have at its heart the rehabilitation of the country's national symbols. This chapter has offered a guide to how these symbols can be rehabilitated and how they can then contribute to the construction of a unified identity. It has demonstrated

willingness by broad segments of the Basque and Catalan populations to engage with the Spanish football team. It has demonstrated that efforts are in motion to convert the team into the sort of national institution capable of galvanizing Spanish identity. But what it also shows is that in the face of harsh economic and political realities, sport, even with the political dimensions it carries in Spain, is not yet up to this task. Nevertheless, there is cause to be cautiously optimistic about the Spanish football team's prospects of rehabilitating its image in the eyes of Spain's regionalists. The stability and longevity of such a process is, however, unknown.

Notes

[1] *Visca* is Catalan for "*Viva*" ("Live on") and commonly used as a way of exhorting FC Barcelona and Catalonia. In the register of language and lexicon, also notice that the European term "football" is employed in this chapter for what is called "soccer" in the US.

Bibliography

Anasagasti, I. "Zorionak España Pero Sigo Pensando Lo Mismo", http://ianasagasti.blogs.com/mi_blog/2010/07/zorionak-espa%C3%B1a-pero-sigo-pensando-lo-mismo.html, 12 July 2010.

Adorno, T. and M. Horkheimer. "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception". In *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, edited by G. Schmid Noerr, translated by Edmund Jephcott, 94-136. New York: Herder and Herder, 2002.

Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1983.

Barba, B. Personal correspondence, 2011.

Billig, M. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 1995.

Bourdieu, P. "How Can One Be a Sports Fan?" In *The Cultural Studies Reader*, 2nd edition, edited by S. During, 427-440. London: Routledge, 1999.

Camacho, I. "España y España." *ABC*, http://www.abc.es/20100705/opinion-colaboraciones/espana-espana-20100705.html, 5 July 2010.

Castro-Ramos, E. "Loyalties, Commodity and Fandom: Real Madrid, Barça and Athletic Fans Versus 'La Furia Roja' During the World Cup". *Sport in Society* 11, no. 6 (2008): 696-710.

Crosstet, T.W. "Sport, Sociology of." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes, 14932-14935. Elsevier Ltd., 2001.

Cruyff, J. "El que más se lo merece." *El Periódico*,

http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/deportes/20100712/cruyff-que-mas-merece/381727.shtml, 12 July 2010.

Delgado, L.E. "The Sound and the Red Fury: The Sticking Points of Spanish Nationalism." *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 11, no. 3-4 (2010): 263-276.

—. Personal correspondence, 2011.

Dittmer, J. *Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity*. Pennsylvania, USA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010.

Edensor, T. *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2002.

Elias, N. and E. Dunning. *Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilising Process*, 2nd edition (revised). Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2008.

Foer, F. *How Football Explains the World*. London: Random House, 2004.

Gellner, E. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Pty Ltd, 1983.

Gellner, E. and A.D. Smith. "The Nation: Real or Imagined?: The Warwick Debates on Nationalism". *Nations and Nationalism* 2, no. 3 (1996): 357-370.

Ghosh, B. "As Spain Begins Its World Cup Quest, a Team United Has Fans Divided", *Time*, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1991933_1991952_1993769,00.html, July 16 2010.

Hobsbawm, E. J. "The Invention of Tradition." In *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by E.J. Hobsbawm and T.O. Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

—. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Holub, R. *Antonio Gramsci: Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism*. London: Routledge, 1992.

Ignatieff, M. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*. London: BBC Books, 1993.

Inglis, D. *Culture and Everyday Life*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Kamenka, E. "Political Nationalism – the Evolution of the idea". In *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, edited by E. Kamenka. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973.

Lechner, F. "Imagined Communities in the Global Game: Soccer and the Development of Dutch National Identity". *Global Networks* 7, no. 2 (2007): 215-229.

Llopis Goig, R. "Identity, Nation-State and Football in Spain: The Evolution of Nationalist Feelings in Spanish football". *Soccer and Society* 9, no. 1 (2008): 56-63.

Lowe, S. Personal correspondence, 2011.
MacClancy, J. “Nationalism at Play: the Basques of Vizcaya and Athletic Bilbao.” In *Sport, Identity, and Ethnicity*, edited by J.MacClancy, 181-199. Berg Publishers: Oxford, 1996.
Nili, S. “The Rules of the Game – Nationalism, Globalization and Football in Spain: Barcelona and Bilbao in a Comparative Perspective”. *Global Society* 23, Number 3 (2009): 245-268.
O’Brien, J. “Football, Politics and the Nation in Spanish Football”. Presented at *WJEC Conference: Journalism Education in an Age of Radical Change*, 2010.
Shaw, D. “The Politics of Futbol.” *History Today* 35, no. 8 (1985): 38.
Smith, A. D. “The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?” In *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 20 (1991): 353-368.
Stannard, T. Personal correspondence, 2011.
Stone, C. “The Role of Football in Everyday Life.” In *Soccer and Society* 8, Number 2-3 (2007): 169-184.
Szlapek-Sewillo, M. “Who Won the 2010 FIFA World Cup? Sport, Triumph and Implications for National Identity in Contemporary Spain”, University of Adelaide, 2011.
Toharia, J. J. “¡Visca España! Esa es la marca-país”, *El País*, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/deportes/Visca/Espana/marca-pais/elpdepfutmunart/20100711elpepidep_20/Tes, July 11 2010.
Ward, T. “Sport and National Identity.” In *Soccer and Society* 10, no. 5 (2009): 518-531.
Wert, J. I. “Anorexia Patriótica”, *El País*, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Anorexia/patriotica/elpepiopi/20010321elpepiopi_12/Tes, March 21 2001.
Witkin, R. W. “Cultural Nemesis.” *Adorno on Popular Culture*, International Library of Sociology, 1-15. London: Routledge, 2003.

CHAPTER SIX

KRATOS WITHOUT *DEMOS*? EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC EUROPE

FRANCISCO SEOANE PÉREZ

Introduction

The role the news media could play in bringing Europeans closer to their supranational institutions has been a matter of debate since the very beginning of the would-be European Union (EU) in the 1950s. As far back as 1957, the year the Treaty of Rome signaled the beginning of the European Common Market, British historian Max Beloff pointed toward a "failure on the side of publicity" on the part of the Common Assembly of the European Carbon and Steel Community (ECSC). The debates of this Assembly (an early precedent of the European Parliament, elected by universal suffrage since 1979), were poorly followed by journalists, and the only ones paying attention were "the circles directly concerned" (Beloff 1957: p. 239). According to Beloff, this contradiction between public ignorance and consequential elite deliberation was partly explained by the indirect rule of the European institutions. These institutions' decisions were reliant on enforcement by the respective national governments that were, in turn, directly accountable to their electors. In this context, the European Press Association (set up in 1956) carried out the first attempts to create the kernel of a European public sphere by providing news from a European and not merely a national point of view. Its subsequent incarnation, the European Press Group, sponsored the simultaneous publication of a supplement on European affairs in several national newspapers (Beloff 1957: pp. 273-274). The reason for creating a European supplement and not a European-wide newspaper were obviously related to Europe's linguistic diversity, "an inescapable fact of the

European scene and a genuine obstacle to the widest possible circulation of ideas", in Beloff's words (1957: p. 89).

Published in 1957, *Europe and the Europeans: An international discussion* summarized the conclusions of a Council of Europe-sponsored study group whose task was to explore the idea of European unity from all possible perspectives: historical, cultural, political, economic, and scientific. Despite being hardly cited today in the literature on European identity, the book edited by Beloff advances the same conundrums that concern contemporary scholars when discussing the possibility of a European democracy with a people and a media system commensurate with the continental reach of the European Union. Two issues stand out as strikingly familiar in the volume: Denis de Rougemont's observations that European unity should not lead to a homogenization of Europe's intrinsic diversity, and the discussions of Turkey's European character.

Throughout the past few decades, much of the hopes for a European-wide democracy have been pinned on the federalization of European institutions and the empowerment of the only directly-elected body of the European Union, the European Parliament. The news media and national political leaders were entrusted with the task of explaining the workings and the relevance of European institutions to their electorates. It was hoped that, through institutional induction, the European Union would create the Europeans. The negative results of the European Constitution referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, along with the decreasing participation in European elections (paradoxically declining as more and more powers have been granted to the most democratic branch of the EU) led the European Commission to talk about a "communications problem" (Valentini and Nesti 2010, eds). According to this rationale, the popular acceptance of European institutions would be higher if political communication from institutions and media outlets were improved. Nevertheless, to paraphrase the title of a famous journal article, to know the EU does not mean to love it (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003). Why is this the case?

The problem with Europe, this chapter suggests, is not one having to do with communications. Rather, the problem that I posit concerns the sort of political monster the EU is – a pseudo-confederation full of anti-popularizing incentives due to its dependence on technocracy and diplomacy. In turn, this political monster has been conjoined with the sort of cultural community Europe is; to wit, a multi-lingual and multi-national grouping. The wedding of the EU to Europe's cultural community, moreover, challenges the principle on which every nation-state democracy is built upon: the equivalence between the nation and the state, however

fictional and contentious such equation might be in the customary nation-states. This latter point is important, because it reveals an uncomfortable truth for cosmopolitans: since the French Revolution transferred sovereignty from the monarch to the people, demo-cratic or people-reliant states have had to legitimate their institutions on the principle that government acts in delegation of a popular mandate (Calhoun 2007 [1997]). For that popular mandate to be coercive, that is, for the losers of an election to feel compelled to abide with the winners, the losing minority must feel part of the same community as the winning majority (Mouffe 2000; 2005 [1993]). The stereotyping and mistrust that the post-2008 sovereign debt crisis in Europe seems to have awakened, with Spaniards and Greeks locking horns with Germans and Finns, could be evidence of a not-cohesive-enough European identity. In any case, these tensions reveal the difficulties of engaging in common decision-making across diverse nation-states.

The "publicity failure" noted by Beloff in 1957 seems to be strikingly persistent. A careful interpretation of his comments in the light of my own research on the sources of the EU's seemingly distant and bureaucratic character shall illuminate the structural and cultural imperatives that prevent the development of a fully-fledged European public sphere and its correlates: a European identity and an encompassing European democracy.

Beloff's prescient description of the gap between the attention that corporate interests and the people at large pay to the deliberations of European institutions is perfectly valid today. After all, despite much change, the institutional settings of the contemporary European Union still carry the mark of the foundational ECSC: an original combination of supranational technocracy (the ECSC's High Authority has been replaced by the EU's Commission), inter-governmental decision-making (the gatherings of national Ministers and Government conferences continue to this day), and a scent of federalism (the old Common Assembly is today's European Parliament). Technocracy, embodied by the European Commission, and diplomacy, incarnated by the Council of Ministers and the European Council, live side by side with a fully-democratic European Parliament. At the same time, the parliament's legislative functions are shared with the other two institutions. Moreover, the parliament's capacity to represent a cohesive people is in doubt, as elections are carried out with national, not European parties, and the national interest still challenges the European one when crucial decisions are voted on in the plenary. Technocracy and diplomacy have obvious problems with transparency and public debate. For technocrats, popular politics may get in the way of getting things done, since people do not always know what's best for

themselves. However blunt and prejudiced this judgment may sound, this is what I found as a prevailing attitude in my interviews with European bureaucrats, be they at the Brussels or regional level. For the national ministers and the national diplomats belonging to the Committee of Permanent Representatives in Brussels, publicizing negotiations may disrupt desired outcomes or, worse still, reveal a temporary "betrayal" to their electors, as some bargains involve current losses in exchange of future benefits.

Beloff's observation of Europe's indirect rule is also accurate and applicable to our times. The success of the EU, as Moravcsick (2002) insists, depends on the compliance of its Member States that are the political units that transpose European-level legislation onto their respective national legislations. Furthermore, the principle of "subsidiarity" prevents supranational authorities from mingling with those affairs that can be directly addressed by lower-level institutions, such as the Member States themselves. However, this indirect rule has relevant consequences for the popular identification with European institutions: the act of transposition is an act of legal translation, and has similar effects to linguistic translation or dubbing of films. In other words, transposition makes legislation more readily acceptable by making it seem more familiar; but it precludes the listener from hearing the original voice and, in legislative terms, it removes European-level decision-makers from accountability for their rulings. The principle of subsidiarity could be considered a standard federal feature but, in the European case, the division of powers between the levels of administration is not clear. Indeed, European-level institutions discuss and legislate about presumably core national competences like employment policy, healthcare, and education. And subsidiarity without a visible federal power (there are no federal EU buildings in any Member State capital, as compared to other federations like the United States of America) contributes to making the European level of decision-making more invisible to the average citizen.

The weak position of the European Parliament is directly related to the weak spirit of the elusive collective European will. There is not such a thing as a European public opinion, perhaps because there is not a European nation, nor a European public sphere. Oddly enough, the supplements sponsored by the European Press Group in the 1950s have a contemporary replica in the *Europa* supplement published in January 2012 by six leading newspapers in their respective national markets, which represent the six most populated EU member states: *El País* (Spain), *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Poland), *Le Monde* (France), *La Stampa* (Italy), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Germany) and *The Guardian* (UK). Interviewed for

the first edition of *Europa*, Italian semiologist Umberto Eco explained the nature of such a multi-lingual supplement by resorting to Europe's linguistic diversity: "Europe will never be the United States of Europe, a single country with a common language like the USA (…) We have too many languages and cultures, indeed, the idea of an unique [European] newspaper is for now just a utopia." (Riotta 2012, January 26). The literature on the European public sphere is divided on whether to render a European-wide space of mass-mediated debate as impossible, or to accept its existence in the form of "Europeanized national public spheres", whereby similar topics are published at the same time and discussed from similar points of view, albeit in the respective national languages (Risse 2010; Weßler *et al*. 2008).

The (im)possibility of a European public sphere without a common European language, along with the anti-transparency biases of technocracy and diplomacy, were pre-figured in Beloff's book. Both issues are examined in this chapter. First, I deal with the importance of a public language of communication in order to sustain a viable public sphere. Second, I discuss the systemic constraints that make the EU a political regime at odds with the peoples of Europe: the technocratic or "functional" way in which the Union was formed, the confederal diplomacy that determines much of the policy-making in Brussels, and the neo-corporatism that brings together administration and organized interests in co-governance. Finally, I appraise the principle of subsidiarity, one of the main theoretical tenets of the European Union, as another distancing device between European institutions and the people. The principle states that "[European] Community institutions should refrain from acting, even when constitutionally permitted to do so, if their objectives could effectively be served by action taken at or below the Member State level" (Bermann 1994). In a federal context, subsidiarity helps clarify the division of functions and makes the federal pact between central government and regional (the *foedus*) more enduring. But in a confederal context like the EU, with no relevant presence of the federal layer of government in the constituent states, subsidiarity contributes to making the supranational institutions even more distant and invisible for the citizens of the Union. These cultural and systemic constraints cannot be solved, I insist, simply by improving communications, either from European institutions or from journalists covering EU affairs. The European Union might require a "constitutive crisis" that would call for more unity (the current economic quagmire might work as such), or just two or three generations of slow-paced incremental integration that would make federalizing measures more popularly palatable.

Empirically, this chapter draws on a hundred semi-structured interviews conducted among a sample of EU-related political actors selected through a social network analysis of the sources quoted in news stories dealing with European issues in two regional newspapers, *La Voz de Galicia* (from Galicia, Spain), and the *Yorkshire Post* (from Yorkshire, England). These two European regions were selected as the comparative case studies because they represent two extreme points of popular acceptance of the EU: Yorkshire is quintessentially Eurosceptic, whereas public opinion figures have shown Galicia to be consistently pro-EU (Elias 2009). The fact that EU politics in Galicia are mostly an administrative, non-political affair, suggests that one of the hopes of pro-Europeans in the UK, namely that having an EU-supportive press would make EU politics closer to the citizens, might be ill-founded. That is, in Galicia, one finds at once a pro-Europe press *coupled with* the same aloof governance from Brussels. My interview subjects, drawn from the three administrative levels relevant for the study of the EU – the regional, national, and supranational – were asked for their lay theories on the distant and bureaucratic character of EU affairs. Only a minority of my informants, who happened to be ardent pro-Europeans, attributed the elusive and apolitical nature of the EU to a communications problem. The rest offered cultural and structural explanations, which are the ones I deal with in this chapter.

Language matters: There is no democracy without communication

If representative government is, as John Stuart Mill famously claimed, "government by discussion", a European democracy must entail the chance for Europeans to discuss matters of public affairs. The intergovernmentalist school emphasizes that European integration is mostly the result of the deliberate will of national governments that are at all times in control of – and not controlled by – supranational institutions. Most of the issues salient for voters (education and health policy, for example), therefore remain firmly in the hands of nation-states. In this view, a politicization of European affairs would not lead to broad participation, but to the activation of Eurosceptics' defense of national prerogatives (Moravcsik 2002; 2006). However, this same school admits that European-level decisions impinge on the EU member states' sovereignty. This is particularly salient in the European economic crisis that began in 2010. A common currency without an encompassing fiscal union has led to hard adaptations in southern Member States and to

budgetary revisions by the dominant player – Germany – and the three-headed Leviathan known as the "Troika", formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Even the most forceful advocates for the status quo might wonder about the means by which European decision-making could be, if not more participatory, at least more comprehensible and accountable. Two imperatives run against a closer European Union: the diverse cultural communities of Europe, and the sort of political monster that the EU is. It might indeed be that Europe is as democratic as these intrinsic imperatives allow. Let us first address the cultural imperatives, with a special attention to language, an issue ignored by multi-lingual pro-Europeans and EU elites, but highly relevant to the average European citizen.

One of the most cherished virtues of Europe, its multi-lingual condition, is at the same time, one of the great impediments for a democratic (that is, people-dependent) European Union. The case of Switzerland, where democracy exists in a multi-lingual context, is often seen as one the examples the European Union could follow to democratize itself. However, the question of the very existence of something called the "Swiss national will" is put into question by authors like Ipperciel (2008), precisely because of the need of what he calls a "public language of communication" in order to sustain a democratic polity. To Ipperciel, the Helvetic Confederation is a cluster of three "communicative nations", each with its own public sphere. In Ipperciel's appraisal, it is the language used in public communication what defines a nation: "Since language is a *sine qua non* of common public discussion (…) the communicative nation must incorporate a linguistic dimension. Following this logic, a country counting more than one public language must be thought of as multinational (…) Public multilingualism does lead to multinationalism." (2008: p. 563).

The impossibility of a transnational European discussion through the use of a shared language is for Dieter Grimm, an expert in constitutional law and a former member of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany, one of the main roadblocks in the way to a European public sphere:

> Communication is bound up with language and linguistically mediated experience and interpretation of the world. Information and participation as basic conditions of democratic existence are mediated through language. (...) The large majority of [European] Community citizens can communicate only in their own mother tongue, and thus remain cut off from direct understanding of communication in any Europe-wide communication. This is not just a private loss. They are instead "participation restricted" and therefore disadvantaged in the European

> opinion-forming and interest-mediation process, which suffers much more than any national one from remoteness from its base. (Grimm 1995: p. 295).

Although, as Calhoun observes, multilingualism is the norm and not the exception in most states (Calhoun 2007 [1997]), democratic states need a commonly shared language of public communication (*e.g.*, Castilian in Spain, English in the United Kingdom) in order to sustain a public sphere commensurate with the breadth and reach of the sovereign state. This shared language allows for the existence of what Grimm calls "mediatory structures" (1995: p. 294), such as political parties or mass media outlets, that provide the essential link between the popular sovereign and its representatives.

The contemporary status of English as the international *lingua franca* could help the configuration of a European public sphere. Although German and French, along with English, were the main languages of communication during the first years of the European Communities, English has established itself firmly as the first option in the contemporary European Union, particularly after the accession of Eastern European countries. The question is, then, whether English is or could be universally known by all Europeans, and whether it could be used not just as a language of business, but as a language of self-governance.

The results of a Special Eurobarometer survey on "Europeans and their languages" (European Commission 2006) reveal that only 38% of EU citizens profess enough knowledge of English to hold a conversation. This situation could change as new generations get to learn English from a very young age. When data on English-speakers is restricted to the EU population between 15 and 24 years old, the level of English competence raises to 60% (according to an interpretation by Charlemagne in *The Economist* 2009, 12 February). The question, however, is whether such a *lingua franca* can be endowed with the emotional power of a mother tongue. To put it differently: competence in a given language is one thing, its uses are another. Europeans might use English for doing business or education in a neighboring state, but…do they dream in English? If politics is not just about administration but also about moral choices, would a directly-elected European President speak in a language that would reach the hearts, not just the minds, of her/his electors? This is the distinction between "instrumental" and "expressive" uses of language that Kraus points at (2008) to stress the idea that the political engagement a democracy needs might go beyond the instrumental dimension of a language. For democracy to work, the language of politics might need to be the same language that people use for expressing their innermost

feelings. This challenge is yet to be resolved, although authors like Wogan (2001) contend that nation-building and monolingualism are less interlinked than Anderson (2006 [1983]) suggests.

Apart from age, there is another demographic feature that might hinder the possibility of a European public sphere and a pan-European democracy: the particular social correlates of European identity. According to survey data analyzed by Fligstein (2008), European identification is higher among those who have benefitted the most from European integration (white collar workers, educated and professional elites, and the youth). By contrast, blue-collar classes identify the EU with immigration and the neoliberal economy and adhere to the nation-state as their main focus of loyalty and allegiance. European identity, then, is in Fligstein's view "class-based", a feature that is not conducive to the construction of a European nation, as a "nation" is by definition cross-class (that is, both the poor and the rich feel part of it). Fligstein foresees two possible scenarios for European identity. The first scenario is that European identity has already reached its limits (being confined to a small elite, around 10 per cent of the total European population). The second, more hopeful scenario is that this is just the beginning. In this view, younger generations will increase their interaction with fellow Europeans, therefore creating a more encompassing and popular European identity. The class divide could also be a linguistic one; in other words, a cultural chasm between the speakers of English and those without enough command of the *lingua franca*, as the Anglophones/Anglophiles would be endowed with linguistic capital (Bourdieu 2012 [1991]) that the rest would be lacking.

At present, Europeans are roughly divided between those who feel nationals of their respective member states (40-50%), and those who identify primarily as nationals but also see themselves as Europeans (35-40%). Only a minority (10-15%) feel European in the first place (Katzenstein and Checkel 2009: pp. 215-216). There is a division between what Risse calls inclusive and exclusive nationalists: those who make room for Europe in their sense of being, and those who do not (Risse 2010).

Risse (2010) is one of the most active defenders of the existence of a European public sphere through "Europeanized" public spheres. He applies the "Eder-Kanter criteria" (Eder and Kanter 2000) for determining the existence of a European public sphere: 1) Debating the same issues at the same time, and 2) Giving those issues the same relevance. Risse adds a third condition: that those issues are framed through similar points of view, positioning audiences as European subjects to news and comment and *not* as members of particular nations. He uses the case of the isolation

of Austrian populist politician Jörg Haider by European governments in 2000 as one example of pan-European debate through national mass media that reported the victory of a racist politician as a challenge to European values, and not merely as a matter of importance for Austria.

It is through the discussion of these issues via those European lenses that a European public sphere can emerge, according to Risse. For him, there is no need for a pre-existing European community. The actual debate in the news media about European affairs is what will eventually create, step by step, the European public sphere and its community. Pan-European media are not a requirement as long as the "same frames of reference and meaning structures" (p. 119) appear in the different national news media: "A sense of community and of collective identification ought not to be treated as a prerequisite for a communicative discourse. Rather (…) it can emerge in the course of a debate in the public sphere (…) 'debating Europe' actually builds a community of Europeans and a transnational public sphere" (Risse 2010: p. 121). Risse's proposal, however well-intentioned, underestimates the incentives for non-communication that are built into the institutional design and political practices of the EU. The media can do little against the secrecy and carefully planned publicity of corporatism and European-level diplomacy.

The in-built anti-popular biases of European integration

The current European Union has been the product of elites. Not even the most ardent pro-Europeans would deny such a statement. There was, to be fair, popular support for any measures that would end war in Europe so as not to repeat the carnages of the two world wars the continent endured in the twentieth century. Some form of political, economic, and cultural cooperation was needed, and three main options emerged after World War II: 1) The federalist solution, with Altiero Spinelli as its figurehead, calling for a true political union; 2) The confederal or inter-governmental Europe or "*le Europe des patries*", as General Charles de Gaulle would call it, building on the recently created Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to create an international bureaucracy that would follow the instructions coming from the regular gatherings of national governments; or 3) The functionalist way or "federalism without tears" (Beloff 1957: p. 152). In this view, the integration of technical policy sectors, led by administrative agencies independent from public whims, would "spill over" to other areas, resulting in an almost imperceptible piecemeal integration that would be complete when elites and the people shifted allegiances towards the new supranational

institutions (Haas 2004 [1958]). The European Union of today is the result of all these three tendencies. It is, more specifically, a sort of pseudo-confederation with a directly-elected Parliament representing the people of the whole European Union (a federal feature). At the same time, the European Council represents the governments of the Member States. Officially created in 1974, this gathering of national Executives provided the political drive that a technical agency like the European Commission could not generate by itself. Along with the Council of Ministers from the different Member States, the European Council represents the inter-governmental or confederal component of the EU. Finally, the European Commission, a bureaucratic body officially endowed with the power of initiating legislation that is supposed to represent the European interest, stands out as the functional or technocratic legacy of Jean Monnet, the father of bureaucratic Europe. All in all, the European Union is an original and complex international organization that, given its pseudo-federal and technocratic components, could best be defined as a "regional-state" (Schmidt 2006).

So far, we have seen the cultural and linguistic impediments for a democratic Europe. It is time now to look at the anti-transparency incentives of the union's structure. The European Union was built following a functionalist principle (putting technocracy first, empowering supra-national institutions and isolating them from public opinion), and it is governed by a curious mix of diplomacy (a balancing of national interests) and technocracy (with bureaucrats upholding the European interest). Perhaps due to the immature status of the European *demos*, the European Parliament connects better with organized civil society interests than with society at large, a situation that could be defined as neo-corporatist.

Functionalism and technocracy

The literature on European studies sees "neo-functionalism" as the great loser of the three big trends that produced the contemporary European Union. This might be true, as the technocratic agency *par excellence*, the European Commission, has lost its legislative initiative (if not legally but in *de facto* terms) to the inter-governmental European Council (Werts 2008; Taylor 1983). However, much of the aloof character of European institutions comes from the intentionally technocratic will with which they were set up. Moreover, the EU's "substitute bureaucracies" (Haller 2008) in the Member States (the bureaucrats who deal with the implementation of European programs like the European Regional Development Funds)

reveal a strong technocratic drive, admitting that people politics get in the way of good public policy delivery.

The so-called "Community Method", minted by French technocrat Jean Monnet, left much of the project of integration to technical and political elites, empowering supranational, non-elected technical agencies. The creation of the ECSC in 1950, which could be considered the founding moment of the contemporary European Union, was not the product of a revolution or a popular upheaval. It was an act of political subtlety carried out by elites who had to convince their own governments and parliaments of its necessity. The prospects for a common European Defense and a European Political Community floundered after the failed attempt to ratify the former in the French Parliament in 1954; a turn of events that reinforced those advocating a European union that would proceed under-the-radar instead of openly and on the surface.

The contemporary remnants of that first technocratic impulse are the European Commission (a body that mixes legislative, executive and quasi-judiciary powers) and the elitist and technical way of administering European funds across Europe. The European Regional Development Funds (ERDF), key for the development of some regions whose GDP is below the 75% of the European average GDP, are administered with no parliamentary debate. In my interviews with civil servants from contrasting regions in the EU (Eurosceptic Yorkshire in the UK and pro-European Galicia in Spain), I found a similar technocratic mindset in regional administrators:

> I am not for the politicization of EU funds, because that would encourage a share of the cake based on selfishness and not on real objective necessities. The Galician political class has a low profile, and the politicization of EU funds would just result in a poorer allocation. There would be an assignment with political aims, whereas now the allocation is done based on real necessities.
> —Expert in regional funding (Santiago de Compostela, 20 November 2009)

> If you had a situation in which we already had a regional government, the [ERDF] program would have become a regional government program, and it would have been dominated by political interests.
> —Yorkshire Forward spokesperson (Leeds, 5 May 2009)

These two testimonies share a common belief: namely, politicization would result in worse administration and less efficient allocation of resources. Interestingly, in both the Spanish and English cases, the regional operative programs are administered outside the limelight. In

Galicia, the regional parliament does not debate what the regional government should do with the funds coming from the EU. But in Yorkshire, the spokesperson from the Regional Development Agency happily endorses funds being administered with no political (or public) oversight. In his view, political intervention would lead to a piecemeal distribution of funds to satisfy everyone but would not bring the change that the region needs. In the mind of the bureaucrat, public debate gets in the way of efficient policy-making.

The main consequence of the (exclusively) technical administration of European funds is a situation in which there is financial, but not political control of the funds allocated, as a political science university professor explained to me in an interview (Santiago de Compostela, 18 January 2010). The logic of administration, of delivery, lives side by side with the logic of democracy, of accountability. Both sides (technocrats and citizens) might be right. EU-related procedures and funding are subject to more scrutiny and control than any of their national or regional equivalents. But at the national and regional scale, there is a political connection between the administrator and the administered. The possibility of electoral punishment (political control) is perhaps more valuable for the average citizen than the rigid and rigorous control of expenditures (financial and bureaucratic control). It is important to be reassured that public funds are spent in the ways that they are said to have been spent. Financial control guarantees that. But it is also relevant to know (and debate) if an accurately processed expenditure is, from the citizen's point of view, a good investment. Such control is what politics and politicization can bring, but they are conspicuously absent.

Diplomacy versus public debate

It might be that Europe has found a transitory solution for the aporia of democracy without a *demos*: a managerial state at the transnational level, where administration replaces politics. Identity, passion and conflict – keywords in the language of politics – are subdued at the EU level. The EU would be, or at least it would pretend to be, "beyond left and right", to paraphrase the title of a famous book by sociologist Anthony Giddens (1994). For authors like Chantal Mouffe, this idea of seeking a rational consensus in the middle is a "denaturalization" of democracy (Mouffe 2000). In her view, politics consists on "the channeling of passions, on the passing from antagonism to agonism, on the legitimation (rather than the eradication) of conflict" (her words at a conference held in Santiago de Compostela, 18 December 2009). In both my Spanish and British sample

of interviewees I found journalists complaining about the removal of public policy from the realm of public politics in Brussels:

> I think the way the EU level works, at its most important level, which is the Council, is a public-free site. Those kind of actors don't like public scrutiny, because it disrupts the procedures that they are used to. So they will use the argument that if you're having negotiations, and the negotiations take place before a piece of legislation is passed, which happens 90 per cent of the time, if you go public, you will disrupt those negotiations (…) But that's precisely the problem, that's precisely why it should be public, so that those conflicts can have their social and public expression, rather than just being the management of conflicts behind closed doors. When you have something out in public, it means a wider world, a wider criteria than management can be applied to it: principles, political principles, which are completely independent of bureaucratic procedures.
> —Bruno Waterfield, *The Daily Telegraph* correspondent (Brussels, 20 May 2010)

> The EU lacks the dynamic of politics. It does not need a charismatic leader, but to accept that public policies are underpinned by ideological values and need to be channeled through political parties.
> —Spanish radio correspondent (11 May 2010)

When the views of journalists are contrasted to those of diplomats, a new light emerges over the issue of transparency. Journalists are demanding the openness they are used to seeing in nation-state democracies, but they underestimate the extent to which the EU, besides making policy, is an organization that has stability (economic, political, social) among its main aims. Given that Member States are the political units tasked with implementing any potential EU level legislation, they must scrutinize Commission proposals through the so-called working parties that deal with technical issues, before the first reading in the Parliament is completed. It is at the level of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) that gathers the 27 EU ambassadors and the President of the Council, where most political decisions are taken. Both the working party meetings and COREPER gatherings happen behind closed doors. When the proposal reaches the Council and Parliament levels in the co-decision procedure, the maximum level of consensus has already been sought in private. As Naurin (2008) observes, "publicity" politicizes discourses. Bargaining parties must be loyal publicly to their constituencies. It is only in private where they can concede a point that, if publicized, would be difficult to justify. Paradoxically, the secrecy of

inter-state bargains might be the only way of pursuing the European interest, as it is only behind closed doors that national concessions can be made without public outcry in the national capitals:

> Some argue for more transparency, but we all know that COREPER meetings have to be held in closed doors. There are many issues that you cannot talk about if they are reported. Closed talks are an effective mean of dealing with difficulties among us.
> —UK Permanent Representation spokesperson (Brussels, 29 April 2010)

> To pretend to get into every EU meeting is like wanting to get into the kitchen of a star chef like El Bulli. If you know how they do it, the business is over. This happens in Europe and in the Member States. If journalists are allowed into the discussion process, the parts cannot negotiate. If you know your rival's cards, there's no game to play. But when you know that both parts have something to offer and something to give up, then there's a game to be played.
> —Spanish trade union spokesperson (Brussels, 7 April 2010)

Secrecy in the first stages of law-making is, for diplomats, the guarantee of stability, as proposals are adjusted to a minimum of feasibility for a diverse Union of 27 member states. The resultant legislation, however, ends up being implemented as domestic legislation. Hence, the EU is caught between the requirements of stability (which calls for secrecy in order to facilitate compromise and mutual national concessions) and the requirements of democracy (which calls for the transparency of legislative processes to facilitate the control by the popular sovereign).

Neo-corporatism and subsidiarity

Corporatism may be characterized as the coordination between economic and political power through tripartite bargaining between the state and "peak associations" of capital and labor. It also embodies two of the main principles of European integration: elite co-optation (the "*engrenage*" of national and regional decision-makers and leaders) and co-determination (the search for economic and social stability through the coordination between capital and labor). In a way, it could be said that the EU invented "governance" before it became fashionable. The principle of subisidiarity, by which upper-level authorities are asked not to get into the policy areas that lower-level authorities can deal with, is a federal principle. However, in the absence of visible federal authorities that live side by side with its Member States, the principle makes the European supranational authorities even more invisible than they already are.

Although the very question of whether corporatism or neo-corporatism at the European level exists has been probed in the literature (Scholten 1987; Taylor 1983), the organization of business and employee interests in Brussels is fairly similar to that of the older member states. The existence of a major business organization (Business Europe) and a major confederation of trade unions (European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC), who are themselves in constant negotiations, is redolent of the German model of social concentration. Very much like the Adenauer era that is denounced by Habermas in his classic book on the public sphere (1994 [1962]), neo-corporatism is more conducive to the staging of agreements than to the voicing of conflict, precisely because government and civil society are so inter-dependent that they become indistinguishable.

This close relationship between EU actors and corporate interests contrasts with the weak connection between European institutions and the citizenry at large. This gap was acknowledged by most of my interviewees. Particularly interesting is the testimony of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from Galicia and Yorkshire, who openly admitted that they easily reached (or were easily reached by) organized civil society, whereas work-a-day citizens remained largely out of their reach. The Yorkshire MEP even expresses some frustration for not being able to meet with "real people", only with umbrella groups:

> The EU has very segmented publics. Local administrations, trade unions, professional organizations, interest groups (...) all these people follow EU activities closely. Therefore there are lots of publics who are concerned about the most strategic, the most symbolic, the most transcendent issues on a medium to long term. Those groups are involved in European politics and are very sensitive to any development, they react quickly. We the MEPs notice it immediately when one of us is named rapporteur or shadow on any topic. Immediately we begin to receive lots of messages, phone calls, appointment requests. (…) But we have to reach the public at large. We are doing policies, but we also have to do politics. We already have an associative base around the parliament. What we lack is a popular base.
> —Galician Socialist MEP (London, 16 June 2009)

> I get very cross sometimes, in the sense that in the Parliament we tend to get the national or the European umbrella groups that come to see us. And frankly, I'm often tempted to say: "Go away, but find me a farmer or a businessperson, or whatever it is, in Yorkshire, near my home, that I can talk to, sort of touch-feel-see, and understand the reality of the problem as it affects those that elect me." Because what I don't want is that sort of watered-down, composite message, that comes from nothing grounded in reality.
> —Yorkshire Liberal Democrat MEP (Leeds, 13 March 2009)

Corporatism, then, can be found at all levels of the EU polity. Although modern "governance" has been praised for making public policy more participatory (Rhodes 1997), the involvement of non-government actors in policy-making and delivery is usually limited to well-resourced or well-organized groups. In traditional liberal democracies, governance lives side by side with government. Both civil society and society at large (the individuals) have means, however imperfect, of influencing policy direction. But in the case of the EU, the world of individuals is highly peripheral. Corporatism is in essence depoliticizing. It has the boardroom, and not the public forum, as its debate arena. Its main actors are the interest groups, not the citizens.

The subsidiarity principle explains, in part, the confederal condition of European identity and its public sphere. If they exist, they exist as "Europeanized" national identities and spheres of debate. The national level overshadows the federal upper layer, as it is the only means by which Europe is domesticated. Subsidiarity appears to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows for the non-controversial existence and functioning of a transnational layer of power. On the other hand, it makes the transnational layer invisible, untouchable, or exclusively accessible through the particular national frames of reference. Subsidiarity might be the precondition for the endurance of the EU, as it keeps national jealousy at bay – but it is also a major drain of the always elusive popular legitimacy for the transnational level of power.

Conclusion

Who are the Europeans? According to Fligstein (2008), they are the new mobile class of white-collar workers who feel at ease crossing national boundaries and see Europe, and not just their nation-state, as their home. Right now, according to survey evidence cited by Fligstein and others, this amounts to 10 per cent of the current European population. Will it change in the near future? In the previously mentioned interview with Umberto Eco published in the *Europa* supplement, the famous Italian author compared the popular exchange program Erasmus with a "sexual revolution" that would create the first generation of true Europeans: "I call it a sexual revolution: a young Catalan man meets a Flemish girl – they fall in love, they get married and they become European, as do their children." (Riotta 2012, January 26). Perhaps in less eloquent terms, this idea had already been advanced by Cederman and Kraus (2004) in their "tandem-hypothesis" of European identity construction. In this view, a series of institutional opportunities (*e.g.*, the Erasmus exchange program)

will lead to real changes in perceptions and habits (*e.g.*, the children of Erasmus students might become the first "natural" Europeans), and those changes will in turn call for more institutional reforms (*e.g.*, harmonization of education degrees, pan-European health records) that could provoke a political translation (*e.g.*, a directly-elected President of the EU would not sound as remote as it sounds today).

In the meantime, until that European *demos* is created, the situation in Europe could be labeled as "*kratos* without *demos*" or "power without the people", to take the words of one of my interviewees, a British Conservative MEP (Cheltenham, 24 April 2009). It might well be that Europe is still that "security community" described by Karl Deutsch more than half a century ago (1966 [1953], cited by Taylor 1983, p. 56). In this view, it is a community in which there is enough mutual trust and understanding so as not to envision war among its members. And, at the same time, the EU is *not* a community in which communication creates the imagined fellow citizen, endowed with the same allegiance as a co-national.

What I have attempted here is to take the blame from the news media, and to deemphasize the importance placed on communication when it comes to making European institutions closer to their citizens. To be fair, Europeans would be better served if their journalists knew more about the Community Method and other jargon so revered by the Eurominati. But the key to understanding the distant and apolitical nature of EU institutions lies not in the way they are mediated to the public. Rather, that understanding resides in knowing the way European institutions were designed (through functionalist cooptation of elites), in the way they are governed (through diplomacy and technocracy), and in the sort of community Europe has been conceptualized to be (not a nation, therefore not immediately amenable to a demo-cratic regime).

Europe was there before the nation-state was created, and therefore Europe existed before the modern idea of mass democracy (so intimately linked to nationalism) came into being. Rather than being like a conspiracy to create a federation by stealth, the EU might be seen as an original form of regional governance, the sort of unprecedented political form that Salvador de Madariaga, a noted Spanish diplomat, wanted for Europe:

> Europe is not and will never be a nation, but a cluster of nations on the vine. There will never be a European electoral body (…) The European federalists should try to make an original work, neither imitating a centralized country like France or a federated country like Switzerland or the United States. Europe is *sui generis*, it does not resemble anything else. It has to create its own original institutions. (Madariaga 1977: p. 204)

And so they might be, "original institutions". Yet there is still something strange about a power structure that remains so out of reach and arcane for its citizens. Nobody is in love with the EU. It is only loved and understood by the network of actors who interact with its structures. It touches a sentimental chord in those cosmopolitan spirits that see no boundaries and no frontiers. But this very porosity and flexibility is at the same time a liability. No national nor true political will stands behind "European decisions". The cosmopolitan creed denies the fact that the political world is, as Carl Schmitt (2009 [1932]) argued, a pluriverse, not a universe. The EU could be thought of as a world-government in the making. But precisely because of its universal reach, it is an apolitical construction, a dream that goes beyond politics and conflict. It has been written into the EU's DNA to make peace and link former rivals; consequently, it is reluctant to define boundaries and to name enemies (Manent 2007). For the cosmopolitan spirit, not prone to die for any country, this might be the only dream worth dying for. But as long as this world is divided by identities, the European will shall be as weak as its *demos*, and its institutions will retain the cold and frigid beauty of the post-political man.

Bibliography

Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso, 2006 [1983].

Beloff, M., ed. *Europe and the Europeans: An International Discussion*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1957.

Bermann, G.A. "Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States." *Columbia Law Review* 94, no. 2 (1994): 331-456.

Bourdieu, P. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012 [1991].

Calhoun, C. *Nacionalismo*. Buenos Aires: Los libros del Zorzal, 2007 [1997].

Cederman, L.E. and P. Kraus. "Transnational Communication and the European Demos". In *Digital Formations*, edited by R. Latham and S. Sassen, 283-311. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Charlemagne. "English is Coming: The Adverse Side-effects of the Growing Dominance of English". *The Economist*, (February 14, 2009): 85.

Deutsch, K. *Nationalism and Social Communication*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966 [1953].

Eder, K. and Kanter, C. "Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa: Eine Kritik der Rede vom Öffentlichkeitsdefizit". In *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gessellschaften: Sonderhelft 40 der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, edited by M. Bach, 306-331. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000.

Elias, A. *Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative Study*. London: Routledge, 2009.

European Commission. Special Eurobarometer 243, "Europeans and their languages", 2006, accessed August 21, 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/pdf/doc629_en.pdf.

Fligstein, N. *Euro-Clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Giddens, A. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Grimm, D. "Does Europe Need a Constitution?" *European Law Journal* 1, no. 3 (1995): 282-302.

Haas, E. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004 [1958].

Habermas, J. *Historia y Crítica de la Opinión Pública*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1994 [1962].

Haller, M. *European Integration as an Elite Process: The Failure of a Dream?* London: Routledge, 2008.

Ipperciel, D. "Communication as Public Debate: A Reply to Dardanelli". *Swiss Political Science Review* 14, no. 3 (2008): 562-577.

Karp, J.A., S.A. Banducci., and S. Bowler. "To Know It is to Love it? Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union". *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 3 (2003): 271-292.

Katzenstein J.T., and P.J. Checkel. "Conclusion: European Identity in Context". In *European identity*, edited by J.T. Katzenstein and P.J. Checkel, 213-227. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Kraus, P. A. *A Union of Diversity: Language, Identity and Polity-building in Europe*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Madariaga, S. de. *De la Angustia a la Libertad/Memorias de un Federalista*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1977.

Manent, P. *Democracy Without Nations? The Fate of Self-government in Europe*. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2007.

Moravcsik, A. "In Defense of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union". *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 4 (2002): 603-624.

Moravcsik, A. "The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy". In *The disparity of European integration: Revisiting neofunctionalism in honour of Ernst B. Haas*, edited by T. A. Börzel, 133-170. London: Routledge, 2006.

Mouffe, C. *The Democratic Paradox*. London and New York: Verso, 2000.

—. *The Return of the Political*. London and New York: Verso, 2005 [1993].

Naurin, D. *Deliberation Behind Closed Doors: Transparency and Lobbying in the European Union*. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007.

Riotta, G. "Umberto Eco: 'It's Culture, Not War, That Cements European Identity'". *The Guardian* (January 26, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/26/umberto-eco-culture-war-europa

Rhodes, R.A.W. *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. London: Open University Press, 1997.

Risse, T. *A Community of Europeans?: Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.

Schmidt, V.A. *Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Schmitt, C. *El Concepto de lo Político*. Madrid: Alianza, 2009 [1932].

Sholten, I. "Corporatist and Consociational Arrangements". In *Political Stability and Neo-corporatism: Corporatist Integration and Social Cleavages in Western Europe*, edited by I. Scholten, 1-38. London: Sage, 1987.

Taylor, P. *The Limits of European Integration*. London and Sidney: Croom Helm, 1983.

Valentini, C., and Nesti, G., eds. *Public communication in the European Union: History, perspectives, and challenges*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010.

Weßler, H., *et al*. *Transnationalization of Public Spheres*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Werts, J. *The European Council*. London: John Harper Publishing, 2008.

Wogan, P. "Imagined Communities Reconsidered: Is Print-Capitalism What We Think It Is?" *Anthropological Theory*, 1 no. 4 (2001): 403-418.

CHAPTER SEVEN

POLITICS IN THE AGE OF BLOGGING: THE INTERNET AS A NEW MEDIUM OF CHANGE AND THE BRIDGE INTO THE IRANIAN DIASPORA

PARDIS SHAFAFI

> "You asked me how I felt, seeing the Libyan and Tunisian uprisings on the television…well yes, every time we saw such things we were filled with emotion and excitement, and especially so when this was taking place in Iran. The Green Movement was something whereby you couldn't just sit with folded arms and spectate."
> —Maryam**,** January 2012**,** Oslo**,** Norway

> "His political participation is directed towards an imagined *heimat* in which he does not intend to live, where he pays no taxes, where he cannot be arrested, where he will not be brought before the courts – and where he does not vote: in effect, a politics without responsibility or accountability."
> —Benedict Anderson**,** *Long Distance Nationalism*: *World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics* 1992: p. 11)

In an article published in *USA Today* on 12 June 2005 regarding the internet boom in Iran, the closing quote beams back provocatively at the reader: "We in the diaspora can seriously participate in Iranian politics as vibrantly as those inside (…) allowing democratic forces to keep in touch", says Abbas Milani, head of the Iranian studies Program at Stanford University (Slavin 2005). Today, Iran is best known for its media censorship and (especially harsh) post-2009 journalistic blackout. For this reason, the internet has certainly been an otherwise absent, unrestricted forum for communication between Iranians and the "outside world". However, blogging has allowed the outsider to peer back into the worlds of those who live within Iran under conditions that have become astonishingly foreign to diaspora Iranians since those at the time of their

departure. This process has, of course, been profound for diaspora communities the world over. But are these often essentialized "outside" and "inside" Iranian communities (diaspora and Iran-dwelling, respectively) configured as Abbas Milani claims them to be? Is the internet actually used as a means by which to "stay in touch" personally – or is it better conceptualized as a means to engage directly with political change? These questions are explored in this chapter. Moreover, I also ask: How and to what ends is the internet *actually* being using in Iran and by Iranians abroad? The speed and nature of international political movements are attributed to the internet, while politically volatile Iran is held up as a "nation of bloggers". To assess these assumptions, I use my recent ethnographic fieldwork amongst Iranian former communist guerrillas in Oslo, blogs and bloggers within and outside of Iran, and my own experiences with opposition movements abroad to draw conclusions about the internet and socio-political change in Iran. The scope of the chapter limits me to a descriptive and primarily analytical approach that should be considered as a starting point from which to tackle the vast, complex and sometimes contradictory worlds of Iran and the internet.

Back story

On 17 January 1979 the Shah left Iran after years of political friction that had been galvanized by his restoration to the throne in a British and American *coup d'état*. *The Guardian* newspaper characterized him as embodying everything wrong with Iran at the time (Tran 2009). In fact, the Shah's rule had been a mixture of socio-economic successes and failures. As Michael Axworthy (2008: p.252) puts it, his failures were (at least initially) primarily political with an absence of any plan to restore a representative government and repression as the only answer to post-Mossadegh era dissent. The regime's resort to coercion and violence overshadowed any damage control measures the Shah implemented. Political opposition to the Shah could and did result in incarceration and torture (Abrahamian 1982: p.499). On the Shah's departure from Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile in Paris and became the symbol and leader of the revolution and the subsequent government. My informants were present and active throughout this period of intense political turbulence. They were members of the Fadaiyan Guerrillas, a Marxist political group who advocated armed opposition to what they perceived to be the oppressive, imperialist regime of the Shah.[1] Many of my informants had served prison sentences during the Shah's time in power and celebrated the revolution victoriously in 1979. After a brief

moment of triumph during an era now referred to as "The Spring of Freedom", with the establishment of The Islamic Republic, my informants and thousands like them found themselves in (the same) prisons once again. Conditions were now far worse and torture and execution routinely exercised more brutally than ever (Abrahamian 1999: p.124). As one informant's brothers (a notable figure from the Fadaiyan) once claimed, "one day in the prisons of the Islamic Republic is worse than 1,000 days in the prisons of the Shah." Subsequently, my informants, and others like them, fled Iran, many through the mountainous terrains of the northwestern border into Turkey. They crossed any and all borders to eventually claim political asylum elsewhere. They began their lives abroad as exiles, but are now members of a global diaspora, what Shahram Khosravi likens to a "deterritorialized world wide web" (Khosravi 2000).

Amongst the 13 core families I interviewed, observed and worked with during 2012 in Oslo, all had been politically active in some capacity and had felt their lives to be at risk as a direct consequence of this activity. Some had politically prominent family members whose deaths caused outrage internationally, others were imprisoned themselves, and others still fled Iran with a bounty on their heads. To further the aims of this study, I explore the exiles' experiences, commentary on censorship, and past and contemporary activism. Moreover, I assay to better understand the impact that the internet has had on the political activity of the youthful "nation of bloggers" that has survived the exiles' departure (Alavi 2005). Contemporary Iran is still a place of political friction, known for its generational and ideological clashes as a young population tries to live under the rules of a revolution that is older than most of them. This is just one side of a country that has a complex and eventful past. Nevertheless, it is due to this political friction that the "how" and "why" of blogging behavior of Iranians is so striking; and it is with extended observations on blogging that the chapter begins.

An extended nation of bloggers: Who and what blogs feature

The blogging phenomenon in Iran has not gone unnoticed by scholars as several research projects focus on who and what Iranians were blogging about (Alexanian 2006; Nafisy 2008, Sreberny and Khiabany 2010). The blogosphere illustrates the heterogeneous quality of the many thousands of Persian blogs, ranging from literature and poetry appreciation to conservative Shi'ite commentary from clerics (Kelly and Etling 2008). Common themes in studies of Iranians and the internet refer to the use of

the internet as "a short hand for political expression, journalism by another name and social exploration in a milieu where such exploration is not particularly welcomed" (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010: p.vii). However, as Sreberny and Khiabany elaborate in their 2010 work "Blogistan" (and my informants themselves illustrate), the internet is a *post*-revolutionary aspect of contemporary Iran. However, political dissent or activism was by no means absent before the digital age. The point here is that political dissent and activism in Iran clearly predate the internet. Thus, I reiterate that the internet functions as an enabler, or an intensifier, rather than a creator of political movements. In order to understand why the internet and blogging technologies were embraced by Iran in a way unlike other Middle-Eastern States facing similarly repressive conditions, it is important to take into account both the desire of the Islamic Republic to appear progressive and technologically "savvy", and the desire of contemporary Iranians to create a private/public space, away from prying conservative eyes (Graham and Khosravi 2002). Some observers perceive this dynamic to be serious enough to spawn "a technology driven protest movement" in itself (Morozov 2009: p.10).

As discussed in Etling, Faris and Palfrey's 2010 paper on digital technology and political movements, a distinction between types of technologies is not just relevant but crucial. Whereas photograph and video transmission fall into the "motivation and empowerment" domain, more elaborated textual online engagement (blogging and user controlled news outlets) exemplify "alternative news sources". These alternative channels are construed as aiding the organizing political fractions and/or movements and they promote more enduring collective organization. After assessing the content of numerous blogs as part of their "internet and democracy" project, Etling, Faris and Palfrey conclude that many blogs express dissent and desire for radical political change. However, they also find blog-transmitted praise for the unelected Ayatollah Khamenei, denial of the holocaust, and religious prose in seemingly comparable measure.

Demography and internet access intersect with the issue of blog content. If it is mostly the young, urban elite that have access to the internet, then how can the conservative religious prevalence of blogs in Iran be explained? One possibility is that a wider demographic has access to internet services than previously thought. On the other hand, it may be that young people who have new media access are not as generally dissatisfied with their theocracy as we on the outside would expect them to be. Certainly, my informants in Oslo agree that a substantial number of Iranians within Iran are supporters of the current regime and/or religious enough to defend an Islamic theocracy in general. Furthermore, my

informants' relatively rural background and the degree and nature of their contact (via Facebook, email and video-telephoning technologies such as Skype, Oovoo and Viber) with relatives back home is proof enough that internet access is growing beyond Iran's major cities. They occasionally introduce software to their relatives to ease communication. On more than one occasion an octogenarian illiterate grandmother from a village in rural Iran has independently logged onto a video-calling program to check on her children and grandchildren thousands of miles away in Norway.

Blogging is different. Among my informants, blogs act as social and political commentary and are almost always about Iran and in Persian (Farsi). Conversely, young people outside of Iran blog within specific (non-Iranian) milieus and in Norwegian and/or English peppered with "Finglish".[2] In a sense, they do not write blogs as Iranians but rather as a part of other interest-centered communities. My own informants, who are mostly in their late 50s, blog only occasionally while teenagers and young Iranians within Iran do so consistently while covering a range of topics. They do this as well as using blogging space as a platform from which to conduct romantic relationships and friendships from chat rooms. An enlightening exploration of the former, amorous sort of online relationship can be found in Pardis Mahdavi's "Meeting, Mating and Cheating online" (2007). Depending on your definition of resistance and/or activism, engaging with new virtual "private" spaces to pursue otherwise state-sanctioned sexual encounters are themselves revolutionary acts. This is truer still for women who can use this hybrid private/public space to express sexual desire in new and otherwise socially "inappropriate" ways.

Blogging as a medium

Hossein Derakhshan captures the themes of this chapter for more than just his title as the "blogfather". Apart from being credited with founding the blogging revolution in Iran, he represents both sides of the contemporary political activism coin. He was educated both within and outside of the nation, claiming both exilic and Iranian status. In 2001 (the same year that he left Iran), Derakhshan created a Persian language "how to" on setting up a blog and sent it into cyberspace from Canada (St-Louis 2010). By 2005, Persian was reported as being the fourth most popular language for keeping online journals (Alavi 2005: p.1). Considering the relatively low number of countries that speak Farsi widely as a native language (Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan respectively), this is quite extraordinary. Why so many would turn to blogging as a medium of expression seems to be clear and is widely reported. Its immense accessibility even renders it

"vulgar" in some instances, drawing attention to substandard linguistic practices (Doostdar 2010). But since freedom of expression is non-existent in contemporary, media-unfriendly Iran, the popularity and potential of blogs are clear. Newspapers and televised broadcasts are subject to high degrees of surveillance as their editors, authors, producers and even presenters face strict regulations on content. They are vulnerable to being harassed and possibly imprisoned, should they fail to meet the demands of an increasingly hard-line Islamic Republic. Anonymity therefore has its obvious advantages, especially when making a decision to wade into the contentious world of national political matters.

The role and importance of blogging might only be considered relevant in terms of political change if the content of the blog is itself politically oriented. Keeping a web log – or "blog" – fulfils a variety of purposes, from a record of feelings and daily events to a platform for disseminating one's own political opinions. Many blogs do both. Although the researchers at Harvard's Berkman Center are quick to dispel the idea that Persian language blogs are used primarily a tool for reformist politics (Kelly and Etling 2008), the political nature of many blogs, even those that do not appear overtly so, is undeniable. "Observations of Tehran life" by "kaveh" is one such example. This blog is both a journal of sorts and a socio-political commentary. The author discusses the mundane activities he undertakes in the city with clever, informed metaphors (for instance, comparing the rich in Tehran to the pigs of *Animal Farm*). The authoritarian rule of The Islamic Republic has politicized even the mundane. Khosravi (2007) and Mahdavi's (2009) studies of youth culture in Iran present prime examples of unavoidable politicization of cultural and sexual expression (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010: p.43). They and others show that a diary, or a journal can therefore be just as political as a post-election commentary or calls for a riot.

Using the opinions and experiences of my informants, especially those that are featured explicitly in this work due to their regular blogging and micro-blogging activities, I have come to understand that they see themselves as at once spectators – *and* as taking part in a new brand of activism, far removed from that of their youth. My informant Amir, author of a well read blog that was featured anonymously in Nasrin Alavi's *We Are Iran*, comments as follows on why he uses blogs[3]: "It is for the anonymity. I can be judged solely on the content of my blog and my wider opinions about the state of things." Amir's admission in August 2012 came after a lengthy discussion about exile politics and the inability of many former political activists, with varying former party allegiances, to work together.

Concern about character assassination, at the cost of working towards a shared goal within the exilic community, was perhaps surprisingly pervasive amongst many of my informants. I also picked up on this while working with other well-known activists in the diaspora who regularly confided that their articles and blogs were subject to immensely unpleasant backlash that often had little to do with their actual content. It is useful to notice that backlash came from diaspora Iranians themselves as well as those suspected to be working on behalf of the Iranian State. Who is who and what can, however, become wholly unidentifiable. The anonymity of the internet caters to everyone, allowing false or distorted identities to be conveyed with no ownership or accountability (Bergen 2010: p.6). What Nazeri (1996) describes as "nasty, provocative and downright offensive" posts on some Iranian sites between Iranians is unfortunately, a common occurrence. Aside from escaping this kind of online abuse, dissident bloggers also harbor the more predictable desire to elude state authorities while expressing opposition material online. If old party allegiances condition the formulation of goals, then, of course, it would be very difficult to imagine any kind of unified (and successful) opposition coming together outside of Iran. At the same time, Herve St-Louis (2010: p.4) posits that diaspora Iranians utilize blogging as a way to communicate and "sell" Iran to the outside world, acting as an interface, or interpreter of a foreign world to their host states.

But my informant Amir was commentating from Oslo, on events within Iran, in Persian. Iranians read his blog from within and outside of Iran; they could either regard it as a commentary or an alternative news source. The latter function of blogs is important because even diaspora Iranians underestimate how little Iranians are told about national political affairs. A Skype conversation between an informant and his family in Iran was proof of this. He warned a male cousin that doing his mandatory military service at this time was risky due to international pressure over Iran's nuclear program and the threat of war. The relatives in Iran asked "What? Why? What have they said they will do?", and my informant explained the latest news. At a later stage in the conversation, he expressed his disdain at the news that Iranian women have started to be denied university admission for certain subjects (Tait 2012). A female cousin was shocked to hear this report: "This kind of news never reaches our ears you see," she responded. Yet one glance at my own social networking pages are enough to see that it is precisely these kinds of news stories that feature most prominently amongst micro-blogging websites and weblogs on Iran. My own Facebook page was inundated with friends and colleagues covering the gendered study restrictions. I noticed that it was often those

residing outside of Iran posting the negative stories and Iranians within Iran commenting on them. Wild discussions flare up over these and other reports. Similarly, after the recent earthquake in Azerbaijan, the national state sponsored news site *Sedaye Sima* barely mentioned the event. Many listeners from Iran subsequently called into popular exile radio station *Radio Farda* to express their condolences on the matter and to question why the Iranian authorities were not reporting on the earthquake or, indeed, reacting to it with emergency relief.

Alternative news sources abroad have become the *only* news sources on these and other matters. Yet, while the censoring practices of the Islamic Republic could silence them (even momentarily), ever-multiplying blogs are more difficult to catch and eliminate. Bloggers within Iran also have better access to the "unpalatable" news stories that diaspora outlets report. I have been witness to well known activists in the diaspora using their Facebook accounts to appeal for more information on news within Iran from those who currently reside there. It is reasonable to conclude that, in such a climate, blogs could take on a new kind of credibility especially since, as mentioned before, some writers are often current or former journalists and academics writing anonymously. Bijan Safsari, a journalist and critic of the regime was well known for consistently writing under his own name using a succession of different blogging websites that were constantly and systematically shut down. He was later arrested and imprisoned for his blogs. Independent journalists like Safsari use blogging media as a means by which to escape (at least provisionally) the harsh censorship and laws governing publishable material in Iran. By maintaining independence, the credibility of the bloggers and their information by proxy is established. Their role is crucial in maintaining bridges of information from Iran to the wider world.

Bambuser is a real time video sharing service for mobile phones and web-cameras, allowing users to share audiovisual material instantly with the world, and interact in real time. This activity hinges on a similar sentiment of independence. Unedited and raw, the impact of the video footage is difficult to dispute. In my past conversation with Bambuser's founders, I was told that increasingly, authoritarian governments are trying to block the technology, which is easily downloadable from their website. By removing visible authorship, material that emerges from Bambuser is also harder for governments to use in reverse-engineered form to harass opposition activists. Throughout the "Arab Spring", footage of the reality of state inflicted violence has been captured and is available to all and any who could bear to watch.

Blogging from the borders

Today, Iran has blogs that extend from Mansour Nasiri's photo-blogs to the current president's own site, *Personal notes of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad*, available in Persian, English, French and Arabic. Ahmadinejad's blog has even attracted fans such as a gentleman from the UK, who comments "May God bless you Dr., it is these deeds which have made you the darling of the hearts of most Muslims of the world."[4] Everyone and his or her president seems to have a blog. This is, however, a dangerous assumption in itself. Although access to the internet and blogging is growing, they are still concentrated amongst the younger, urban, more affluent, and liberal-minded cross-section of a demographically diverse society (St-Louis 2010: p.5). At the same time, Iran's youthful national demographics, and its system of relatively egalitarian university access across the whole country (including rural areas), tend to promote internet use; and with it, diverse sets of social relations across societal hierarchies and divisions (Escobar *et al*. 1994: p.214).

Iranians who use internet access to enact "techno-activism" (Kahn and Kellner 2009: p.28) are doing so under immense risk. In a Big Brother surveillance state like Iran, techno-activism carries the same harsh penalties as other more traditional forms of activism (as in the episodes of Derakhshan's arrest in 2008 and Sina Motallebi in 2001, along with numerous others). More recent are the cases of Zhila Bani-Yaghoub and Sattar Beheshti. Bani-Yaghoub is an imprisoned journalist whose current charges relate to her position as editor of the *Focus on Iranian Women* website. She was previously tried for the offence of "having a personal blog without any authorization from government authorities" (Amnesty International 2012). Beheshti died soon after being arrested by the Islamic Republic's cyber policing unit in November 2012. He was said to have criticized the Iranian government's financial contributions to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Interestingly, the international outcry after his unexplained death while in custody resulted in the dismissal of General Saeed Shokrian, National Police Chief (Erdbrink 2012). This suggests that the Islamic Republic has recognized the potential of blogs to be credible news sources. We also see the formation of a Foucauldian "digital panopticon" (Kahn and Kellner 2009: p.30) that is assuming the roles formerly enacted by the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK, the Shah's secret police) and, later, the Islamic Republic's Revolutionary Guard.

A main criticism of over-zealous optimism regarding internet activism is that it fails to address the internet as available and utilized by an array of actors – including the very anti-democratic forces of the governments that

it tries to overcome (Morozov 2011: p.6). Indeed, during and following the 2009 post-election protests in Iran, the government used the same technology that the activists used to organize and disseminate information in order to locate and punish them. It is not entirely unfathomable to imagine that they also engaged with blogging and micro-blogging media to undermine the protests and to spread propaganda. The government was able to further discredit the use of this media by spreading unfounded and spectacular claims that are still disputed. These included claims that hot water and hazardous liquids were poured onto the protestors from helicopters (Morozov 2011: p.17). While the inaccuracy of the stories is certainly compatible with an effort to show the unreliability of "citizen journalism" (namely on Twitter), I also want to point out that the ancient tactic of creating a climate of confusion in order to undermine a movement has simply been endowed with a high-tech gloss. Sadly, this is not the only way that the Iranian government could use the internet to strike back at activists.

Perhaps in line with US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's claim that attempting to halt the development of the internet was like "nailing jell-o to the wall" (Morozov 2009), the Islamic Republic instead chose to re-appropriate and use the internet for its own means. As well as creating an atmosphere of speculation and disorder to discredit any unsavory tales of their wrongdoings, governments can (and do) intentionally slow the internet connection that makes downloaded and streamed videos almost impossible to watch; and they selectively block websites. Unsurprisingly, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights organizations, and human rights centered NGOs were amongst the consistently blocked websites (Deibert *et al.* 2008: p.297) In turn, many Iranian politicians and state run news outlets now have their own web pages with which to message the masses. This activity took a turn for the radical when the Islamic Republic began to develop a national *intra-net* in 2012 (Ball and Gottieb 2012).

Despite obviously not furthering (nor intending to further) the democratic project, I do not believe that these State actions necessarily halt the cyber-activist's aspirations. In the lead up to the 1979 revolution, surveillance by the Shah's secret police was rife. My informants remember exchanging handwritten copies of dense Marxist literature, copied out in tiny lettering in pocket notebooks and on scrap paper. They recalled the cassette tapes with audio-recordings of party material and of coded messages and exchanges that passed between them undetected. What I mean to say is that technology may have made it easier to pursue and punish opposition activists, but critics, including Evgeny Morozov, may underestimate the creativity of the activists in realizing their political aims.

Although cyber activism naysayers will consider Ayatollah Khamenei's Facebook page as further proof of their antithetical assumptions, all of my informants deem it as concrete verification that the Islamic Republic amply acknowledges the radical political potential of new media in their attempts to co-opt it.[5] It is taken as obvious to my informants that the internet poses a threat for the Iranian government. Indeed, what makes the internet so dangerous for State powers is the diffused networking capabilities it offers. In this view, there is no "place" in which they are "located" that is vulnerable to being stormed or bombed (Castells 2011: p.66)

Long distance activist: Blogging from inside and outside

Iranian exiles are eager to gaze upon the daily life of Iranians within Iran. For those who have been living outside of Iran in the years following the revolution, the various blogging sites from within Iran present one of the only "authentic" sources of information open to their access. Although distance may seem to endanger their nationalist sentiment, the opposite may have occurred (Erikson 2006). Amongst political exiles, such as those featured in my own research, returning to Iran is rarely an option. The internet and blogs are for them both a window and a reflecting glass, and an opportunity to return "virtually" (Khosravi 2000).

As blogs can be written by lay members of the public with the intention of capturing the author's life in diary form, they are not generally written for large audiences (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010: p.41). However, the absence of trusted, unbiased news outlets has affected this situation as non-professional journalists use blogs to record social and political changes and reach interested audiences. My informant Amir, a now long retired former member of the Fadaiyan guerrilla communists had much to say on the subject. He regarded the highly sophisticated and informed political blogs of young Iranians to be symptomatic of a generation that was capable of creating its own future without the need for help from diaspora Iranians. "They are not like our generation…they are far better informed", he told me in an interview in January 2012. He went on to say that they understood the system that they criticized, something that presumably he feels that his own generation did not. Undoubtedly, access to the internet as well as to satellite television, are key in this socio-political knowledge. I wondered whether he considers his now intermittent postings, such as one entitled "The Arab Autumn, the Islamic Spring", as activism? Like many of my other informants, he does not think so. This is somewhat easy to understand, the Fadaiyan Guerrillas were best known

for their 1971 armed storming of the *gendarmerie* post in the village of Siakal in Gilan. This (unsuccessful) operation was designed to release a number of comrades who had been detained there. The event has been considered to be the start of intense guerrilla activity in Iran (Abrahamian 1980: p.3).

My informant Leila was also a prominent member of the Fadaiyan Guerrillas in the 1970s. She does not consider herself to be politically active presently, yet one glance at her engagement with micro-blogging mediums such as Facebook may indicate otherwise. Her Facebook page was (at the time of writing) almost completely dedicated to Iranian feminist and humanitarian causes, with conference fliers and banners in lieu of a profile picture. Both Amir and Leila are in regular contact with political actors in Iran and they make a distinction between their time as Fadaiyan activists and their commentary and circulation of information via blogging media. This could be due more to their geographic positioning – far from Iran – than the nature of blogging.

The 2009 national Iranian elections and beyond

The summer of 2009 saw a disputed election outcome whereby Ahmadinejad took office for a second term in what many considered a corrupt and fixed election result. Many diaspora Iranians around the world staged solidarity protests and rallies in support of those who took to the streets inside the country. As media blackout ensued within Iran, the only information available to the outside world came via personal blogs, coded phone calls, and smuggled photographs and videos. Had it not been for the mobile phone recording of the moment when Neda Agha Soltani died from gunshot wounds on a busy Tehran street during the protests, we would never have been witness to this extraordinary and disturbing event.

A flood of other grim images flooded video blogging sites such as YouTube, allowing the outside world to see how events were unfolding from those who were present. The recordings were both heartbreaking and inspiring to those who, like my informants, had initiated a revolution of their own over 34 years ago. Leila's brother was a prominent Fadaiyan leader who faced imprisonment and torture and was then executed and dumped in a shallow grave for his role as a leader of a left-wing political party. There is no visual evidence documenting his torture or death – and most of what we know about him during those last weeks comes from the handful of political prisoners who were there with him and who survived. Times have changed and dictatorships are finding it more difficult to dispose of unruly elements quietly.

The speed and ease with which images are captured and shared is striking and difficult to intercept, even for the Islamic Republic. The image of Neda Agha Soltani bleeding from her mouth and nose in a Tehran street has inspired news pieces, songs, documentaries and rallies from within and outside of Iran. It indicates that although the action of uploading images onto the web may not be in itself synonymous with political activism as we know it, the ramifications of broadcasting such State brutality are profoundly political. The question here is whether enabling technologies with a capacity to motivate audiences *actually* turn information into political change. Solidarity protests took place across the world and moved people like my informants. But did my informants think of their various reactions to these images as activism *per se*?

> When I think about that summer, it was a very difficult time emotionally. (…) It was a flashback to 1979, a spark of hope was ignited in my heart as a 1979er. (…) Following the solidarity protests we would go straight to the computer and stay up watching YouTube clips and weeping until we had to go to work again the next day.

These were the words of Maryam, Amir's wife, herself a former member of the Fadaiyan Guerrillas. But when asked whether they felt that their political activism (internet-based or otherwise) impacts those within Iran, Amir said:

> They do not react to what we do here, if anything we react to them. If 10,000 people protest here, not a fly will move in Iran. But a fly moves in Iran and we get emotional and flow into the streets.

Much like Benedict Anderson's sentiment in *Long Distance Nationalism*, Amir described Iranian protests within Iran as "real" due to the fact that the actors live within the circumstances they are attempting to change through their activism. This includes online or "techno-activism" (Kahn and Kellner 2009) that carries real and very brutal consequences within Iran; some such consequences have been described earlier in this chapter.

That is not to say that writing from abroad does not carry its risks. For this reason, many diasporic Iranians use pseudonyms, according to the Harvard Berkman Center research group. Indeed, pseudonyms are sometimes more prevalent with exiles than bloggers within Iran. The "porous" nature of contemporary Iran (Streberny and Khiabany 2010: p.viii) has meant that many exiled Iranians can travel relatively freely between their home and host states; a situation that they do not wish to endanger. Still, Amir is right in that any threat to diasporic Iranians is

minor compared to those faced by Iran-dwelling bloggers. Reporters Without Borders dedicates a whole section to Iran in its March 2012 report on "Enemies of the Internet". The report names 19 Iranian bloggers who are currently on trial, sentenced to death, or incarcerated. Web developers and others working with internet related media are among the persecuted. Many of the charges brought against them relate to their criticisms of the Iranian Government (Enemies of the Internet Report, March 2012). In this sense, we see place and location as still being directly related to activism, despite the "dislocation" that internet technology ostensibly promotes.

It is striking that palpable threat of persecution has not seemed to diminish the popularity of blogging amongst Iranians – despite what Geneive Abdo describes as some of the most extensive surveillance censorship techniques in the world by 2001, when internet use was out of reach of most Iranians. During this time, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution required that all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) use filtering systems (Abdo 2012). But, as anyone who has visited Iran since internet use became prevalent will tell you, for every household with an internet user, there is also knowledge of and access to a "*filter-shekan*" or "filter-breaker"; a proxy server to me and you.

Those familiar with post-revolutionary Iran will have already come across this cat-and-mouse dynamic of contemporary (young) Iranians, who may feel at odds with a revolution that they "inherited" from their parents' generation. Babak Rahimi cites the spectacular statistic: 70 percent of the Iranian population was, in fact, born after the 1979 Islamic revolution. Unsurprisingly, this is a generation of contradictions. From Shahram Khosravi's *Young and Defiant in Tehran* (2007) to Pardis Mahdavi's *Passionate Uprisings* (2009), the complicated, turbulent and topsy-turvy world of traditional and contemporary desires and actions have been documented in hyper-speed among their urban Tehrani informants; and such ferment is not absent among more rural Iranian elements either. Through media and what Arjun Appadurai has called "ideoscapes" (Appadurai 1996: p.45), counter modes of identity are generated and circulate with greater ease. A new social construction of reality can be said to exist, with its own developing codes and norms (Escobar *et al*. 1994: p. 217). Now more than ever, these ideas are documented in cyber space and authored in a first person voice. We now have access to their blogs, which unveil (to use a clichéd term in Iranian terms) both radical dissent and more moderate calls for reforms within an Islamic state.

However, to simplify the internet as a tool that only the youth are engaged with would be false – and to reduce dissent within Iran to narrowly-cast theocratic disagreements with the regime would be even

more so. Increasingly, economic matters are coming to the forefront of concern of the more rural populations of Iran. Generally devout and supporters of an *Islamic* Republic, the rural population's qualms are with the country's atrocious unemployment records, the rising price of food, low wages, and low level of public services, rather than Shi'ite law and national politics. Moreover, the highly competitive university admissions exam in Iran (*Konkour*) makes it possible for even rural and economically disadvantaged individuals to study at top universities. To do so means access to technology and the means by which to express experiences and ideas as well as, crucially, to interact with other like-minded people; opportunities that may not otherwise be possible.[6] As Rahimi (2003: p.104) observes, there is a marked effect of young rural university students taking their newfound knowledge of the internet and introducing it into the villages and small towns from which they originate. In the same vein, a fervent cyber-café culture has generated new demand for internet access for a diverse geographical and economic clientele.

A very necessary citizen journalism

Blogging started something that continues in interactive platforms of almost all popular culture mediums available today throughout the world. As in the UK and the rest of Europe, where readers comment on and critique online newspaper stories, so too do Iranians engage with *their* news sources from diverse places and to diverse ends. In 2012, the "Oscar" Academy Award for Best International Film went to an Iranian entry entitled *A Separation*, by director Asghar Farhadi. State affiliated newspaper *Fars News* reported on the story, "improving" parts of Farhadi's acceptance speech (Esfandiari 2012) by airdropping in mention of Iran's suspected nuclear program. Due to a backlash on social media sites, *Fars News* eventually altered the piece, removing the reference to the nuclear program from Farhadi's speech. Many of those who blogged and tweeted in response to the fabrication had seen the speech and immediately spotted the tampering with its transcript. Well-known bloggers like *Scream Under Water* even translated the speech into Persian as a whole post in a bid to "set the story straight".[7] What the bloggers accomplished was altering (mis)information available to Iranians who would not otherwise have been able to access either the clip itself or an accurate translation. Despite not being overtly political, the virtual community had accomplished something intensely so. They had condemned the integrity (or lack thereof) of an official State news source. They had, at least in one small way, shown the Big Brother State that they

too were watching. Reiterating Kelly and Etling's theorization, the virtual Iranian community is not simply a united oppositional front; nor is it made up of a mass of riot-inciting calls for revolution (although some bloggers certainly do that). Furthermore, these calls may not represent the sentiments of a great number of those living within Iran who blog about a range of things including greater civil liberties, slow reforms and – perhaps most significantly – national economic progress. It is largely the hardliner policies of the Islamic government that politicizes blogging in the first instance. This is so whether bloggers are writing "safely" from abroad or under the watchful gaze of the Islamic Republic's panoptic eye.

Conclusion

Asghar Farhadi's speech is just one way that the blogging revolution has initiated a step into a popular and efficacious arena for political activism. It also illustrates how the definition of a politically motivated act is altered for contemporary Iranians, something my own research has demonstrated time and again. The common metaphors of public and private take on contested and unique meanings when applied to virtual online spaces (Graham and Khosravi 2002) that create a special sense of "private" in their promises of relative anonymity. In turn, geographic boundaries shrink and allow the virtual space to encompass its long departed exilic members. In this sense, the potential that the internet holds in places like Iran with a now established international diaspora seem clear and make radical political change seem even inevitable.

However, and predictably, things are not so simple. The diaspora community embodies profound political, social and, notably, ethnic fractions. Just as a unified opposition front does not exist abroad, willing the "insiders" to revolt, within Iran the motives behind the desire for change are as numerous as those who call for it. Furthermore informants like Amir feel it wholly unreasonable and inappropriate for diaspora Iranians to engage with this "long-distance nationalism", to meddle with conditions under which they will not be living. In the eyes of a former guerrilla, now exiled, what we term an Iranian community – members of which will never meet face to face (Anderson 1983: p.6), a community that crosses class, ethnic, national and virtual boundaries into the homes of those like him abroad – is an imagined community *par excellence*.

The impression that I hope that this descriptive account of Iranians, blogging and the internet will have on the reader is simply that the internet in Iran allows for more information from more sources originating in more places to reach more people. In this view, the internet itself is a

communicative tool rather than an explicitly political one. Access to information can cascade to educate individuals. This, in turn, allows for Iranians to make their political choices based on a whole picture, or at least on more of it than they would have had prior to the 2001 blogging revolution. In terms used by Escobar *et al.* (1994: p. 214), routine engagement with these "technoscapes" can produce new ways of thinking and being. Whether this access to variety and information will develop into substantial political change depends on multiple variables, perhaps the most important being the motives of those on the receiving end of the information. Arguably, the rising price of meat is of far bigger concern for most Iranians across the demographic board than is the removal of the mandatory *hijab*. We can only (and perhaps optimistically) hope that blogging allows for a concerned public to discuss, debate and reduce misunderstanding, driving the process of progressive change forward.

It is undeniable that, from its bottom-up broadcasting to photo blogging of the everyday, Iranians within Iran can become the most authentic and legitimate sources of "inside" news. Without being explicitly political, they undermine counter-claims on the same issues reported by the State as well as communicating information that is otherwise unavailable to outsiders. From outside of the country, diaspora Iranians can literally act as channels of information (as in the communication and dissemination of 2009 protest imagery and news) to wider non-Persian speaking communities. Moreover, these independent, heterogeneous international communities can interact directly with the writers and commentators who produce information from around the world about Iran. In undoing what the Iranian state has long tried to implement (conflict between "insider" and "outsider" Iranians), a dialogue has been and is continuing to emerge between two generations, estranged through time and space. But as Amir puts it, it is not the younger, Iran-dwelling generation that has much to learn from the exiles; rather, exiles must learn from young Iranians in Iran, if any positive changes are to emerge.

To close, I will recount a relevant example of my work with diaspora activists and the role that internet technology played therein. In an interview in 1996 Benedict Anderson commented on the utopian idea of technology "saving us" (Gower 1996). Anderson shifts the terms of discussion to how communication becomes converted into power. He draws concrete examples from the arms trade, noting that the guns have to be real in order to make any impact outside of the realm in which they are discussed. In 2012, following years of virtual communication, and mass online meetings and conferences, individuals from within the Iranian diaspora convened a Truth Commission and an Iran Tribunal. Modeled on

the Russell Tribunal of the 1960s, the Iran Tribunal sought to bring to light the atrocities of the 1980s, known as the "bloody decade" of the Islamic Republic. The Tribunal was made up of former prisoners and victims of torture and persecution, as well as families of those who had been tortured and executed by the Islamic Republic between 1980 and 1989. I began working and researching with the activists in 2012 through informants who were taking part as witnesses and volunteers. Members of these campaigns were located in many different places and came from a variety of provincial, political and economic backgrounds. Through the Iran Tribunal, they formed (where possible) small national committees and met "in real life" to further the aims of the project. A steering committee of renowned legal professionals was empanelled and it designed the formal court proceedings and questioned witnesses in the presence of an international group of judges specializing in human rights cases. With these conditions in place, witnesses shared their ordeals at the hands of the post-revolutionary government, between the 18 and 22 June 2012 (during the Truth Commission), and from 25 to 27 October 2012 (during the Tribunal). Skype enabled individuals who could not make the journey to London to give evidence at the Truth Commission and Bambuser generated a live, unedited broadcast of the proceedings at The Hague.

Internet media was both friend and foe with frequent character assassinations of members of the Campaign and Steering Committee from international and Iranian state-controlled news outlets and blogs. As with the 2009 protests, conflicting stories and claims were made around this two-stage enactment of the Iran Tribunal (Truth Commission and Tribunal respectively). *Fars News*, among other outlets, published online articles aiming to discredit the organizers and cast doubt over their political intentions (*Fars News* 2012). Despite this, a virtual (perhaps otherwise imagined) community with shared aims met face to face and thus became a "real" community. The networking power of the internet had allowed for people from all over the world to connect (Castells 2011). As for power and efficacy, the Iran Tribunal succeeded in its core goal of drawing attention to the massacres of the 1980s. Although (unsurprisingly) the Iranian government has not formally taken steps to investigate the issue, it has since conceded that they actually took place and attempted to justify its actions. New information about the nature and extent of tortures, imprisonment and execution has been broadcast straight back into Iran, where the information's circulation is most crucial. And this could have only taken place with the digital technologies available. The internet, at least in this case, shepherded a real community from a previously imagined one, transforming long-distance activism into real, palpable

impact and success. So although the internet and blogging media were not the sites of these historic events, without new media, they simply could not have taken place.

Notes

[1] The full name is Organization of Iranian People's Fadaiyan Guerrillas
[2] This neologism is for Farsi written using the Latin alphabet.
[3] All names have been made anonymous for the safety and privacy of informants included in this research project.
[4] Author's own translation of comment left by "Mohammad Madjidi".
[5] Ayatollah Khamenei is Iran's unelected Supreme Leader and holds absolute power over the nation.
[6] "*Konkour*" is the Persian transliteration of the French "*Concours*" system. It is the national University entrance exam in Iran.
[7] This blog is called "*Faryad-e zire aabi"* and has been translated by the author into English.

Bibliography

Abdo, G. "The New Political Tools". *The Iran Primer* (2012), http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/new-political-tools.

Abrahamian, E. "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977". *Merip Reports* 86 (1980): 3-15.

—. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.

—. *Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999.

Ahmadinejad, M. "Personal Notes of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad" (personal webpage and blog). http://www.ahmadinejad.ir/fa/.

Alavi, N. *We Are Iran.* London: Portobello Books, 2005.

Alexanian, J. "Publicly Intimate Online: Iranian Web Logs in Southern California" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26, No. 1 (2006): 134-145.

Amnesty International (2012): "AIUK: Iran: Journalist and women's rights activist imprisoned for 'insulting the president' and 'spreading propaganda'", *Amnesty online appeal* http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=20313, September 2012.

Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso, 2006 [1983].

—. *Long Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics*. Wertheim Lecture**,** Centre for Asian Studies, Amsterdam, 1992.

Appadurai, A. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Vol. 1. Madison, WI: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Axworthy, M. *A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind.* New York: Basic Books, 2008.

Ball, J and B. Gottieb. "Iran Tightens Online Control by Creating Own Network". *The Guardian.* http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/25/iran-state-run-internet, 25 September 2012,

Berkman Centre for Internet and Society, Harvard University; Interactive Persian Blogosphere Map (2008), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2008/Mapping_Irans_Online_Public/interactive_blogosphere_map.

Bergen, N. "Blogging For Human Rights". *Rights In Review.* 6. 2010.

Castells, M. *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*, Vol. 2. Walden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Doostdar, A. "'The Vulgar Spirit of Blogging': On Language, Culture, and Power in Persian Weblogestan". *American Anthropologist* 106, no. 4 (2004): 651-662.

Deibert, R. Palfrey, Rohozinski, J. and R. Zittrain, eds. *Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering.* Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2008.

Eriksen, T.H. "Nations in Cyberspace". In *Short Version of the 2006 Ernest Gellner Lecture, delivered to the ASEN Conference, London School of Economics*, 2006.

Enemies of the Internet Report published by *Reporters without Borders* (2012), http://en.rsf.org/beset-by-online-surveillance-and-12-03-2012,42061.html.

Erdbrink, T. "Head of Tehran's Cyber Crimes Unit is Fired Over Death of Blogger". *New York Times.* http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/world/middleeast/after-death-of-sattar-beheshti-iranian-blogger-head-of-tehrans-cybercrimes-unit-is-fired.html?_r=0, 1 December 2012.

Escobar, A. Hess D. Licha, I. Sibley, W. Strathern, M and J. Sutz. "Welcome to Cyberia: Notes on the Anthropology of Cyberculture [and comments and reply]". *Current Anthropology* 35, no. 3 (1994): 211-231.

Esfandiari, G. "Iran's Hard-Line News Agency Tries to 'Nuclearize' Farhadi's Oscar Speech", *Payvand Iran News.* http://www.payvand.com/news/12/feb/1281.html, 28 February 2012.

Etling, B., Faris R., Palfrey J. "Political Change in The Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of Online Organizing". *SAIS Review* 37 Summer-Fall (2010) http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4609956.

Fars News. "Who is Behind the Curtain of the Iran Tribunal?" http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910511000033, 1 August 2012

Graham M. and S. Khosravi. "Reordering Public and Private in Iranian Cyberspace: Identity, Politics, and Mobilization". *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 9 (2002): 219-246.

Gower, E. "When the Virtual Becomes the Real: Interview with Benedict Anderson" *nettime.org* (1996), http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9711/msg00019.html.

Kahn, R and D. Kellner. "New Media and Internal Activism; From the Battle of Seattle to Blogging". *New Media Society* 4, no. 87, 2004.

"kaveh" "Observations of Daily Life in Tehran" (Blog): http://jactancy.blogspot.com/.

Kelly J. and B. Etling. "Mapping Iran's Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere". Berkman Centre Research Publication no.2008-01, The Berkman Centre for Internet and Society at Harvard University. 2008. http://tavaana.mobi/uploads/20715020003412805217885 12/files/Mapping%20Iran's%20Online%20Public%20-%20PDF%20-%20English.pdf.

Khosravi, S. www.iranian.com "An Ethnographic Approach to an Online Diaspora." *ISIM newsletter* 6 (2000): 13.

—. *Young and Defiant in Tehran (Contemporary Ethnography).* Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.

Mahdavi, P, "Meeting, Mating, and Cheating Online in Iran". *Leiden Repository,* ISIM Review Articles 19 (2007): 18.

—. *Passionate Uprisings: Iran's Sexual Revolution.* Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Mansour Nasiri.: Nasir Phots (Photoblog). http://www.nasiriphotos.com/blog/.

Morozov, E. "Texting Towards Utopia**".** *Boston Review*. http://bostonreview.net/BR34.2/morozov.php, 10 April 2009.

—. "Iran: Downside to the "Twitter Revolution". *Dissent Magazine* 56 (2009):10-14Morozov, E. *The Net delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom***,** New York: Allen Lane, 2011.

Nafisy, A. "Blogging Outside Iran: A Tool for Internal Democratic Change?", Honors Thesis, 2008. http://ccce.com.washington.edu/projects/assets/nafisi_blogging_outside_iran.pdf.

Nazeri, H. "Imagined Cyber Communities, Iranians and the Internet". *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 30, no.2 (1996): 158-164.

Rahimi, B. "Cyberdissent: the Internet in Revolutionary Iran". *Middle East* 7.3 (2003): 102.

Scream Under Water. (Blog). http://hidar510.blogfa.com/post-131.aspx.

Slavin, B. "Internet Boom Alters Political Process in Iran." http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-12-iran-election-internet_x.htm, 12 June 2005.

St-Louis, H. “Iranian Political Unrest in Cyberspace”. *Democracy and Society* (Democrats, Dictators and Demonstrators Conference issue) 7, no. 2, July 2010.

Sreberny A. and G. Khiabany. 2010. *Blogistan: The Internet and Politics in Iran*. United States and CanadaL I.B Tauris and Co Ltd., 2010.

Tran, M. “The 1979 Iranian Revolution: How the Guardian Covered it**”.** *The Guardian.* http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2009/feb/03/iranian-revolution-archive, 3 February 2009.

Tait, R. “Anger as Iran Bans Women from Universities”. *The Daily Telegraph*, 20 August 2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9487761/Anger-as-Iran-bans-women-from-universities.html.

CHAPTER EIGHT

LA DOLCE VITA: CREATIVE RE-IMAGININGS OF ITALIANICITY

PAUL VENZO

Directions

Just as a moth is very sensitive to light, a writer cannot help but be drawn by an innate attraction to the existential poetry of one's own life. There is poetry in the mundane details of everyday living, but also in the way our lives intersect with history and culture and politics on a much broader scale. For this reason, as a poet interested in my own subjectivity and its relationship to the environments in which I move, live and work, I am in constant reaction to these intersections; they are an inspiring means to interrogate identity and understandings of the self.

As a first generation Australian poet working in translation across English and Italian, my particular interest is in interrogating traditional conceptions of home, borders, national identity, and belonging. For this reason I am drawn to the images and stories emerging from Europe in the present moment; they remind me of my own geographic, historical, and psychological ties to this space and make me question my own conception of European–ness as a result.

In recent times, much global media attention has been paid to the Eurozone economic crisis, including speculation that the financial problems of Spain, Greece and Italy might trigger the collapse of the European Union. The systemic debt issues faced by these countries and the various measures to combat their economic situation are a catalyst for broader debates about social cohesion, national sovereignty, and identity. As part of a response, I argue that the economic crisis is a starting point from which we might begin to reassess our connections to, and understandings of, this geo-political, social, and historical terrain beyond issues of financial interdependence.

The economic crisis in Italy in particular is interconnected with the politics of the Berlusconi era and the cultural implosion of the myth of *la dolce vita*. As a poet, I am not so much interested in the technical details of the financial crisis as I am in the effect it has on notions of European-ness and what I term Italiancity. While the crisis has material implications for the everyday life of citizens, it also signifies an opportunity to address the dominant discourses and stereotypes that persist around national identity, particularly those framed by global media. By doing this, I am then able to respond to widely-circulated tropes through my own creative practice, the goal of which is to propose other ways of thinking about what it means to belong to this physical, cultural, political and social terrain.

This chapter will begin by examining the effect that two representative examples of Italian identity have had on the way Italy is currently perceived from beyond its borders: the ill-fated misadventure of Mario Schettino, Captain of the Costa Concordia cruise liner that sank off the Tuscan coast on 13 January 2012, and the rise and fall of media mogul/politician Silvio Berlusconi. I will argue that these two figures represent outdated and problematic stereotypes of Italianicity (ways of being and doing Italian identity) that tend to dominate other ways of viewing and understanding Italian–ness in the contemporary era. In particular, this chapter investigates how the anti-immigrant politics of the Berlusconi era failed to paper over the complicated and hybrid nature of national and cross-cultural subjectivity in the post-war period.

I will then investigate the effects of this outdated and jingoistic way of understanding what it means to be Italian. Influenced by the work of Braidotti, Deleuze and Guattari, Žižek, Trinh and other post-modern theorists and creative practitioners, I argue that the stereotypes and dominant discourses embodied by Berlusconi and Schettino fail to account for the myriad other ways we might imagine our subjectivity, especially as it relates to a specific site; in this case, Italy.

My own practice-led research in poetry is used here as the basis for exploring the idea that the poet who critically investigates his or her historical and cultural background and sense of belonging complicates – in strange and potentially beautiful and liberating ways – traditionally fixed or stable identity categories. Thus, poetry and poetics offer a way into the labyrinthine existential material from which we fashion ourselves into people able to resist and interrogate the labels and stereotypes that keep us locked in the past. Recognizing the possibilities of fluid and ongoing identity (de)construction, we are then able to rethink the traditional approaches to subjectivity through which we have previously claimed to "know ourselves" and others.

Italianicity in global media

Before investigating the idea of Italianicity as it relates to the poet writing from "outside in", it is important to understand how dominant discourses and representations of Italy and Italians have previously been framed by global media. I posit the existence of a persistent and debilitating notion of Italianicity in the contemporary era that crowds out other ways of imagining who belongs to or within this space. Federico Fellini's 1960 film *La dolce vita* transferred an Italian idiomatic expression into common English parlance. While Fellini's film took a rather "mordant look at the seamier side of Italy's post-war economic miracle" (Flamini 2011: p. 77), the notion of "the sweet life" became synonymous with a reconstructed post–war Western Europe in which poverty, unemployment and conflict were gradually replaced with images of tourism, fashion, cuisine and design as the dominant signifiers of modern Italy in the global consciousness.

However, this popular image of modern Italy has not always matched its reality. Many poor Italians who survived military defeat and successive invasions and occupations during World War II were subsequently faced with a profound economic depression. This triggered a mass exodus of Italians bound for North and South America, and Australia. The rebirth of Italy and its romantic reimagining (particularly in Hollywood cinema) as a desirable destination filled with art, great food and handsome young men and women, ignored the material reality of many Italians whose best options, seemingly, lay elsewhere.

More recently, the way we imagine and talk about Italy through the mass media has been reshaped once more, as the country again struggles with social, political and economic crises. On one hand, the stereotypes of Italianicity forged in the post-war period persist, but they do so against a backdrop of political corruption, the resurgence of the mafia, sex scandals, economic mismanagement, incompetence, and what Andrea Mammone calls Italy's "collapse of public morality" (2010: p. 64). Just as in the 1960s, the bigger picture – the diverse realities that Italians experience today – is often obscured by a much smaller set of dominant and persistent images and imaginings.

Media representations of Silvio Berlusconi and Mario Schettino, Captain of the Costa Concordia cruise liner, embody two illustrative examples of the tropology of Italianicity in the contemporary era. Though only two men in a country of 60 million people, not to mention those many millions living in the Italian global diaspora, they are representative of a dominant and persistent stereotype that poses a challenge to those of us interested in new and alternative versions of Italianicity.

Berlusconi – the end of an era?

Silvio Berlusconi – ex-Prime Minister, media mogul and one-time cruise ship crooner – was born in 1936, and his economic and political success (and failure) seems synonymous with the post-war redevelopment of Italy itself. Just as the *La Dolce Vita* is a film about the changing role of the media in the creation of celebrity, Berlusconi embodies the capacity of media power to have political and social effect.

The litany of his successes and short-comings is lengthy. To be fair, Berlusconi was democratically elected to office three times and challenged the tendency of Italian governments in the modern era to be extremely short-lived. Perhaps his greatest success was his popularity; despite his inordinate wealth, he was perceived as an endearing "common man". Slavoj Žižek, in his article "Berlusconi in Tehran" (2009) observed that:

> The wager behind Berlusconi's vulgarities is that the people will identify with him as embodying the mythic image of the average Italian: I am one of you, a little bit corrupt, in trouble with the law, in trouble with my wife because I'm attracted to other women. Even his grandiose enactment of the role of the noble politician, *il cavaliere*, is more like an operatic poor man's dream of greatness (5).[1]

However, this "poor man's dream of greatness" turned to nightmare. Berlusconi's successive governments led the country into financial ruin, leaving the nation with a debt-crisis in the trillions (BBC News: Business, 18 November 2011). He was consistently in trouble with the law over allegations of bribery, nepotism, and fraud. Although never successfully convicted in a criminal court, he is now facing charges of soliciting a minor for sex.

His strange behavior and bizarre rhetoric have long held the fascination of the international media. For example, one British media company alone – JourneyManPictures – has produced four short-films about Berlusconi's colorful approach to public life, including his archaic notions about women. John Agnew (2011), writing on the different reactions to Berlusconi in international media, notes that while the international media tended, until the latter part of the last decade, to be fairly even-handed in its representation of the Italian Prime Minister, as time wore on foreign news reports became increasingly more negative in tone.

Whether it concerns his comment about President Barack Obama's "suntan" or his claim that Italy was attractive to investors because of its pretty women (Glendinning 2008, 6 November), such reports consistently regenerate a story about Italy and Italians: even if we do not think that all

Italians are like Berlusconi or even support him, his image and his story are persistently associated with the nation and its people that continued to re-elect him. Despite Berlusconi's ignominious departure in 2011, effectively forced out of office when Europe's confidence in his capacity to manage the debt crisis he had helped to create shifted dramatically, the ex-Prime Minister has launched an anti-Euro, pro-nationalist comeback (Hooper 2012).

The ship of nightmares

Berlusconi's "*cavaliere*", Machiavellian character is not unique in the Italian context. Coinciding with Berlusconi's departure was an episode in modern Italian history that did little to shift this dominant idea of the incompetent, sleazy and self-interested Italian male in a position of responsibility and power. The sinking of the Costa Concordia under the direction of Captain Francesco Schettino played into the global notion of a prominent kind of Italianicity that previously had been embodied by Berlusconi. It has been suggested that Schettino's alleged cowardice in abandoning ship was a painful reminder of the stereotype of Italian wartime incompetency (Kissane 2012), and the image of Schettino as a slimy womanizer has also been promoted in global media (Squires 2012).

While undoubtedly the sinking of the Concordia was also the catalyst for heroic deeds done by crew, passengers and emergency services personnel, the story as reported by the global media does little to shift the association between Italianicity and incompetence and even cowardice. Interestingly, while bodies were still being removed from the wreck, t-shirts emblazoned with "*Vada a bordo, cazzo!*" ("Get on board for fuck's sake!" – the words of the coast guard commander to Schettino when he resisted orders to return to the ship) appeared on the backs of everyday Italians walking the streets. This too was reported in the global media, and did little to shift the perception connecting Italy, Italians and buffoonery.

Of course, it is not accurate to suggest that all Italians treated the event so lightly, or that one man's incompetence – or indeed the stereotypes of Italian masculinity presented above – accurately sum up the myriad ways of being Italian. However, these dominant images and ideas congregate in the broader international consciousness; they resurface with regularity and leave in their wake other ways of imagining Italianicity. While the examples mentioned so far are broadcast across global media, in many ways they narrowcast identity by functioning as memes: small packets of communication that stand in place of bigger and more complex scenarios and possibilities.

Schettino will soon be tried both by the courts of law and by the court of public opinion, but ultimately his image will also fade into insignificance over time. It is interesting however that the demise of Berlusconi and the fall of Schettino intersect with the bigger picture of the economic crisis currently facing Europe. The rise and fall of two iconic Italian "characters" signals a point at which we can begin to reassess the impact of dominant national stereotypes, and place it within the context of a more general "crisis" or zeitgeist currently at play in Europe. This crisis is not simply about the parlous state of some European economies, but rather about the very fabric of Europe itself, and calls into question who belongs to this psychological and geographic terrain, and how. This is because the material effects of the economic crisis bring into play the politics of nationalism, immigration, multiculturalism and social unity.

In this manner, the economic crisis is important to this discussion insofar as it raises the questions: Who belongs here? What does it mean to identify with Europe as both a geographic reality and as an imagined concept? What does European "unity" mean, especially to those of us living at its margins?

Reimagining European-ness

Writing about the social impacts of European Union, Rosi Braidotti (2000) argued that economic unification, together with other cultural and political forces of globalization, has contributed to the dismantling of what she identifies as a "Fortress Europe" mentality; in the view of this mentality, individual European identities remained fixed by narrowly defined geographic, linguistic, political and cultural borders. In hindsight, Braidotti's argument from the start of the millennium seems overly optimistic when we consider recent debates about European unity, national sovereignty, border control, and political independence that have been intensified by the economic crisis. However, Braidotti's call for new ways of thinking about European identity in the contemporary era, particularly as it relates to those groups and individuals cast as outsiders and border-crossers, remains resonant.

Žižek (2009), in league with other commentators searching to understand how Berlusconi managed to cling to power for so long (see Mammone 2010 and Flamini 2011), argued that it was his ability to stir up the fear of outsiders – more specifically immigrants – that allowed him to draw focus away from his own failures, and to maintain a sense of unity and belonging among his constituents. Recently, similar targeting of migrant groups by far–right political parties in France and Greece demonstrate how

identity is often forged in a self/Other configuration that reaffirms a sense of national unity along ethnic and cultural lines while vilifying displaced persons who may also wish to indentify as European.

This is ironic perhaps when we consider the rich history of European migration to other continents in the post-war period. For example, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs has estimated that nearly 400,000 Italians made their home in Australia between 1949-2000 (2001). The effect of this sort of mass–migration is obvious: these migrants and their children form generations of people whose identities are hybrid, uncontained by simple notions of a single nationality or cultural origin.

Braidotti (1992) observed that the processes and flows of globalization position such people to have unique insights into both home and host environments, in which nomadic, exilic and hybrid identities become possible. In particular, she sees the personal stories, imaginings and experiences of such people as a rich and untapped resource for recasting identity away from the fixed categories that dominated the rubrics of thinking, particularly in academic scholarship, in the latter half of the twentieth century (2000).

As a response to Braidotti's point, I contend that poetry, written from the perspective of a first-generation migrant writing into contemporary notions of European-ness and Italianicity, challenges the pervasive myths and structuring metaphors embodied by figures such as Schettino and Berlusconi. For this reason, I now wish to bring my discussion and my research back to a material and personal level in order to gaze over the horizon of dominant myths, images, stereotypes and identities. Earlier I flagged the notion that the pervasive myths embodied by Berlusconi and Schettino must be challenged. I now want to add that this charge is not made simply to reformulate a notion of Italian masculinity. Rather, its purpose is to problematize and challenge the very idea of European-ness or Italianicity as fixed identities that include some and exclude others. For me, the creative practice of "outsiders" – migrants, their children, refugees, academics, activists – are a potent means through which we can begin to re-imagine Europe and European-ness.

When crossing and re-crossing physical, psychological and linguistic boundaries in creative practice, we have the potential to discover the frontiers of identity and subjectivity where essentialized notions of "who we are" come into play and can be challenged. In this space nationality and ethnicity become porous concepts into which our own experiences can be written and explored. This "borderlands" of subjectivity is therefore a

space for speculation and creativity around questions of belonging and identity.

Migrant writing is not by default nostalgic, nor does it have to be a vehicle through which displaced people "find themselves" again by returning to a place they imagine as home. Moreover, the children of migrants, at an even greater remove from this notion of home, have the capacity to re-imagine this space and question the centre-periphery model that an idealization of "home" tends to require. By contrast, Berlusconi-think may imagine Italianicity as something fixed and controlled in the same way a physical border is patrolled and secured, whereby the outsider becomes the Other against which a "true" sense of national identity is tested. However, control over the borders of language, culture and identity is arguably even more difficult to maintain than physical borders.

Uprooting the family tree

The representations of Italian masculinity embodied by Berlusconi and Schettino that I discuss above are aborescent texts (Deleuze and Guattari 1987); that is, they connect an image with an identity that appears to be historical, predictable and inherited, passed from one generation to another. On one hand, creative writing may indeed reference the search for roots, for a genealogical origin, a sense of fixed meaning and a coherent subjectivity. This might be especially true of poetry that refers to family or firsthand experiences of belonging and alienation. As such they may represent a drive to "find oneself" in the history and landscape of one's forebears. However, texts of all kinds can simultaneously represent the desire to uncover an origin, a family tree, symbolic root system or an explanatory narrative – *and* the consistent failure in being able do so. Certain texts are a "stranger to any idea of genetic axis or deep structure", revealing as they do a kind of "anti-genealogy" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: pp. 2-21).

In response to what they saw as the hierarchical, aborescent model of modern thinking based on clear origins, linear narratives and root causes, Deleuze and Guattari argued that the rhizome is a useful model for exploring other ways of understanding and producing texts (1987). The rhizome, a term more commonly associated with botany and horticulture, has the characteristics of a weed: it features shallow root systems, the capacity to seed and develop in hostile or seemingly unfertile territory and the tendency to grow in clusters. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest that the rhizome is a model of text that resists deep-rooted notions of origin. In other words, it can draw ideas together without resorting to essentialism.

For migrant writers, the model of the rhizome is particularly attractive, as it signals the possibility of taking up ground in the cracks between our sense of belonging and alienation.

In particular, Deleuze and Guattari respond to analytical approaches associated with a dominant, patriarchal model. They take particular exception to the kind of scholarly approaches favored by psychoanalysis and its focus on the Oedipal trajectory and the symbolic Law of the Father; an approach that can collapse into naturalizing "the way things are". Just as Braidotti (1992) questions the way dominant patriarchy functions as the gatekeeper of knowledge and research in the European context, Deleuze and Guattari question dominant modes of textual production and meaning-making more generally.

Along these lines, creative practice summons into play myriad ways we might define or understand ourselves in relation to place or culture. Trinh T. Minh-Ha, an artist and researcher on subjectivity in creative practice, questions the traditional approach to understanding self and identity:

> Since the self (…) is not so much a core as a process, one finds oneself, in the context of a cultural hybridity, always pushing one's questioning of oneself to the limits of what one is and what one is not. The reflexive question is no longer: who am I? but when, where and how am I (so and so)? (1992: pp. 156-157).

This idea has implications for the way we conceive of identity as framed by nationality or citizenship and the other various ways in which we try and understand who we are. For those of us who move across languages and cultures and geographies, it proposes a means by which to see the fabric of our lives – and our creativity – as a powerful way to question and understand our relationships to particular spaces and contexts.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe how texts rise to the surface of culture as plateaus of communication. These text-plateaus are like islands in a vast sea of other images and ideas and stories. In this sense, media texts such as news reports in print and video can be understood as coalescences; the momentary surfacing or eruption of a story which brings together ideas, images, words, narrative, mythology, stereotype and so on, until there is a terrain to explore.

However, this model not only refers to the texts produced by global media. Other forms of creative practice also emerge as islands of communication about who and how we are in any given context. Across literature, the visual arts, music, and digital culture there are many ways in which subjectivity is explored – and through which boundaries between

notions of self and Other can be tested and explored. I, therefore, wish to refer to my own creative practice – poetry – in order to demonstrate one means by which to challenge the claims to European-ness and Italianicity I have thus far identified.

Poetics: subjectivity as creative practice

The analysis of media representations of Italianicity above prefaces my intention to explore and interrogate a range of other ways to imagine, represent, and understand alternative ways of being Italian through my poetry. The eponymous poem, below, is from an unpublished manuscript of poetry titled *Archipelago*. It as an illustrative example of the response poetry can make to the dominant forms of Italianicity I have previously interrogated. I posit it as a means to open up this discussion to look at the capacity of self-ethnographic creative practice to provide "ways into" the labyrinthine connections that exist between self, place, and culture:

> "Archipelago"
> There are other lives I might have led
> crouched in the foothills of Pordenone,
> meandering along the shoals of the Piave,
> stabled in a farmhouse in Maser, impatiently
> pacing the platform at Ponte nelle Alpi.
>
> They are lives crouched over endless rounds
> of Bastoni, played in a truck-stop bar
> in Refos, or Castion or god-forsaken Trichès;
> an endless, ever-mounting Tarot
> of forgotten images:
> here we are thugging about Chioggia,
> here we are kissing
> beside the grotty cathedral in Vicenza.
>
> I am tumbled from this archive,
> strewn across its cool marble floor.
> I stand marooned on private islands
> of uncertainty, potential: a vast,
> sweeping, uncharted archipelago.
> (Venzo 2012)

In *Representation and the Text, Reframing the Narrative Voice* (1997) Carolyn Ellis explains why auto-ethnographic research is important today; in a post-modern era when the very notion of an objective truth or reality

comes under scrutiny, orthodox approaches to research may fail to capture the rich data offered by storytelling that is based on one's own experience (p. 116). Ellis argues that through creative writing we "learn to understand the meaning of the past as incomplete, tentative and revisable" (p. 129). Thus, poetry about one's own unique relationship to a particular site or terrain can similarly problematize the "truth" that might hover about other representations and ideas that relate to the same place and context.

This approach is further informed by the scholarship of Estelle Barrett and Barbara Bolt and their work on creative practice as research (2007) in which they argue that the production of an artwork can reveal a variety of ways to conceptualize subjectivity and, as a result, shift and develop the understanding of our relationship to the world, its people and its environments. As a poet and a researcher, I embrace this approach as a broad methodological framework to scrutinize and interact with the "terrain" of Italy as a historical, cultural and political site.

Following the approaches outlined above in my work on a manuscript of poetry that forms the basis of my current postgraduate research, I made the strategic decision to utilize my own personal relationship to Venice and the Veneto as the basis of a collection of poetry in translation across Italian and English. The poems in the *Archipelago* collection are, for me, a form of "data" that reveals how my own understanding of Italianicity differs from that circulated globally via media representations discussed above.

Those who have had the pleasure of visiting Venice in winter will recognize the eerie delight of shadowy figures appearing in the mists of a narrow *calle* and will perhaps have witnessed islands in the lagoon as they loom out of a thick damp fog, only to disappear again as time passes – and you with it. These images sum up for me the effect that spending time in the area of my ancestral home has had on my conception of identity. At different moments and in different spaces, it coalesces and becomes apparent and can be described; but soon it dissolves again as I move forward and encounter a new environment. I have attempted to capture this phenomenon in the poetry, especially as it relates to my sense of connection to this region.

In poetry, I am able to construct the other versions of me that might have existed had I been born and raised in my ancestral home in northern Italy, rather than in Australia. These myriad potential selves coalesce and dissolve as the writing flows forward and they reflect the multiple ways one might identify with and be part of this space. This is the Italianicity not of the grand stage but rather of everyday life. The poems imagine a range of possible masculinities, relationships and desires integrally linked

to the landscape of the Veneto. They are selves composed of small details rather than grand narratives or national stereotypes. A diverse cultural topography of Italian life is presented in an archipelago of poems. It is fragmentary, multiple, fragile; it is a jigsaw puzzle of possibilities.

As a first generation migrant away from it, I experience Italy as both foreign and familiar and I attempt to capture this in writing. The poems are an attempt to put down shallow roots, to create clusters of images and ideas based on my own unique experiences, across a real and imagined terrain. In this way, the poetry functions as a means for oppositional and alternative ways of "being Italian" to gain traction in the dominant field of representations that already cover this space. By concentrating less on the macro-representational view of Italy in the mass media and more on the detailed nuances of everyday life and experience, these poems colonize space for hybrid identities to take root.

In fact, the process of writing becomes an act of *both* de– and re–territorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) – of the self and identity and of the means we use to study and theorize, as well as to embody, those terms. Braidotti argues that for new European identities to evolve, the "soft" approaches of storytelling may act as an antidote to the persistent discourses of European-ness that are framed by notions of insiders and outsiders (2000). While Braidotti may have women particularly in mind when considering who should take up this challenge, I contend that all of us who embody ethnic, cultural, and linguistic hybridity (and use it as part of our scholarship and research practice) can have a part in de-essentializing stereotypes and dominant representational modes that concern identity. In effect, when calling up in writing "the other lives I might have led", I am also imagining various forms of Italianicity, many of which play with and challenge the tropes flagged earlier in this chapter.

Destinations

Who can forget the aerial images of the Costa Concordia lying on its side in the still, dark waters of the Mediterranean Sea? There was a disturbing poetry to this image, and it seems that in many ways Europe and Italy have "run aground" in the turbulence of the economic crisis; a crisis that, I have argued, spills over into other aspects of politics and society. The myth of *la dolce vita*, in the Italian context, remains powerful but, as I have attempted to show, it is also increasingly anachronistic. Corruption, ineptitude, scandal, machismo and the vilification of migrant "outsiders" are also very narrow ways of embodying and representing this space. In the same manner, the current global media focus on riots and violence,

poverty, and unemployment is only one of the many and varied ways we can imagine Europe and European–ness.

As an Australian-Italian I am interested in challenging the pervasive ideas associated with Italian and European identity, bringing forward in my own writing and research a sense of my own complex relationship to this terrain. I have used poetry to represent this relationship and I have argued that it can be a potent means to resist some of the essentializing discourses about subjectivity that crowd this space. While cognizant that there are dominant tropologies for imagining Italianicity, I propose alternative means to represent Italianicity and to reclaim some of the space in which we might study and theorize it.

Notes

[1] Berlusconi is sometimes referred to by the nickname "*Il cavaliere*" (the knight) in reference to his being awarded an Italian knighthood in the Order of Merit for Labor in 1977.

Bibliography

Agnew, J. "The Big Seducer: Berlusconi's Image at Home and Abroad and the Future of Italian Politics". *California Italian Studies* 2 no. 4 (2011): 1-15.

BBC News: Business "Eurozone Debt Web", http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15748696, 2011.

Braidotti, R. "Embodiment, Sexual Difference and the Nomadic Subject". *Hypatia* 8, no. 1 (1993): 1-13.

—. "Once Upon a Time in Europe". *Signs* 25, no. 4 (2000) 1061-1064.

—. "Personal Views: the Exile, the Nomad and the Migrant". *Women's Studies International Forum* 15, no. 1 (1992): 7-10.

Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Australia). *Immigration: Federation to Century's End*, Statistics Section, Business Branch, October 2001.

Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari (trans. Massoumi). *A Thousand Plateaus*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1987.

Ellis, C. "Evocative Autoethnography: Writing Emotionally About Our Lives". In *Representation and the Text, Reframing the Narrative Voice*, edited by W. G. Tierney and T. S. Lincoln, 115-139. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.

Barrett, E. and B. Bolt, eds. *Practice as Research: Approaches to Creative Arts Inquiry*. London: IB Tauris, 2007.

Flamini, R. "Bunga Bunga No More", *Time*, May/June, 2011, pp. 71-77.
Glendinning, L. "Obama is Young, Handsome and Tanned, Says Silvio Berlusconi", *Guardian*, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/06/italy-barackobama, 2008
Hooper, J. "Disgraced Berlusconi Planning a Comeback". *Sydney Morning Herald*, http://www.smh.com.au/world/disgraced-berlusconi-planning-a-comeback-20120625-20ygf.html#ixzz1yrf3WQKJ, 2012.
Kissane, K. "Drama on the Decks". *The Age*, http://www.theage.com.au/world/drama-on-the-decks-20120120-1qa4f.html, 2012.
Mammone, A. "Italy's Moral Crisis". *Soundings* 46, Winter (2010): 64-75.
Squires, N. "Costa Concordia: Investigators Probe Role of Young Moldovan Woman on Cruise Ship", *The Telegraph*, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9024768/Costa-Concordia-investigators-probe-role-of-young-Moldovan-woman-on-cruise-ship.html, 2012.
Trinh, M. H. *Framer Framed*. London: Routledge, 1992.
Venzo, P. "Archipelago", *Archipelago*, unpublished manuscript, 2012.
Žižek, S. "Berlusconi in Tehran". *London Review of Books* 31, no. 14, (2009): 3-7.

PART III:

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

CHAPTER NINE

MATCHMAKERS AS SOCIALIZATION AGENTS IN THE PROCESS OF RECONSTRUCTING A NEW IDENTITY FOR JEWISH SINGLES

YA'ARIT BOKEK-COHEN

Introduction

The family is considered a sacred institution in Jewish society. Consequently, establishing a family has always been a central objective of conventional Jewish life. In traditional Jewish society, the parents married off their children at a young age through an arranged marriage with the assistance of a matchmaker. The purpose of these practices was to preserve the sexual "purity" of the society, ensure its moral and demographic status, and guarantee the continuity of the life of the community (Grossman 2004; Shiloh 2001; for a historical overview of the institution of the matchmaker, see Bokek-Cohen and Zalcberg 2011). In Israel today, there are three main sub-groups within the Jewish population; each features its own separate educational system and is characterized by different mating norms. Despite these differences, however, each group shares a common appreciation for the significance of the family that is demonstrated by marriage at a relatively young age, comparatively low divorce rates, and high birth rates. These characteristics of contemporary Israel reflect the stronger and more central position of the family as a social institution as compared to most industrialized countries (Katz and Lavee 2005; Zalcberg and Almog 2008).

In this chapter, I examine the practice of matchmaking within Jewish society. I begin by briefly comparing the major characteristics of Jewish sub-groups followed by a detailed description of the national religious sector (hereafter, NR) that is the focus of this chapter. Furthermore, I describe the practice of matchmaking in Jewish society and its significance in today's NR sub-group. Next, I introduce primary research on the matchmaking process within the NR. Finally, based on qualitative

interviews, I argue that Jewish matchmakers actively reconstruct a new identity for each applicant. The new identity consists of three main dimensions that are enhanced: (1) physical appearance; (2) inter-personal relations skills; and (3) desirable traits for a potential life partner. Following these findings, I propose some theoretical insights into matchmaking practices.

The Jewish population in Israel

The Jewish population in Israel is composed of three main subgroups (Almog and Paz 2009; Almog 2012; Israel 2012). I describe them below.

The secular sector: Estimated as 75 percent of the Jewish population, of which 48% define themselves as "secular" and 27 percent define themselves as "traditional". The secular sector consists of people who do not systematically observe Jewish law and its commandments, although some do observe various imperatives such as circumcision, Jewish marriage and divorce rites, Jewish burial ceremonies and customs related to Jewish holidays. Secular Jewish mating norms are similar to those in the US and Europe, where young people meet their mates during social or educational activities, as well as by using internet-based introduction services. Few of thes**e** people turn to matchmakers (Bokek-Cohen 2012).

The Ultra-Orthodox or *haredim*, sector*:* Estimated as 9 percent, this group is characterized by strict observance of *halacha* (Jewish law) and a conservative *halachic* and cultural outlook, religious piety, and deliberate separation from non-*haredi* society, with the aim of preserving their own traditions from the incursion of values not acceptable to them. This includes separating themselves from Western culture, as well as shunning national, patriotic events that have secular manifestations. Young singles of both genders are forbidden to talk with members of the opposite sex, aside from family members or whenever it is necessary (*e.g.*, during health care or shopping situations). Men are forbidden to look at women except their family members or close neighbors and friends. Marriages are arranged by the parents, ideally when the girls arrive at the age of 17-18 and for boys at 18-20 years of age. These marriages are almost always achieved by hiring a matchmaker who accompanies both families all the way to the wedding and also receives an average payment of $US1000 from each family.

The national-religious sector: Estimated as 16 percent of the population, this group sees observance of *halacha* as a central value yet, at the same time, supports Zionism and active integration into general society in the State of Israel. In Jewish law, sexual relations are permitted only for married couples. However, young singles are free to meet and date members of the opposite sex but are educated to avoid touching each other.

The national-religious sector

The national religious sector attempts to integrate modernity while maintaining fidelity to tradition (Fishman 1995: p. 89). Historically, in Israeli society, the ideological integration of religion and nationalism has been a unique feature of the NR sector. In general, it might be said that the NR worldview tries to cope with the tension entailed by walking a tightrope between tradition and modernity. NR Jews have tried and are still trying to find the golden mean between fidelity to traditional and religious values and allegiance to the general Zionist secular culture (Almog and Paz 2009). Accordingly, the NR faction (also termed 'Religious Zionism'; see Schwartz 2003) is in constant disagreement around a variety of issues, with the secular public on the one hand, and with the ultra-Orthodox community on the other (Friedman 1991). As Rapoport and Yanay put it: "Conceiving itself as the authentic heir of both modern Zionism and ancient Judaism, religious Zionism has been compelled into a problematic position: it is forced to demarcate its difference from ultraorthodox and secular groups, and at the same time to define itself as part of the national Jewish collective" (1997: p. 661).

The institution of matchmaking in Jewish tradition and society

An arranged match is a practice in which people who are not married are introduced to each other for the avowed purpose of marriage**.** Such matchmaking is generally accepted in societies with a conservative, collectivist orientation (Buunk, Park and Duncan 2007; Dion and Dion 1993; Katz 2000; Monger 2004; Triandis, McCusker, and Hui 1990) that are further characterized by social norms that generally forbid casual encounters between men and women.

In the Jewish world, the institution of matchmaking is well known and employing a matchmaker until a marriage is achieved is socially accepted (Lewittes 1994). Until the twelfth century, matchmakers in Jewish society worked without charge; the emergence of the professional matchmaker

took place later. In the late Middle-Ages and the beginning of the Modern Age, Jewish Ashkenazic society was based on a strict social stratification so that finding a spouse by a chance encounter was nearly impossible (Katz 2000).[1] As a result, the matchmaker's activity increasingly became an integral part of selecting a mate in Jewish society, and the profession of matchmaker became popular, important, and respected among religious scholars (Grossman 2004).

Matchmaking was considered a great *mitzvah* (good deed) and yet it was accepted that the matchmaker would be paid for services rendered. In his book *Sefer Ha-Nisuim Kehilchatam (Book of Marriage According to Jewish Law)*, Rabbi Binyamin Adler writes:

> The matchmaker is like any workman and he must be paid the wages of his labor. Even when the matchmaker works at his own initiative […] he deserves his pay in full. And even if he is not a professional matchmaker and even if he did not inform anyone that he is acting as a matchmaker, he is owed his payment in full (1983: p. 143).

The transition from traditional marriage (based principally on financial status and family lineage and usually arranged by the parents) to modern marriage (based on the personal relationship between the two members of the couple) has led to an overall decline in the status of the matchmaking in Jewish society (Burges and Wallin 1954; Goshen-Gottstein 1966; Hetsroni 2000; Murstain 1974; 1981). The exception to this decline has been with the Ultra-Orthodox sub-group where matchmaking has been preserved (Friedman 1988; Heilman 1992; Shai 2002; Zalcberg 2007).

The rituals of matchmaking within the NR society present unique challenges. Because singles in the NR sector operate within the religious and secular worlds, finding a potential mate is somewhat problematic. On one hand, because of the gender separation of educational institutions, they have fewer opportunities to meet members of the opposite sex than secular singles. On the other hand, matchmaking is not as well-established and respectable as in Ultra-Orthodox society. Therefore, members of the NR sub-group are expected to find their life partners by themselves. Contacting a matchmaker is usually done after the single or his/her parents suspect that there may be difficulties in achieving a match. These circumstances have led to an increase in "protracted singleness" within the NR sector, which many see as a "social problem" (Engleberg 2009; Bartov 2004; Nehari 2007; Shtul 2000) because it delays or prevents the observance of the Biblical command to "increase and multiply", imperils the presumptive sexual purity of the community, and undermines the

desired social order. In light of this, many people have begun to take on matchmaking in an informal manner, for the sake of the religious ideal.

In general, matchmakers may be categorized as two types (Bokek-Cohen 2012). There are "professional" matchmakers – those for whom matchmaking is both their art and their livelihood – and "amateur" matchmakers, who may be family members, friends, acquaintances, or functionaries and key figures in the community and for whom matchmaking is a sideline activity. Among the amateurs there are those who have done it on a one-off basis and those who engage in it frequently. Professional matchmakers charge expensive registration fees of $US200-500 and take an additional $US1000 fee from each partner if they succeed in bringing the couple all the way to the wedding canopy. "Amateur" matchmakers do not charge a fee, yet it is customary for the new couple to visit him/her after the wedding and bring a present. These offerings are usually a modest, symbolic house gift or ritual object such as a set of candlesticks or an elegant wine cup.

The institution of matchmaking: a theoretical perspective

The present study is based on marriage market theory, which is a derivative of the "economics of the household" school (Becker 1973; Mincer 1962). Marriage market theory applies general economic theory to marriage-related practices (Grossbard-Shechtman 1984, 1985; Grossbard-Shechtman and Clague 2002). I found this theoretical basis relevant to the studied phenomenon because it allows us to regard the institution of matchmaking as one of competing options that individuals may use to find their desired marriage partner. From this perspective, potential mates may be considered to be "products" within the open marketplace. Furthermore, marriage is analyzed as a barter transaction in which the "value" of a person in the marriage market is determined by the sum total of the resources, services, and goods that he/she can contribute to the future family unit.

Ahuvia and Adelman (1992) provide a general framework for understanding the processes that take place in the marriage market by employing three basic market functions: "searching", "matching" and "transaction-interaction". Searching is the process of gathering information about the pool of potential mates. Matching relates to making use of the information about relevant singles in order to decide what relationship is desired. Finally, transaction-interaction involves the process by which two people establish or decline a romantic relationship. In the searching stage, information is gathered from the external environment or through

mediating factors that Ahuvia and Adelman (1992) have termed "market intermediaries". By and large, these are social networks such as shared friends and parties for singles (Austrom and Hanel 1985), computerized dating services, dating agencies, and matchmakers. The intermediaries in the marriage market help with at least one of the above-mentioned three functions.

Method

The aim of this chapter is to describe the activities of volunteer, amateur matchmakers who act as socialization agents in an effort to help people having difficulty find their match. Because I am using marriage market theory as my analytical framework, I am interested in the practices and tactics that are employed by the matchmakers in order to help their clients with the three market functions.

Data gathering was accomplished through in-depth interviews (Patton 1990) conducted with 25 "amateur" matchmakers (16 women and 9 men), who describe themselves as "national-religious". Most of the men and women interviewed (hereafter, the matchmakers) are married, possess an academic degree, and live in different parts of Israel. Most of them are educators, rabbis, or engaged in therapeutic professions. The amateur matchmakers receive no financial rewards and they help singles without charging any payment (except for one female matchmaker who charges some clients $50 as a "registration fee"). They contribute substantial time to matchmaking because of their deep concern for the "problem" (in their own words) of a growing number of singles who have difficulties in finding their life partner. As a result, their guidance, as well as the potential mates they offer to introduce, reflect their own genuine viewpoints and attitudes and are not motivated by economic interests. Therefore, for the purpose of exploring matchmakers' practices of reconstructing new identities for the applicants, the amateur matchmakers are preferable to the professionals as the study population for this research.

The interviews consisted of open-ended questions that relate to the personal characteristics of the matchmakers and their *modus operandi*. In particular, I was interested in the characteristics of their clients and their requirements with respect to a mate. Furthermore, I was interested in the meanings that matchmakers ascribed to their work, the difficulties they encounter and how they cope with them. Notes were taken during the interviews after obtaining the consent of the participants.

Studying NR matchmakers posed a methodological challenge because they are few in number relative to the general NR population, they do not

advertise their services and there is not an exhaustive list of population members. Therefore, I used "snowball" sampling in which I obtained information about matchmakers from acquaintances (the "seeds") and from the interviewees themselves who, in turn, referred me to additional matchmakers. This technique is relevant in cases where the respondents have highly specific knowledge and skills, as the matchmakers are assumed to have (Heckathorn 2007), or if informants are connected to the same social networks (Faugier and Sargeant 1997; Spreen 1992).

I found Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) to be an ideal framework for analyzing the data. The premise of grounded theory is that people with shared life circumstances also have shared social and psychological patterns that grow out of shared experiences. Theory grows out of the data that has been systematically collected and then analyzed (Strauss and Corbin 1994). Accordingly, the analysis consisted of two stages. First, the investigator's analysis of the general topic seeks out and collates central themes and patterns that emerged in the interviews. Second, the investigator devises an interpretation of the motifs that emerged in the first stage and elaborates their significance. An important component of Grounded Theory is what Glaser (1978) has termed "theoretical sensitivity", which refers to the process of developing the insight with which a researcher approaches the situation. It is a personal quality of the researcher and describes a creative facet where he or she acquires broad experience and understanding of the specific field of research and develops conceptual insights. Because of my sustained study of mate-selection practices among Jewish singles over the last decade, I have acquired certain insights that have enabled me to ascertain the nuances embedded within the narratives of the interviewees.

More specifically, applying Grounded Theory to the analysis of the narratives of the interviewees consisted of three stages of data analysis: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. During the open coding, I looked for motifs that appeared in most of the respondents' rhetoric. I noticed that most of them describe a similar matchmaking process (to be described in the beginning of the "Findings" section). I also identified categories of information given by the matchmakers; for example, why they started matchmaking, what difficulties and dilemmas they encountered, their opinions regarding the issue of payment for services, their attitude toward the clients, their reasoning on the "problem" of protracted singlehood, among other issues.

During the axial coding, I distinguished between two categories of matchmakers, "successful" versus "less successful", by examining each matchmaker's productivity. In doing so, I checked how many couples each

had married off since starting out as a matchmaker. One of the successful matchmakers, for example, succeeded in marrying off 83 couples during her 12 years of matchmaking. A less successful matchmaker introduced many couples, but only two of them were married during four years of matchmaking. I found causal relationships between the category of "success in matchmaking" and other categories, such as "tenure in matchmaking" or "behavioral patterns of the matchmaker".

During the selective coding phase, I selected "behavioral patterns of the matchmaker" and identified it as the core category. I then systematically related this core category to two major categories that had emerged in the previous stage, namely "attitudes of the matchmaker toward the clients" and "opinions of the matchmaker regarding the reasons for the problem of prolonged singlehood".

Findings

Fifteen of the interviewees reported an especially high number of couples (more than 30) whom they matched where the match led to marriage. Therefore, I judged them as "successful matchmakers". Eight other interviewees reported a more modest number of successful matches, and two reported that they had not yet succeeded in marrying off a single couple; I ranked these ten "less successful". It should be stressed that defining a matchmaker as less successful in this study did not relate to the quality of the married life of the couple, but rather only to the number of marriages. Including matchmakers with such a broad range of success in the study made it possible to identify behavioral patterns that typify the successful matchmakers. These patterns are not employed among the less successful matchmakers, or are employed less frequently. The distinction between the successful versus less successful matchmakers enabled discoveries about what behavioral patterns enhance good matchmaking through comparison of the narratives of the successful and the less successful.

Usually in the NR sector, the matchmaking procedure follows a pattern. The matchmakers meet the applicants in face-to-face meetings and conducted introductory conversations with each one. They usually collect data about the applicant's age, educational attainments, occupation, level of religious observance, and health. All of the matchmakers record these data during the meeting using pen and paper; none of them uses a computerized dataset. Then, the clients are asked to describe the traits desired in a potential mate. Some of the matchmakers ask the applicant to give a photo (either printed or digital) and promise to show it only to

candidates who seem truly suitable. When they have an idea for a match, the matchmakers all tend to turn first to the man, by phone, and describe the potential bride's traits and characteristics, including her physical description. If he is interested, he will go to the matchmaker's office and look at her photo (if available). Only after the man agrees to meet the woman do they proceed to talk to the woman about the potential match and give her the same sort of information. According to the matchmakers' explanations, the reason is that if they first obtain the woman's consent, and then the man refuses to meet her, the woman tends to be much more hurt by such a rejection than the man. The women can also ask the matchmakers to show them the man's photo. If the woman is also interested in the meeting, then the matchmaker calls him again and gives him the woman's telephone number. As a cultural matter, it is not accepted that a woman is the first to initiate contact and women are generally expected to play a passive role in the process.

Analysis of the interviews reveals that the "successful" matchmakers perceive themselves as agents of socialization, and act to reconstruct a new identity for each applicant. The new identity consists of three main dimensions. Specifically, these dimensions concern (1) physical appearance, (2) inter-personal relations skills, and (3) desired traits in a potential life partner.

The interviews revealed that external appearance is of high importance in the dating process. Moreover, men in the NR community, like men in general, unequivocally prefer women who are slim and well-groomed (Bokek-Cohen and Peres 2006; Feingold 1992; Hatfield and Rapson 1995). Since that is the case, many matchmakers tend to direct the women toward improving their appearance. Ziva, for example, said: "There are those girls I tell to take better care of themselves, to go on a diet so that the guy can approach."[2] Similarly, Orna explained: "You can cross out the heavy girls. I try to tell them gently that 'Unfortunately, guys are into external appearance, and if you want to be realistic, you have to do something about that – and it can be done'." Likewise, Zippora told an overweight girl who applied to her: "Look, you have a lot to offer. You're smart; you have a doctorate. Just one thing. You have to go shopping for good clothes, and you have to lose weight."

Zippora and other matchmakers like her do not ignore the external appearance of the men. In her words: "It has already happened to me that I told some guy 'Go on a diet'." In a similar vein, Orna said: "I saw that he had enormous sores near his eyes. I told him 'I can't offer you any girl until you take care of the sores near your eyes'." Natan added: "I told the guy to take care of his appearance – that he should examine himself head

to toe and that he should be sure that he doesn't have any unpleasant odor."

Sarah doesn't hesitate to help applicants when it comes to dress. As she says: "There was one guy whom I accompanied for many years. His mother was dead, so I went with him to buy clothes. I also took a girl to a good clothing store – so that she could see how she could make herself look different."

The issue of clothing is particularly significant in the NR community because it reflects the "religious observance level" of the girl. Therefore, for example, Edna explains to girls that their style of dress sends a non-verbal message and thus, "I will recommend to a girl, 'Perhaps you should not dress pants, if you want to show you are modest and conservative'."[3]

Outward appearance is not the only subject on which the matchmakers tend to advise their clients. Good inter-personal skills may also improve a person's self-presentation. Accordingly, the matchmakers instruct their clients how to conduct a conversation with a potential mate. In giving instruction on how to manage the date, matchmakers help their clients with advice on how to act during a date and on how to generally improve their social skills.

Since the educational institutions attended by NR youth are characterized by separation between the genders (Zalcberg and Almog 2009), many matchmakers reported that the young men do not know how to behave with a girl on the first date and, in general, throughout the relationship; thus, they need guidance and direction. The successful matchmakers give direction and guidance about how to behave, based on their worldviews and experiences. Rabbi Meir explained:

> I deal with the group that grew up in separate society. If I had time, I would teach the boys how the world of the girls operates. There are things that can insult girls because of a total lack of awareness. Each time I am shocked anew. I teach them that you can't keep a girl out after 11 p.m. on a first date without walking her to a bus stop!

Natan also noted: "Some girls complain because the guy [on the first date] sat with her on a park bench and didn't even offer her a glass of water. So before a date, I direct the guy, 'You have to buy the girl something to eat and drink, because otherwise, it is not respectful for you or the girl'". Natan even suggests that the young men prepare subjects to talk about on the first date in order to prevent uncomfortable silences: "You have to prepare a conversation. I tell the boy: 'Open up the Talmud, there are endless stories there – prepare something so that the evening is interesting'."[4]

Yehonatan gives young men more general, strategic advice in winning the girl's heart:

> If the guy sends too strong a message that he is interested in a relationship with her or that he is aiming at marriage right away, she will kick him out. Because of that I say to the guys, "Don't send too strong a message that you want to push the relationship towards marriage. They will not appreciate you. They are looking for a challenge."

Successful matchmakers also tend to guide the applicants regarding their requirements for a partner. They tend, for example, to enlighten the applicants regarding certain demands that may seem less crucial and less relevant to relational success – but that make a difference in practice**.** In doing so, it becomes possible for the matchmaker to identify a larger number of possible partners for the applicant and, consequently, increase the chances of finding a suitable match.

At the same time, successful matchmakers tend to challenge their clients regarding the characteristics of their "ideal partner". The successful matchmakers ask the client about the qualities they seek in a potential partner and listen attentively. However, if some of these qualities seem not to be relevant to the success of the relationship, the matchmaker may ignore them and suggest potential partners who do not comply with the qualities stipulated. In doing so, they tend to impose their own values and standards on their clients in a highly directive or even patronizing manner, thus expropriating some of the client's autonomy and preferences in choosing a mate.

Zippora, for example, reported that despite one man's preference to meet a younger woman, she introduced him to a woman who was five years older. She explained, "Age is really not important, as long as the age range is 25-35." When the client asked how old the girl was, she said, "I don't really know her age, but she looks like a model, so how old can she be?" Ahuva told a similar story: "If the age is problematic, I skip over it unless they ask me and then I will say, 'Something around…' But I will not deliberately deceive someone and knock off a few years." Zippora tends to "maneuver" when it comes to ethnic origin also: "One girl asked to be introduced only to an Ashkenazi. I told her: 'Don't worry, he's one of us', even though he's barely one quarter of Ashkenazic origin…Many people don't always know what they are looking for. So I look at the truly important things."

The singles have rigid demands when it comes to level of religiosity and they are interested in a partner who is as religiously dedicated as themselves. However Natan has matched up people with varying degrees

of religious dedication. As he puts it: "Let's say I have a very religious guy, and I introduce him to someone who is not exactly as religious as he is. Then I tell him, 'this is your chance to help her become stronger religiously'. They usually agree to that."

Discussion

Interviews with Jewish matchmakers indicate that most of them see themselves as figures of authority, expected to function as a secondary socialization agent and design a new identity for the singles. Matchmakers apply their own agenda when giving direction and guidance. In doing so, they may deny the applicant's worldviews, freedom of thought and autonomy. Because matchmakers are typically 20-30 years older than their applicants, they may also be less sensitive to possible changes that have occurred in the mating norms. These practices run contrary to the classic view of the helping process; that is, the essence of helping another person is assumed to consist of facilitating his growth in line with *his or her* own goals, values, and attitudes. Brammer and MacDonald (1999) explain: "The helping process assumes the helpee is aware of alternatives and is willing to take responsibility for acting on an alternative. […] Help, however, should be defined mainly by the helpees, who select the goals of their own growth." In order to avoid being patronized, Brammer and MacDonald recommend that "helpees define desired help on their own terms and to fulfill their own needs. […] Many persons wanting to help others have their own helping agenda and seek to meet [their own] unrecognized needs". (1999: p. 4).

The interview discussions suggest that the personal needs and goals of clients are not fully recognized by the matchmaker. Instead, the client is often re-packaged for sale in the marriage marketplace. In order to obtain a "good" transaction (*i.e.*, meet a successful and desirable mate) the matchmaker will try to present their clients as having positive and desirable traits.

From a marriage market perspective (Grossbard-Shechtman 1984; 1985), matchmaking involves the transaction of resources, services, and goods of each one of the spouses. According to social exchange theory, these resources constitute the main assets that are exchanged between the marital partners before and during the decision process to marry each other (South 1991; Kenrick, Groth, Trost and Sadalla 1993). The resources that are presented to potential mates were defined by Zalcberg (2007) as "matchmaking values". In order to enhance one's chances to meet and marry a desirable partner of the opposite sex, the matchmakers meet their

clients and identify, evaluate, and characterize each one's "matchmaking values" to be delivered to **a** potential match.

The "matchmaking values" that characterize each individual client may be construed to correspond with Bourdieu's (1986) concepts of economic, cultural and social capital. According to Bourdieu, "economic capital" refers to material wealth. "Cultural capital" includes wisdom, knowledge, education, and academic degrees. It is convertible, in some situations, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications. Bourdieu's concept of "social capital" includes family connections (up to the status of nobility), prestige and social networks. Social capital, and its network of social obligations ("connections") is convertible, under certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of that may come to bear on a single person in the "marriage market".

In addition to these forms of capital, Hakim (2010) also discusses the importance of "erotic capital," defined as a multifaceted combination of physical and social attractiveness that goes well beyond sexual attractiveness. According to Hakim (2010) erotic capital consists of six elements (*i.e.* beauty, sexual attractiveness, social attractiveness, vivaciousness/energy, presentation and sexuality). Hakim (2010) contends that erotic capital is an important personal asset that people can possess alongside economic, cultural, and social capital. Analysis of the narratives of the interviewees reveals that matchmakers, being aware of this powerful resource, have put much emphasis on advising their clients on how to improve their outward appearance, thus increasing their erotic capital.

As identifying the types of "capital" that their clients possess is not enough to enhance the client's marriage prospects, the matchmakers also guide their client on how to improve their self presentation. Following Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical perspective on social interactions, a date is a social encounter in which each partner tries to create the best impression on the other. In the preface to his book *Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*, Goffman (1959) distinguishes between a social encounter in a theatre play and a "real" social encounter. On the theatre stage there are, typically, at least two actors who present themselves to each other, with the audience as an observing "third" party. In real life, however, there is only the person as "actor" – and the audience includes all the other people in that person's life. Using Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor, it can be suggested that the matchmaker plays the role of a third party, who may even be closer to the stage and equivalent to a theatre prompter during the dating process.[5]

Goffman (1959) contends that the other people are aware of the fact that an "actor" is trying to impress them and, thus, they distinguish between and decode two kinds of messages. The first is the kind of information that is easy for the actor to control and process as he wishes – mainly verbal messages – and the second is information that is created unwillingly or unconsciously, mainly by non-verbal messages. Matchmakers provide extensive advice regarding both kinds of messages, particularly of the second type. As they help their clients improve their outward appearance, thus facilitating their non-verbal communication, they do not overlook the opportunity to guide them in social skills that also enable them to improve verbal communication. Clients who adopted the new identity succeeded in better negotiating the conditions of the "transaction", and so obtained better "transaction results".

Since the matchmaking process posits a kind of "barter transaction" between personal characteristics and types of capital, this practice might be considered the objectification of singles (Nussbaum 1995). A broad definition for objectification posits it as treatment of people as akin to merchandise, or as like objects for use without sufficient regard for another person's needs and personality (Bartky 1990; LeMoncheck 1997). According to Nussbaum (1995), objectification occurs when people are treated as interchangeable with each other and as lacking autonomy and self-determination. Does objectification, indeed, characterize the behavior of the matchmakers?

The matchmakers appear to relate to the client as an object which must be "sold". Accordingly they try to advise their client to accentuate his/her positive traits. They also tend, to a certain extent, to deny the client's autonomy in the sense that they ignore some of his or her desires and try to design a slightly different identity for him or her.

While matchmakers' objectification of their clients may be seen as negative, it is important to notice that matchmaking also appears to present the characteristics of a mutually beneficial practice. The applicant benefits from the logistical assistance in meeting new potential marriageable singles, as well as from the useful advice offered by the matchmaker. The matchmaker, for his or her part, gains social prestige, and societal appreciation, as well as status in his/her local community. Moreover, there is a trade-off for each applicant at the individual level: he or she pays the "cost" of giving up some enduring qualities out of desire for a potential mate. He or she receives a "return" for this payment by increasing the likelihood of finding "the one" and establishing a family, thus assuming a "proper" place in the larger society and adopting the accepted way of living in a family-oriented society.

To conclude, I would like to propose that the institution of matchmaking serves to achieve various kinds of interests and goals through a process of reconstructing applicants' identities in ways that are assumed to be "better" than their more "authentic" ones. This process is based on a voluntary mobilization of the matchmakers as socialization agents. The re-building of identities is the core function of a successful matchmaking process. By applying a version of market dynamics, most of the clients do become more "marketable" to the extent they act upon the matchmaker's advice and guidance. Compliance is crucial to the success of the process and reflects the willingness of the applicant to incorporate new components into the "improved" version of the product, *i.e.*, his or her identity, a result that may condition the degree of objectification. At the macro-level, the barter is beneficial to the NR society because it helps to partially eradicate the "problem of prolonged singleness". It would then seem that the activity of successful matchmakers enacts a concert of interest where the applicant, the matchmaker, and the social collective all achieve widely accepted societal goals.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the Samaria and Jordan Rift Research and Development Center at Ariel University of Samaria for financial support of the field study. I also thank Dr. Sima Zalcberg-Block and Dr. Tali Lev for their helpful suggestions.

Notes

[1]The Jewish population is Israel is composed of two main subgroups. "Ashkenazim" are those who either personally emigrated from Europe or America, or whose relatives did so. They are usually afforded higher status than the second main ethnic group, the "Sephardim", whose origins are mainly in Asia and Africa.
[2] All of the names of the interviewees are fictitious.
[3] More strictly observant Jewish women wear only long skirts and dresses, whereas more liberal women wear pants or sometimes pants under the skirt.
[4] The Talmud is the central text and basis of all codes of Jewish law.
[5] The prompter in a theatre is the person who prompts or cues actors on stage when they forget their lines or neglect to move to where they are supposed to be situated.

Bibliography

Adler, B. *Sefer ha-Nisu'in ke-Hilkhatam (The book of laws of marriage)* Jerusalem: HaMesorah. (in Hebrew), 1983.

Ahuvia, A.C. and M.B. Adelman. "Formal Intermediaries in the Marriage Market: A Typology and Review". *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 54 (1992): 452-463.

Almog, O. and D. Paz. "Ideological Streams and Life Styles in the National-Religious Population". (in Hebrew) available at http://www.peopleil.org/details.aspx?itemID=7711, 2009

Almog, O. "The Boundaries and Dimensions of the National Religious Population" (2010), http://www.peopleil.org/details.aspx?itemID 30005&index=17&searchMode=1, 2012 (in Hebrew).

Austrom, D. and K. Hanel. "Psychological Issues of Single Life in Canada: An Exploratory Study". *International Journal of Women's Studies* 8 (1985): 12-23.

Bartky, S. L. *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression*. NY: Routledge, 1990.

Bartov, H. "The Challenge of Singlehood: Does Defining Singlehood as a Problem Fulfill a Societal Need?" *De'ot* 17 (2004): 28-30 (in Hebrew).

Becker, G.S. *A Theory of Marriage*, Part 1. *Journal of Political Economy* 75 (1973): 493-515.

Bokek-Cohen, Y. "Women's Sex Objectification During the Matchmaking Process in Israel". *Asian Women* 28, no. 2 (2012): 81-111.

Bokek-Cohen, Y. and Y. Peres. "Mate Selectivity: An Empirical Confrontation of Evolutionary Psychology with Marriage Market Theory". *Social Issues in Israel* 2 (2006): 73-93 (in Hebrew).

Bokek-Cohen, Y. and S. Zalcber. "The Secrets of the Matchmakers", *Social Issues in Israel* 12 (2011): 80-107 (in Hebrew).

Bourdieu, P. "The Forms of Capital". In *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, edited by J.J. Richardson, 241-258. New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Brammer, L. M. and G. MacDonald. *The Helping Relationship: Process and Skills*, 8th ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2003.

Burgess, E.W. and P. Wallin. *Engagement and Marriage*. Philadelphia, PA: JB Lippincott Co., 1954.

Buunk, A. P., J. H. Park, and L.A. Duncan. "Cultural Variation in Parental Influence on Mate Choice." *Cross-Cultural Research* 44, no. 1(2010): 23-40.

Dion, K., and K. L. Dion. "Individualistic and Collectivistic Perspectives on Gender and the Cultural Context of Love and Intimacy". *The Journal of Social Issues* 49, no. 3 (1993): 53-69.

Engelberg, A. "Love Conquers All? The National-Religious "Singles Problem". *Theory and Criticism* 35 (2009): 280-291 (in Hebrew).

Faugier, J. and M. Sargeant. "Sampling Hard to Reach Populations". *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 26 (1997): 790-797.

Feingold, A. "Gender Differences in Mate Selection Preferences: A Test of the Parental Investment Model". *Psychological Bulletin* 112, no. 1 (1992): 125-135.

Fishman, A. "Modern Orthodox Judaism: A Study in Ambivalence". *Social Compass* 42, no. 1 (1995): 89–95.

Friedman, M. *The Haredi Women*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies (in Hebrew), 1988.

—. *The Haredi Ultra-Orthodox Society: Sources, Trends and Processes*, Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (in Hebrew), 1991.

Glaser, B. *Theoretical Sensitivity*, Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press, 1978.

Glaser, B. and A. Strauss. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*. Chicago: Aldine, 1967.

Goffman, E. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, University of Edinburgh Social Sciences Research Centre, Anchor Books edition, 1959.

Goshen-Gottstein, E.R. "Courtship, Marriage and Pregnancy in 'Geula', a Study of an Ultra-Orthodox Jerusalem Group". *Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines* 4, no. 1 (1996): 43-66.

Grossbard-Shechtman, S. "A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labor and Marriage", *Economic Journal* 94 (1984): 863-882.

Grossbard-Shechtman, S. A. "Marriage Squeeze and the Marriage Market". In *Contemporary Marriage*, edited by K. Davis, 375-396. NY: Russel Sage, 1985.

Grossbard-Shechtman, S., and C. Clague, eds. *The Expansion of Economics Toward a More Inclusive Social Science*, M.E. Sharpe, NY. 2002.

Grossman, A. *Pious and Rebellious Jewish Women in Medieval Europe*. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2004.

Hakim, C. "Erotic Capital". *European Sociological Review* 26, no. 5 (2010): 499-518.

Hatfield, E. and R.L. Rapson. *Love and Sex: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. New York, NY: Allyn & Bacon, 1995.

Heckathorn, D.D. "Extensions of Respondent-driven Sampling: Analyzing Continuous Variables and Controlling for Differential Recruitment". Sociological Methodology 37 (2007): 151-207.

Heilman, S. *Defenders of the Faith: Inside Ultra-Orthodox Jewry*. New York: Schocken Books, 1992.

Hetsroni, A. "Choosing a Mate in Television Dating Games: The Influence of Setting, Culture, and Gender". *Sex Roles* 42, no. ½ (2000): 83-106.

Israel. CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics), Monthly Bulletin of Statistics No. 11 (2012), http://www1.cbs.gov.il/www/yarhon/b1_e.htm.

Katz, J. *Tradition and Crisis: Jewish Society at the end of the Middle Ages*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

Katz, R. and Y. Lavee. "Families in Israel". In *Handbook of World Families*, edited by B. Adams and J. Trost. Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005.

Kenrick, D. T., Groth, G.E., Trost, M. R. and E.K. Sadalla. "Integrating Evolutionary and Social Exchange Perspectives on Relationships: Effects of Gender, Self-appraisal and Involvement Level on Mate Selection Criteria". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64, no. 6 (1993): 951-969.

LeMoncheck, L. *Loose Women, Lecherous Men: A Feminist Philosophy of Sex*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1997), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780195105559 p. 133.

Lewittes, M. *Jewish Marriage: Rabbinic Law, Legend and Custom*. Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 1994.

Mincer, J. "Labor Force Participation of Married Women: A Study of Labor Supply". In *Aspects of labor economics*, edited by H.G. Lewis, 63-97. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Monger, G.P. *Marriage Customs of the World: From Henna to Honeymoons*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2004.

Murstein, B. I. *Love, Sex, and Marriage Through the Ages*. New York: Springer Pub. Co., 1974.

—. "Mate Selection in the 1970s". *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 42 (1980): 777-792.

Nehari, G. *Now I am on 'Semester Break': Religious Identity of Religious Single Women*. MA thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007 (in Hebrew).

Nussbaum, M. C. "Objectification". *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 24, no. 4 (1995): 249-291.

Patton, M.Q. *Qualitative Evaluation Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1990.

Rapoport, T. and N. Yanay. "Ritual Impurity and Religious Discourse on Women and Nationality". *Women's studies international forum* 20, no. 5-6 (1997): 651-663.

Shai, D. "Working Women/Cloistered Men: A Family Development Approach to Marriage Arrangements Among Ultra-Orthodox Jews". *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 33, no. 1 (2002): 97-116.

South, S.J. "Socio Demographic Differentials in Mate Selection Preferences". *Journal of Marriage and Family* 53, no. 4 (1991): 928-940.

Schwarz, D. *Religious Zionism: History and Ideology*. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence: Broadcast University Series, 2003 (in Hebrew).

Shiloh, M. "Princess or Prisoner? Women's Lives in Pre-State Jerusalem", 1840- 1914. Haifa, Israel: University of Haifa Press, Zemora-Bitan, 2001 (in Hebrew).

Shtul, H. "The Single Women Aren't Waiting Anymore". *Deot* 11 (2000): 16- 20 (in Hebrew).

Spreen, M. "Rare Populations, Hidden Populations and Link-tracing Designs: What and Why?" *Bulletin Methodologie Sociologique* 36 (1992): 34-58.

Strauss, A.L. and J. Corbin. *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures Techniques*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998.

Triandis, H. C., C. McCusker and C. H. Hui. "Multimethod Probes of Individualism and Collectivism." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59, no. 5 (1990):1006-1020.

Zalcberg, S. "The Voice of the Girl and Her Role in the Process of Seeking a Match in the 'Toldot Aharon' Hasidic court". In *Woman and Her Jewishness,*Vol 4., edited by T. Cohen, 185-206. Jerusalem: Kolech. (in Hebrew), 2007.

Zalcberg, S. and O. Almog. "Divorce in National-Religious society" (2008) http://www.peopleil.org/details.aspx?itemID=7755.

CHAPTER TEN

RETHINKING AGENCY: PORNIFIED DISCOURSES AND SHIFTING GENDERED SUBJECTIVITIES

ANTONIO GARCÍA-GÓMEZ

Introduction

Among the latest modes of Computer-Mediated Communication, social media such as Facebook, Bebo, and Twitter have attained widespread popularity in the last ten years (Ringrose 2010). Such popularity has driven many people of all ages to maintain their own profile and show their "internet presence". The penchant to become an active member of the cyber-community has reshaped not only the ways people in general and teenagers in particular communicate, but it has also noticeably changed the way the so-called "Net generation" (Oblinger and Oblinger 2005) relates to each other (Boyd and Ellison 2007). These changes in the underlying architectures of social interaction have provoked a great amount of discussion that has centered on the identification of the linguistic features that can characterize online writing as a new genre of Computer-Mediated Communication (Miller and Shepherd 2004; Herring and Paolillo 2006; Herring 2007). Similarly, attention has been devoted to understanding the practices, implications and meanings of social networking sites for teenagers (Livingstone 2008; Livingstone and Helsper 2009; and Livingstone and Brake 2010).

As concerns practices, researchers have put special emphasis on teenage girls and young women's adoption of an exaggerated aggressive macho behavior (Jackson 2006; Ringrose 2006; Eatough *et al*. 2008). Following this social phenomenon, this chapter delves into Britain's "ladette" culture and contributes to the existing literature. Specifically, I place young women's relational aggression in the spotlight by discussing findings about gendered subjectivities and discursive strategies of

sexual aggression among British young women in their online conflicts. Aggression is, in the light of the ethological view of behavior, a significant part of subjectivity. More precisely, this study develops a discourse analysis and discursive psychology that focuses on how young women draw on pornified discourses to shape their sexual identities in episodes of online relational aggression. Using quantitative and qualitative analyses of British female teenagers' wall posts on Facebook, I outline the transforming roles of these young women and argue that performing femininity in an online environment is both reconstituted and compromised by the use of hypersexualized speech acts. Therefore, the study gives evidence for the sexualization/pornification of culture in these young women's episodes of online relational aggression. I argue, moreover, that the proliferation and mainstreaming of porn culture in this particular context does not represent authentic sexual liberation for women (Levy 2005).

Before turning to my findings, I consider research on subjectivity and (gendered) identity within the broader literature on the self. I then discuss my data and methods, outlining an analytical framework that identifies the different discursive strategies and allows me to measure the incidence and extent of hypersexualized speech acts in online conflicts. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings.

Performing modes of subjectivities and (gendered) identity

This section covers current knowledge about an important part of the self – namely subjectivities and gendered identity in social networking sites (henceforth SNSs). With the advent of the concept of subjectivity, both psychologists and discourse analysts have left behind the modernist discourse that stressed the need for stability and unity in one's identity. Instead, investigators have adopted a postmodern and post-structuralist discourse that not only focuses on the making of the subject through (discursive) subject positions, but also stresses the complex, multidimensional and reflexive nature of subjectivity (Taylor 2003).

Different theoretical approaches to subjectivity are certain to produce different types of analysis and forms of knowledge. Subjectivity is understood here as the cultural, social and psychological processes that influence, shape and even determine who individuals think they are and how they situate themselves in the world (Mansfield 2000). In accordance with Althusser (1971), and against Weedon (2004)'s theorization, I understand that subjectivity is not located in the individual consciousness,

but in the material acting out. Facebook becomes a material practice insofar as it interpolates people to participate by writing on people's walls and reading what others have written. Facebookers are then transformed into subjects of (and subjects to) the material practice of ideology. By paying attention to material practice, this study moves strongly away from assuming subjectivity as an essence and instead posits it as a matter of material practice and learned behaviors. The fact of understanding subjectivity in these particular terms makes it possible to stress not only the importance of building a stronger connection between power, language and identity, but also underlines the fundamental interconnectedness of individuals with their environment.

This theoretical framework is sensitive to studying how a particular social network, Facebook, is certain to play a role in defining how these British young women construe who they are, how they think, and how they relate to one another in general. More specifically, this framework is bound to allow the analyst to see if the subject positions these young women take up, and the modes of embodied subjectivity encoded in these young women's discursive strategies in episodes of online relational aggression, enable different types of gendered identity and whether that agency is compliant and/or resistant to "heteronormative femininity" (Butler 1990).

In this chapter, I attempt to relate Althusser's theorization to the anti-essentialist "gender as performative" that Butler (1990) proposes. In doing so, this study is freed up to find a non-essentialized subjectivity in the aggressive social games – the gendered performances – between these young women as play out on Facebook. More specifically, I build on Butler's claim that individuals repeatedly perform modes of subjectivity and (gendered) identity by analyzing episodes of online relational aggression. I hypothesize that these female teenagers' gendered subjectivities rely explicitly on active and complex processes of identification. These processes allow the analyst not only to shed light on the competing discourses that produce different subject positions and forms of identity, but to also trace how young women negotiate contemporary discourses of sexual aggression and competition.

Data and Methods

Selection process

Discourse analysis of evaluative language in episodes of young women's relational aggression was performed on a selection of comments made by

young women aged between 14 to 17 and posted on their own and other friends' walls in Facebook (mean age = 16.23, SD = 1.14). Five different secondary schools located in northwest England participated. As agreed with the schools, both parents and teenagers were first contacted to be told about the research objectives in simple terms and were encouraged to take part in the study. Eventually, 68 parents signed the informed consent form for the research after their daughters had also agreed to take part in the study. In addition, parents were requested to fill in a brief questionnaire in order to gather basic information about these young women's family background and social class.

These 68 young women's Facebook pages were closely analysed on a daily basis for six months. During this time, I noticed that in the first few days they barely wrote anything on their own or anyone else's walls; however, they gradually forgot about the research and normality was restored. In addition, it took me some time to carry out a preliminary inspection of older posts in order to locate instances of episodes of relational aggression. This six-month inspection of older and current posts made it possible to select those young women's Facebook pages where most episodes of relational aggression were identified. In the end, 50 out of 68 female teenagers' Facebook pages were judged as full of relational aggression episodes and were therefore selected to carry out the present study. Finally, it is also worth noting that, although the area around the four schools where these fifty young women attend school is predominantly white lower-middle class, most parents classified themselves as white middle-class in the aforementioned questionnaire.

Classification process and preliminary analysis

In order to identify the actual episodes of relational aggression and select the data for later analysis, a search for examples of negative appraisals of other young women was carried out. This preliminary linguistic inspection was highly productive insofar as more than 90 percent of these negative evaluations of others and their behavior enabled a sample to be compiled. Linguistically speaking, these episodes were characterized by expressions of disagreement and negative evaluations of other's physical appearance, personality traits, or ways of doing things that eventually caused these young women's anger to provoke an online fight. In particular, the Facebook sample consisted of 4,149 thought units. As each thought unit represents a pragmatic intention and tends to occur as an independent clause, every thought unit was then coded for its pragmatic force. It is worth pointing out that, given the multi-functional dimension of many

utterances, the coding process accommodated annotation at different levels or for different functions. The decision to code at this level, as Taylor and Donald (2003: p. 18) point out, reflects an attempt to isolate single communication acts and avoid "overlooking smaller but psychologically meaningful components of dialogue".

Table 1: Principles of classification and transcript examples

Speech Act Category	Transcript Example
An avoidance-identity strategy aims to differentiate Us Vs Them	I am not like you, You and me are very different
An avoidance-instrumental strategy aims to inform the other young woman what the rest of the group think about her	Let me tell you what everybody says about, Rumor has it u r a bitch
An avoidance-relational Strategy aims to make explicit why their friend relationship is not possible	We r not friends anymore, stop calling!, U r a slapper, I don't want a friend like you in my life

Source: Adapted from Taylor's (2003) classification of interpersonal behavior in crisis negotiation

Once all the episodes were selected and all the thought units carefully examined, I classified interpersonal aggressive behavior into Identity, Instrumental, or Relational categories, depending on the degree of affiliation or independence these Facebookers displayed in their "online conversation". According to Taylor and Donald (2003), this classification characterizes interpersonal behavior during conflict and identifies the three main motivational goals that people can pursue during a negotiation (see Table 1). Intercoder reliability was established throughout the compilation process and based on a random selection of over 10 percent (n = 26) of items from the sample. The corpus was tested with the following variables: Avoidance-Identity (0.99); Avoidance-Instrumental (0.98); and Avoidance-Relational (0.99). Each category will be further explained as the analysis unfolds.

Finally, it must be added that the excerpts of episodes chosen to illustrate the analysis in the present chapter were further analyzed by the young women who actually wrote the comments. For this purpose, parents were contacted via email asking their daughters to explain the meanings they give to these examples of hypersexualized language. A meeting was

then agreed with both parents and daughters via Skype so that these young women could interpret the intention of their actual words as well as to explain the meaning of some of the expressions they used. Analytically speaking, this kind of approach proved very useful in augmenting my understanding of the hyperbolic dysphemistic expressions and in identifying the best way to interpret the tone of the expressions these young women use. All in all, the procedures made it possible to further explore the meaning of what these young women said and how their statements were intended to be, and actually were, received by the other young women.

Shifting gendered subjectivities: giving evidence of the sexualisation and pornification of culture

Before turning my attention to shifting gendered subjectivities evident in the corpus, I shall briefly give an account of the emerging research on the sexualization and pornification of culture. This, in turn, will contextualize the analysis and further justify its relevance in the existing literature. Leading edge research in the exploration of gendered and sexual identity online has taken important steps in empirically examining the construction of online femininity (Kelly *et al*. 2006) through weblogs (García-Gómez 2010a; 2010b) or through other online media (Magnuson and Dundes 2008; Renold and Ringrose 2011; Ringrose and Eriksson Barajas 2011). More specifically, research revolves around identity and privacy concerns in teenagers' online social practices (Derrick 2008) and warns of the perils of engaging in negative social practices such as cyber-bullying (Williams 2012) or "sexting" (Ringrose *et al*. 2012). All in all, this extensive girl-focused research finds evidence for the increased sexualization of women (*e.g.,* Attwood 2009; Olfman 2009) and even for the pornification of society (Paasonen *et al*. 2007; and Evans *et al*. 2010).[1]

In spite of this extensive research, in my assessment, the literature does not yet capture the full range of young people's uses and engagements with social networking sites and, perhaps more importantly, all studies of sexualization measure only the presence or absence of aspects of sexualization in isolation (Hatton and Trautner 2011). As a consequence, there is a gap in the research on how young women construct their online gendered and sexual identities from a psychosocial and discourse analysis perspective. Let me outline a theoretical framework that builds on these previous studies to provide a more comprehensive analysis.

From a poststructural and psychosocial research tradition (Walkerdine *et al*. 2001; Ringrose and Eriksson Barajas 2011), I explore how these

British young women enact gendered and sexualized performances of self by analyzing how they perform discourses of femininity. From a discourse analysis perspective, I address the pornified discourses employed in these young women's digitized identity construction by identifying the specific linguistic strategies employed. This, in turn, makes it possible to understand the use of this hypersexualized language as a rhetorical device that not only regulates social behavior, but also encodes the expression of anger, jealousy and dominance. In brief, I take seriously Gill's (2007) analysis of the intensified post-feminist shift to hypersexualized embodiment and self-regulation for young women and I intend to explore what I consider to be contradictory discourses of sexual agency in Facebook. In doing so, I intend to answer the following questions. Do the discursive strategies behind these young women's sexualized subject positions give evidence of a discourse of compulsory agency?[2] Do these sexualized subject positions reveal contradictory relations of gendered sexual identities? To consider these questions I intend to unpack some of the discourses surrounding young women's relational aggression and outline my own discourse approach.

Pornified discourses and shifting gendered subjectivities in Facebook

Discourse analysis of the data shows that the first step these young women take to form their self-concept occurs when they begin to evaluate their own actions and abilities against apparently agreed upon standards.[3] As these young women self-evaluate their actions as good or bad, this positive or negative appraisal suggests a feeling of self as capable of living up to certain in-group standards. Moreover, given that these actions are examples of online relational aggression, the young women's sense of competence and control tends to increase dramatically. More precisely, they tend to compare their actions and abilities in more complex ways as they are concerned about who is better able to keep a man contented in bed.

This particular appraisal of one's own and others' sexual abilities shapes the quest for self-knowledge. Inspection of the data reveals three main variables that shape the quest of these female teens for self-knowledge: self-assessment, self-verification and self-enhancement (*cf.* Trope 1986; Swan 1987). In this online context, the first variable constitutes their desire to gain accurate information about themselves through interaction. The second is their need to gain some confirmation from Facebook pals about what they believe about themselves. The third

variable is their attempt to learn favorable things and cast a positive light on themselves.

Furthermore, this evaluation process not only allows these teenagers to self-present in particular ways in discourse, but it also determines how these three variables behave. In other words, inspection of the data makes it possible to argue that the young women's discursive construction of their own identities deal with multiply-positioned sexual subjectivities. In the following sections, I provide qualitative and quantitative evidence of the presence of two arguably new forms of compulsory female sexual agency. I will discuss these two new types of discourse in detail; one form entails a "hyper-sexualized" performance of femininity and provides evidence of self-sexualization in adolescent girls, whereas the other one is based on the denigration of anything gay/queer.

Evidence of self-sexualization in young women: performing hypersexualized femininity

When being relationally aggressive, these female teenagers endorse heteronormative femininity. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, young women's discursive construction of their identities on the blogosphere revolves around the expected normative heterosexual femininity matrix that sociological studies proclaim (García-Gómez 2010a, 2010b). In fact, the social evaluation underlying episodes of relational aggression evidences the fact that girlhood remains carefully regulated through a heteronormative matrix that differentiates between socially acceptable normative and socially deviant adolescent girls (García-Gómez 2011).

In all the examples of relational aggression that I found, these young women seem to find it useful to know accurately how their own and others' abilities and sex appeal stack up (*i.e.*, self-assessment and self-verification). The rhetorical and discursive strategies employed in these examples show how pornified discourses point to a hypersexualized femininity. I suggest that this endorsement of heteronormative feminine sexuality is based on a twofold strategy. On the one hand, these young women go through a process of deindividuation by self-assessing their own qualities and self-presenting as unique individuals who react against any civilized code of conduct. On the other hand, they seem to identify femininity within a narrow band of behaviors and expressions heavily focused on their physical appearance, "sexiness" and sexual abilities. This set of behaviors offers evidence of sexualization in the form of compulsory female sexual agency insofar as these young women's values

derive only from their sexual appeal and sexual expertise. Consequently, they are sexually objectified.

Table 2. Hypersexualized performance of femininity: self-sexualization

	British	**Corpus**
An avoidance-identity strategy differentiates Us Vs Them	Frequency	Percent
(In-)direct positive appraisal of the speaker and explicit contrast between speaker and other(s)	207	31
Direct positive appraisal of the other young woman's skills to satisfy young men's sexual desire	456	69
Total	663	100
An avoidance-relational strategy makes explicit why the friend relationship is not possible		
Negative appraisal of the other young women's behavior and/or physical appearance	589	44
Use of insults and swear words	741	56
Total	1330	100

As the quantitative analysis shows, the process of self-assessing and self-verifying who these young women are goes hand in hand with two discursive strategies (see Table 2). Let us explain them in turn. These young women mainly rely on an avoidance-identity strategy. This strategy consists of utterances which aim to differentiate the young woman who initiates online relational aggression from the other(s) who are subjected to it. Although the process of deindividuation is realized by means of (in)direct positive appraisal of the speaker and explicit contrast between her and other(s), the process of sexualization and objectification is realized by hypersexualized speech acts that explicitly evaluate these young women's ability to satisfy men's sexual desire. This strategy is supplemented with an avoidance-identity strategy that aims to emphasize the young women's rejection of others. This avoidance-identity strategy is realized by direct negative appraisal of the other young women and/or these other young women's physical appearance. All in all, these episodes of online relational aggression can be said to represent examples of hostile aggression.[4] Furthermore, as Williams (2012) suggests, the fact that relational aggression takes place in an online environment prompts people to behave more aggressively as their opponents are not physically present. Although this idea was underlined by the actual young women who were

asked to comment on their use of hypersexualized language, it is worth noticing that they also mentioned that the disproportionate use of insults and threats used to lead to physical fights.

Table 2 presents the linguistic realizations and frequency of each pragmatic meaning of utterances. In making the data more concrete, the following are examples of the hypersexualized performance of femininity; young women's concerns to perform as sexually experienced pleasure servers to men are vigorously policed in the comments these young women posted on their walls.

Extract 1

A (16 years old): he's called u yet?
B (17 years old): Nope
A: don't [know] what to think
C: (16 years old): it's over
A: What r u talkin' bout?
C: he won't call u 'cos he's M I N E
B: Fuck off!
C: what u think he was at home when u were crying ur eyes out for him. NO WAY!!! he was in my bed slamming into me and LAUGHING AT YOU!
B: You're lying
C: lying!!! he's just left and I still have the taste of his cum, I can still feel the head of his bulging cock throbbing inside my hungry mouth Gosh! I love sucking up and down his throbbing shaft
B: U r a whore
C: Yes! I'm the perfect whore for his cock. I'd throw lips and cunts to his cock ANYTIME and ANYWHERE!
A: He'd never do that!
C: Oh girl! U don't know how to make him happy, I do... I let him do anything! I love when he pumps his cock into my tight hairless little pussy like a piston
B: U wish
C: Has he ever grabbed you by the hips & slid his straining prick into your cunt from the rear? My arse shook & my big tits jiggled as he plowed into me with jack-hammer strokes and his huge balls slapped against my juicy clit, pushing me quickly towards a powerful orgasm
A: U r definitely a whore
C: but I give him what he wants! I'm the one who feels his pistoning cock! He prefers emptying his balls into my convulsing tight bunny

This extract is an example of the process of self-sexualisation as C sees her own body, and those of others', merely as objects to be used for keeping a man contented in bed. Linguistically speaking, C self-presents as a sexual object who attempts to differentiate from others by means of her sexual abilities and her willingness to do anything to fulfil her partner's sexual desires. By displaying such a range of sexual behaviors, C self-presents as a submissive servant to her man's sexual needs. This understanding of sex gives these young women a very limited and biased view of what staying in a relationship means. C underlines this idea: "My boyfriend loves sex and, umm, I'm always ready to have sex with him, umm, I never push him away if he wants sex, umm, I'm worried he'll look for it somewhere else, umm, I'm not a frigid." C also admitted spending substantial amounts of time on her bodily appearance and exhibited high levels of anxiety and self-criticism. In her own words: "Yeah, I don't like my boobs, they're nasty! They simply don't match. I don't like my nipples either, they're big but clearish […] umm, I'm not fat or anything but I also feel embarrassed about being naked but it's all right I know how to keep a guy interested. I'm not really a slut I just want sex unconditionally, don't know what you think but this is what girls my age do." Although it seems that this young woman feels social pressure to be flirtatious because she is very sexually active, she avoids pejorative labels by generalizing her sexual behavior and, therefore, justifying what she does.

Both the linguistic analysis and the interview with C make it possible to argue that this young woman treats and sees herself as a sexual object. She also justifies her behavior and engages in self-sexualization by saying that these behaviors are good and normal or, at least, what females her age do. It is of relevance here to mention the semantics of scaling present in the values attached to both the male and female sexual organs. The extract is crowded with intensifiers by means of which C attaches interpersonal force to their utterances. On the one hand, the young man's sexual organ, as well as the description of his sexual skills, are always preceded by positive adjectives that highlight the size of the penis and/or its performance. On the other hand, C's utterances incorporate a wide range of adjectives that describe her sexual behaviors and self-present her as a desirable sexual object.

The following example not only illustrates this hyper-sexualized performance of femininity, but it also shows how young women manage an episode of online relational aggression by competing and boasting about their sexual prowess.

Extract 2

A: u do it?
B: Yes!!!!!
C: Liar!
B: ?????
C: U were not with him yesterday
B: how you know?
C: cos I was I sucked on his beautiful cock, I called & told him I wanted to feel his warm, wet tongue circling my love hole and I needed him to be inside me
B: Slapper!
C: you want him?
B: he's mine, you randy little fuck
C: sure? tell him to fuck you as he fucked me yesterday
B: He mouth fucks me every day, he moans when I take his gigantic pole into my hot wet mouth
C: U don't know how to make him cum u can't take his cock, he told me you say it hurts you when he rides you I love HIS COCK and I can take it all. I know how to swallow his load and I love feeling his throbbing cock inside me and his balls slapping my clit "fuck me harder, fuck me harder"
B: U r insane!
C: No he's mad, mad about me he prefers coming all over my titties I love when he collapses on top of me breathless, I take his dick! put your horse dick deep in my pussy, dug your dick into my hungry pussy hole, he gets so horny when I tell'm this. I'm a sex goddess
A: tell her what she does to you
B: I also take it slut! he fucks me with long strokes my pussy eats his horse dick and I dig my nails into his steel back
C: hahahahaha… you're lying! I'm the one who pumps on his 7inch cock till his horse dick explodes inside of me! I love tugging on his balls…ummmmmm

This extract shows how these young women (B and C) treat and experience themselves as sexual objects (Fredrickson and Roberts 1997). Once the online aggressive relational episode starts, the fight revolves around both young women boasting about their sexual skills and trying to show who is the most skilled lover and, therefore, who deserves to have a particular man. Linguistically speaking, it is interesting that B and C encode their attitude when they hyperbolize their sexual availability. In addition, they self-present as sexually objectified as they are made into a thing for young men's sexual use, rather than seeing themselves as women with the capacity for independent action.

By self-representing in terms of their genitals, these two young women locate their own value in their body's sexual abilities and seeing themselves as objects to be used to give pleasure. In turn, they seem to obtain acceptance or empowerment. This idea was confirmed when both participants were asked to comment on their writing and intentions. B feels evaluated and comments: "There is nothing wrong in what I said, I know what he wants, that's it." In this respect, C also justifies herself: "You may think I'm a slut, but I'm not. Parents don't just understand, umm, I'm not sexually repressed." Seeing their bodies and sexual organs as merely a means to achieve goals certainly provides evidence of these young women's self-sexualisation. Similarly, the semantics of scaling present in the values attached to the male sexual organ is worth mentioning. As in the previous extract, the text is crowded with intensifiers by means of which C attaches interpersonal force to her utterances. The strategy is slightly different from that in Extract 1, however, as positive adjectives are only concerned with the male sexual organ. Furthermore, the male sexual organ is preceded by boosters such as "beautiful", "gigantic", "7 inch" or "horse" which not only describe size but also highlight the young women's ability to handle it.

The denigration of anything gay/queer: regulating behavior and reinstating heteronormativity

Apart from performing hyper-sexualized femininity, there is one more form of discourse through which these young women endorse heteronormative femininity. Once again, the social evaluation present in these episodes of relational aggression confirms that girlhood remains carefully regulated through a heteronormative matrix. In spite of the sexual freedom these young women seem to proclaim, this particular form of discourse not only regulates norms by differentiating socially acceptable behavior from what is not, but also helps reinstate heteronormativity by denigrating anything gay or queer as a socially censurable "vice".

In all the examples of relational aggression, these young women attempt to self-enhance by casting a positive light on themselves. In spite of women's apparent freedom in terms of their sexual liberation, ridiculing and insulting those who may enjoy alternative sexual practices apparently creates pleasant emotional states and builds up these young women's self-esteem. However, this offensive strategy illustrates a new form of discourse of "compulsory female sexual agency" (Gill 2008: p. 40) as it offers evidence of how these young women's sexual freedom goes hand in hand with the performance of heterosexual scripts and the censorship of

homosexual/lesbian practices. All in all, this self-presentation empowers these young women as representatives of the heteronormative group.

As in the previous section, the rhetorical and discursive strategies employed in these examples illustrate gendered pornified discourses wherein these young women display a hyper-sexualized femininity. In particular, I suggest that this endorsement of heteronormative feminine sexuality, and criticism of homosexual/lesbian practices, involves a positive social evaluation of in-group and a social sanction of out-group behavior. This form of discourse supports Ringrose and Eriksson Barajas' (2011: p. 127) argument that "new compulsory discourses of female sexual agency proliferate […] as they [adolescent girls] construct gendered and sexual digital identities."

As the quantitative analysis shows, the process of self-enhancement is closely connected with two discursive strategies (see Table 3). Let us consider them in turn. These young women rely on an avoidance-identity strategy. This strategy consists of utterances that evaluate themselves positively, and others negatively, because of their sexual preferences. As a consequence, there is a social sanction that is realized by means of (in-) direct negative appraisal of other(s). This strategy is supplemented with an avoidance-instrumental strategy that aims to inform the others what the rest of the group think about her/them. Such a strategy is realized by impositions of a course of action for the speaker's benefit (*e.g.*, "Stop flirting with my friend or else"), and suggestions of actions for the speaker's benefit (*e.g.*, "If I were you, I'd never come back"). In addition, the hostile nature of these episodes of relational aggression is underlined by the overuse of insults and swear words that confer a more aggressive quality to this avoidance-instrumental strategy.

While Table 3 displays the linguistic realizations and frequency of each pragmatic meaning of utterances, the following extracts illustrate how these young women regulate behavior and reinstate heteronormativity by denigrating anything gay/queer.

Table 3. The denigration of anything gay/queer

	British	**Corpus**
An avoidance-identity strategy differentiates Us Vs Them	Frequency	Percent
(In-)direct negative appraisal of the other(s)	142	59
(In-) direct positive appraisal of the speaker	97	41
Total	239	100
An avoidance-instrumental strategy informs the other young woman what the rest of the group think about her		
Imposition of a course of action for the speaker's benefit	425	39
Suggestions of actions for the speaker's benefit	268	25
Use of insults and swear words	391	36
Total	1084	100

Extract 3

A (17 years old): girls done it!
B (17 years old): u text him?
A: Meet' him tonight got condoms already ;)
B: go girl go!
C (17 years old): go to hell you fucking Mrs. Lube
A: what the heck
C: don't pretend u don't know stop fingering ur arse, it's SO LOOOOSSSSEEEE that you'll shit yourself everybody knows it
B: what r u talkin about?
C: ur friend is a fucking pervert half town has fucked her loose I'm sure she's asked you to lick her gloomy smelly arse
A: U r mental
C: sure! Andy told me you made him puke and push you out his car when u told him my juicy ass lips are ready for you and u asked him to lick them do yourself a favour and go to hell
A: leave me alone or I'll poke your hole with my finger till u cry for mercy I'll plow [so] deep into you that u'll have to go for arsehole repairs u r such a bitch that sure u like having your arse fondled

This extract gives evidence of an important process of feminine subjectivity; "one that provides a dialogue between the existing tension between masculine and feminine identifications and the linguistic strategies by which relational aggression is organized and articulated" (García-Gómez 2011: p. 14). The offensive strategy employed by this

young woman is based on an explicit criticism of the other's apparent preference for practicing anal sex. Such a strategy not only shows young women's confusion in interpersonal conflict. The strategy also makes it possible to argue that the young women seem to understand gender as a hierarchy insofar as it shows the clash between hegemonic and non-hegemonic sexual practices that are still present in society (Baker 2008).

In this extract, C seems to represent the heterosexual normative group. Linguistically speaking, there is an implicit positive evaluative preference for heterosexual practices and explicit negative appraisal of anal sex – generally associated with gay sex. As a result of this social comparison, C casts herself in a positive light, whereas A's social identity is depicted in negative terms. More specifically, C compares her own behavior and opinions about what is a deviant sexual practice with those of the other young woman. As she commented: "I simply find them [lesbians] disgusting. They are not normal." By evaluating lesbians and their sexual practices negatively, C asserts her power and establishes what she considers the correct or socially approved way of thinking and behaving. Such prejudice and discrimination toward alternative sexual practices (*i.e.*, anal sex) can also be seen as part of the general process of ethnocentrism. As a counter-attack to C's insults and impositions of a course of action, A also defends herself by insulting C in return. Interestingly enough, A's counter-attack is based on an exercise of lexical creativity as she threatens C to force her to have anal sex. Notice how A strengthens the impact of the threat by adopting a masculine subject position and threatening C with performing sex as a man would.

It is also common in the data to find examples of relational aggression wherein these young women denigrate lesbian practices. Consider the following extract:

Extract 4

A (16 years old): LOVE U
B: (15 years old): congratulations!
C: (16 years old): yeah!!! tell us all about it
D: (16 years old): tell me u r attracted to a cunt like fucking hell
B: fucking dumb cunt
C: u shld stop bein' a totally weirdo and posting these things on peoples pages that you have no idea who they are we r not ur friends!
D: Stop pestering me evrbdy knows ur slutty lesbian pussy munchers
A: yeah u r a fucking bad carpet muncher go and fucking die
D: Me?? I'm not like u u wish u all r a bunch of cunt munchers now everybody knows u have been secretly fucking each other while u have

> sleepovers but I am not ur nightly fucking toy u love sucking pussies as much as I love the taste of a big cock. evrbdy bitches abt you!
> B: u r mental
> D: sure you let her scoot her pussy towards ur hand u love when she massages ur wet clit ask her to tow her fingers toward ur dripping pussy I'm not like u I've got a taste for cock

By endorsing the phallogocentricism of the heterosexual matrix, this extract illustrates the hegemony of heteronormativity (Butler 1993; 2006). As in the previous example, D relies on an avoidance-identity strategy; that is, D establishes a social comparison by self-presenting as different and by publicly denouncing what she considers to be a socially deviant behavior. The process of ethnocentrism is also present in the explicit and positive evaluation of her preference for heterosexual practices and her negative appraisal of lesbian sex. An avoidance-instrumental strategy can also be seen in the use of impositions and the explicit utterance which informs C about what other people think about her. The offensive strategy is intensified by the wide range of denigrating words for a lesbian. In this regard, D commented, "Why do I hate lesbians? Give me a reason not to. I'm fine with gay guys and I have a couple of friends who are gay too but I hate lesbians, they are disgusting!"

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to offer a deeper understanding of gendered and sexualized peer-to-peer and relationships in a particular social media platform: Facebook. In general terms, my findings not only explore British ladette culture by investigating how these young British women relate online, but they also point to a narrowing of the culturally acceptable ways for "doing" femininity (West and Zimmerman 1987; Butler 1990) as presented in popular media. These findings are particularly important insofar as the sexualized images present in the discursive strategies employed by these female teens give evidence of practices that may legitimize and exacerbate violence among young women. This dire possibility aligns with recent studies that not only offer valuable insight into how frequently teenagers engage in negative practices in social media (*e.g.*, sexting or rumor spreading), but that also give evidence of how these practices impact, in real terms, teenagers' lives (Ringrose *et al*. 2012; Williams 2012). Therefore, my study makes it possible to argue that cyber-bullying or online relational aggression may be viewed as a common practice; however, the results can have lasting, negative effects.

In particular, what emerged from the analysis was a remarkable set of young women's habits of describing themselves in terms of their abilities to satisfy men's sexual needs. As the extracts have shown and these young women's comments have underlined, it can be argued that they enact a highly masculinized, sexual subjectivity in order to attack and humiliate one another. In accordance with Butler (1990), these performances of femininity seem to conform to the values of hegemonic masculinity.

Furthermore, this chapter's analysis offers evidence of pornified discourses of female sexual agency. On one hand, the discourse analysis captures the hyper-sexualized language in these young women's episodes of online relational aggression. Hypersexualized language can be understood as a rhetorical device insofar as the pragmatic force behind these words encodes messages about jealousy and dominance that, in turn, defines the norms of conduct among these young women. On the other hand, the analysis reveals how young women are imbued with adult sexuality and seem to be encouraged to look sexy and have an active sexual life, without understanding much about what it means to have sexual desires or to make responsible decisions about sexual relationships that satisfy their desires (Tolman 2006).

Finally, the analysis has offered evidence of the intensified post-feminist shift to hyper-sexualized embodiment and self-regulation for young women (Gill 2007). The examples analysed here point to a form of "compulsory sexual agency" that highlights the connection between women's sexual freedom and the performance of particular sexual scripts that revolve around pleasing men. As Gill (2008: p. 40) argues, this form of "compulsory sexual agency" is now a "required feature of contemporary postfeminist, [feminine] subjectivity."

Nevertheless, the discourses of acute competition in these British female teenagers' online relational aggression produce meanings and subjectivities that are not homogeneous. In fact, these narratives also include discourses and discursive practices that are contradictory, conflicting, and create the space for new forms of knowledge and practice. In this view, social media is not merely a case of "old wine in new bottles" as concerns the practices of subjectivity, but further investigation is clearly needed to map these emerging arenas for the formation of identity.

Acknowledgements

The present study was financially supported by a grant (ID No: FFI2009-7308) from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación. This study is part of a long-term research project: Functions of Discourse: Evaluations in Text Types.

Notes

[1] These two widely examined phenomena have been given a plethora of names, including "striptease culture" (McNair 2002), "porno chic" (McRobbie 2004) or "the seeming mainstreaming of prostitution online" (Farley 2009).
[2] According to Ringrose (2012: p. 67), "combining the ideas of 'compulsory' with 'sexual' and 'agency' is a conceptual device Gill [2008] undertakes to further destabilize taken-for-granted notions of free will and choice that underpin humanist theories of agency, and to suggest we are witnessing a new hegemonic discourse of feminine empowerment."
[3] Self-concept is the "total subjective perception of oneself, including an image of one's body and impressions of one's personality, capabilities, and so on." (Coon1994: p.471)
[4] According to Berk (2007), hostile aggression comes in three varieties: physical aggression, verbal aggression, and relational aggression.

Bibliography

Althusser, L. "On Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. Notes Towards an Investigation". In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, 121–73. London: New Left Books, 1971.

Atwood, F. *Mainstreaming Sex: The Sexualisation of Western Culture.* London: IB Taurus, 2009.

Baker, P. *Sexed Texts: Language, Gender and Sexuality*. London: Continuum, 2008.

Boyd, D. M., and N. B. Ellison. "Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship". *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 13 (2007): art. 11. Accessed December 4, 2012.

Berk, L. E. *Development Through the Lifespan*. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, 2007.

Butler, J. "Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse". In *Feminism/Postmodernism.*, edited by L. Nicholson, 324–330. New York and London: Routledge, 1990.

—. *Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of Sex*. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.

—. “Response to Special Issue. Troubling Identities: Reflections on Judith Butler’s Philosophy for the Sociology of Education”. *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 27, 4 (2006): 529–534.

Eatough, V., Smith, J. and R. L. Shaw. “Women, Anger and Aggression: an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis”. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 23, 12 (2008): 1767-1799.

Coon, D. *Essentials of Psychology,* 6th ed. Los Angeles: West Publishing Co, 1994.

Derrick, W. “Online Social Networks: Educational Benefits and Dangers”. *Distance Learning* 5, 1, 43 (2008). Accessed December 4, 2012.

Evans, A., Riley, S. and A. Shankar. “Technologies of Sexiness: Theorizing Women’s Engagement in the Sexualization of Culture”. *Feminism and Psychology* 20, 1 (2010): 114–131.

Farley, M. “Prostitution and the Sexualization of Children”. In *The Sexualization of Childhood,* edited by S. Olfman, 143-164. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009.

Fredrickson, B. and T. Roberts. “Objectification Theory: Toward Understanding Women’s Lived Experiences and Mental Health Risks”. *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 21 (1997): 173-206.

García-Gómez, A. “Disembodiment and Cyberspace: Gendered Discourses in Female Adolescents’ Personal Information Disclosure”. *Discourse and Society* 21, 2 (2010a): 135–160.

—. “Competing Narratives, Gender and Threaded Identity in Cyberspace”. *Journal of Gender Studies* 19, 1 (2010b): 15–30.

—. “Regulating Girlhood: Evaluative Language, Discourses of Gender Socialization and Relational Aggression”. *European Journal of Women’s Studies* 18, 3 (2011): 243-264.

Gill, R. “Post-feminist Media Culture: Elements of a Sensibility”. *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 10, 2 (2007): 147–166.

—. “Empowerment/sexism: Figuring Female Sexual Agency in Contemporary Advertising”. *Feminism and Psychology* 18, 1 (2008): 35-60.

Hatton, E. and M. N. Trautner. “Equal Opportunity Objectification? The Sexualization of Men and Women on the Cover of Rolling Stone”. *Sexuality and Culture* 15 (2011): 256–278.

Herring, S. C. “A Faceted Classification Scheme for Computer-Mediated Discourse”. *Language@Internet* 7, 2 (2007). Accessed December 4, 2012. urn:nbn:de:0009-7-28011.

Herring, S. C., and J. C. Paolillo. “Gender and Genre Variation in Weblogs”. *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 10, 4 (2006): 439–459.

Jackson, C. *Lads and Ladettes in School: Gender and a Fear of Failure.* Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2006.

Kelly, D. M., Pomerantz, S. and D. H. Currie. "'No Boundaries'? Girls' Interactive, Online Learning About Femininities". *Youth and Society* 38, 1 (2006): 3–28.

Levy, A. *Female Chauvinist Pigs: Women and the Rise of Raunch Culture.* Free press, 2005.

Livingstone, S. "Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content Creation: Teenagers' Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy and Self-expression". *New Media and Society* 10, 3 (2008): 459–477.

Livingstone, S. and D. Brake. "On the Rapid Rise of Social Networking Sites: New Findings and Policy Implications". *Children and Society* 24, 1 (2010): 75–83.

Livingstone, S. and E. Helsper. "Balancing Opportunities and Risks in Teenagers' Use of the Internet: the Role of Online Skills and Internet Self-efficacy". *New Media and Society* 12, 2 (2009): 309–329.

Magnuson, M. J. and L. Dundes. "Gender Differences in Social Portraits Reflected in MySpace Profiles". *CyberPsychology and Behavior* 11, 2 (2008): 239–241.

Mansfield, N. *Subjectivity. Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway*. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

McNair, B. *Striptease Culture: Sex, Media and the Democratization of Desire*. London, New York: Routledge, 2002.

McRobbie, A. "Post-Feminism and Popular Culture*". Feminist Media Studies* 4, no. 3 (2004): 255–264.

Taylor, P. J. and I. J. Donald. "Foundations and Evidence for an Interaction Based Approach to Conflict". *International Journal of Conflict Management* 14 (2003): 213–232.

Tolman, D. "In a Different Position: Conceptualizing Female Adolescent Sexuality Development Within Compulsory Heterosexuality". In *New Directions in Child and Adolescent Development*, edited by L. Diamond, 71-89, 2006.

Trope, Y. (1986). "Self-Enhancement and Self Assessment in Achievement Behavior". In *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of Social Behavior*, edited by R.M. Sorrentino and E.T. Higgins, 350-378. Guilford Press, USA: New York, 1986.

Walkerdine, V., Lucey, H. and J. Melody. *Growing Up Girl*: *Psychosocial Explorations of Gender and Class.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001.

Weedon, C. *Identity and Culture: Narratives of Difference and Belonging*. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2004.

West, C. and D. H. Zimmerman. “Doing Gender”. *Gender and Society* 1 (1987): 125-151.

Williams, J. L. “Teens, Sexts, and Cyberspace: The Constitutional Implications of Current Sexting and Cyberbullying Laws”. *William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 20, no. 3 (2012): 1-35.

CONTRIBUTORS

Ya'arit Bokek-Cohen is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology in Ariel University of Samaria, West Bank. She obtained her Ph.D. from Tel Aviv University in 2002. Dr. Bokek Cohen's research interests include family dynamics, mate choice, marriage and remarriage, and the sociological and psychological implications of human physical attractiveness. Bokek-Cohen is the author of several book chapters and her work has appeared in several research journals including *Teima: A Journal for the study of Yemen Jewry*, *International Journal of Culture, Tourism and Hospitality Research* and *Sociological Focus*.

Christopher Chávez (Ph.D., University of Southern California) is an Assistant Professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon. His research and teaching interests lie at the intersection of globalization, advertising and culture. Dr. Chávez has authored several book chapters and his work has appeared in peer-reviewed journals including *Consumption, Markets and Culture*, *International Journal of Communication* and *Journal of Spanish Language Media*. Prior to his doctoral research, Dr. Chávez worked for ten years as an advertising executive at TBWA Chiat/Day, Goodby, Silverstein & Partners and Publicis & Hal Riney.

Antonio García-Gómez is an Associate Professor of Linguistics at the University of Alcalá de Henares, Madrid (Spain) where he teaches discourse analysis and functional linguistics. He holds a Ph.D. in Linguistics from Universidad Complutense de Madrid. His expertise lies primarily in discourse analysis and discursive psychology. Professor García-Gómez's first and most developed research interest is conflict talk. A main strand of his research has focused on the pragma-discursive strategies employed in conflict-laden episodes in talk-show interaction. Other current research interests include gender, identity and language use in new media. He has published numerous articles and authored two books. Professor García-Gómez was an Honorary Research Fellow at University College London (Department of Psychology). He presents regularly at conferences across Spain and Europe.

Brian Michael Goss was awarded the doctorate degree from the University of Illinois at Urbana's Institute of Communications Research in 2000 where he pursued a concentration in "Politics and Media". He also holds B.A. (Wesleyan University) and M.A. (University of Illinois at Urbana) degrees in Psychology. Since 2001, Dr. Goss has been appointed to the Communication faculty at Saint Louis University-Madrid, Spain Campus and is currently Coordinator of the department. His principle interests as a scholar and in-class instructor revolve around mass media in its many manifestations. He has produced peer reviewed literature on news discourse, film, women's magazines, cartoons, blog comments, editorials, and "think tanks". Dr. Goss is the author of *Global Auteurs: Politics in the Films of Almodóvar, von Trier, and Winterbottom* (2009, New York: Peter Lang) and *Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the Twenty First Century* (2013, New York: Peter Lang).

Francisco Seoane Pérez is Assistant Professor in Political Communication at the Faculty of Journalism, University of Castilla-La Mancha, Cuenca Campus. He holds a Ph.D. in Communications Studies from the University of Leeds (2011), an M.A. in Communication from the University of Illinois at Chicago (2006), and a B.A. in Journalism and Mass Communications from the University of Santiago de Compostela (2001). His academic interests are the role of journalism in democracy, the European public sphere, and the impact of the Internet on political engagement. He is associate editor for the *International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics*.

Arne Saeys is a Ph.D. Candidate in Film Studies at the University of Southampton, United Kingdom. Previously, he has been adjunct faculty at Saint Louis University-Madrid, Spain Campus, Marie Curie Early Stage Researcher at the Faculty of Communication of the Kadir Has University in Istanbul, Turkey and research assistant at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. He graduated with an M.A. in Social & Cultural Anthropology and an M.A. in Psychology, both from the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. His research interests include globalization, migration, cultural theory, political economy and creative industries.

Pardis Shafafi is a doctoral candidate in Anthropology at the University of Saint Andrews, Scotland. She obtained her Bachelor of Science degree in Anthropology from University College London in 2010. Her current thesis project centers on the narratives of the 1979 Islamic revolution by former communist Iranian activists now living in the (Norwegian) diaspora. It draws on themes of (new) political activism, diaspora networks, collective memory and oral history. Her areas of interest are located within wider contexts of political exile, urban ethnography, (gendered) narratives, identity and agency. She has worked extensively with former political prisoners, translating their works to and from Farsi for an array of purposes ranging from theater productions and memoirs to personal blogs. She also freelances with and conducts research on Iranian human-rights and feminist groups abroad. Most notably and recently, she has worked with the Iran Tribunal and continues to provide editorial and research assistance to this movement on an ongoing basis.

Mateo Szlapek-Sewillo graduated from the University of Adelaide in 2011 with specializations in economics and political science. His thesis, "Who won the 2010 World Cup? Sport, triumph and implications for national identity in contemporary Spain" was directed by Dr. Benito Cao. While considering his next move, Mateo provides academic support to undergraduate students enrolled in the Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Adelaide. His research interests include the politics of identity, Spanish history and the study of state institutions.

Paul Venzo completed a Master of Arts at the University of Melbourne in 2002, and subsequently worked as a researcher and broadcaster with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. He is now appointed as Lecturer with Deakin University in the area of communications and literary studies. His writing has been published both nationally and internationally, appearing in the *Journal of Children's Literature* in Great Britain and the 2009 book of collected essays *Bodies, Theories, Cultures in the Post-Millennial era*. He is currently undertaking a creative writing Ph.D. exploring the poetics of the self-in-translation.

Sompatu Vungthong is a lecturer in the Department of Language Studies at King Mongkut's University of Technology Thonburi in Thailand. She received her B.A. (first class honors) and M.A. in English from Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, and now is working towards her Ph.D. at Macquarie University, Australia. Her research interests cover literature teaching, critical discourse analysis, and semiotics. Some of her

publications are "Media as a Tool of Consumerism in Don DeLillo's *Americana*" in *Thoughts* (2010), "Postmodern Consumerist Condition and its Effects on People in Don DeLillo's *White Noise*" in *Journal of Liberal Arts* (2011) and "Scaffolding as a Bridge to Literature for Science and Engineering Students" in *Journal of Educational and Social Research* (2012). She also co-wrote research articles in *Journal of English Studies* (2011) and the English in Southeast Asia Conference Proceeding (2011).